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Beginning in 2014, high-level German politicians spoke plainly about a more responsible 
and more substantial German foreign policy—including stronger German (military) 
contributions and commitments on the African continent. In light of these public 
statements, three years of mixed policy outcomes have raised questions about the factors 
that determine Germany’s decision making on military engagements in Africa (and 
elsewhere) and the extent to which Germany’s engagement in Africa since 2011 
corresponds with Berlin’s desire to take greater responsibility in matters of global 
security. Anchored in the case studies of Libya and Mali, this thesis argues that within a 
complex interplay of determinants on three inter-related levels, six factors—strategic 
approaches (if applicable), multilateral imperatives, the mission framework, cultural and 
conceptual axioms, domestic politics, and policy-makers—chiefly inform Germany’s 
decision-making process on whether and how German soldiers should be deployed in a 
certain mission. Based on this matrix of considerations, each such participation must be 
externally required, politically desired and indispensable, militarily affordable and 
feasible, and domestically justifiable. The thesis concludes that it is exactly the inter-
related tenets of “empower others,” “being restrained,” and “being responsible” that drive 
German foreign and security policy and contributed to Germany’s active but modest 
military engagements in Africa after Libya. 
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At the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014, high-level politicians spoke 
publicly and plainly about a more “responsible” and a “more active” German foreign 
policy.1 While asking whether Germany does enough to stabilize its “neighborhood,” 
both in Europe’s East and in Africa, Federal President Joachim Gauck argued that 
Germany “should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and 
more decisively if it is to be a good partner,” to maintain an “open world order” and to 
make it fit for the future.2 His thoughts were echoed by Minister of Defense Ursula von 
der Leyen, who claimed that not “indifference” or “to sit tight,” but “commitment and … 
                                                 
1 Niels Annen, “Eine Militarisierung unserer Außenpolitik findet nicht statt [A militarization of our 
foreign policy does not take place],” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft [International policy and 
society], September 14, 2014, http://www.ipg-journal.de/schwerpunkt-des-monats/interventionen/artikel/
detail/eine-militarisierung-unserer-aussenpolitik-findet-nicht-statt-587/; Arvid Bell et al., “Früher, 
entschiedener und substanzieller?: Engagiertes außenpolitisches Handeln und militärische Zurückhaltung 
sind kein Widerspruch [Earlier, more decisive, and more substantial?: Dedicated foreign policy action and 
military restraint do not contradict each other],“ HSFK Standpunkte 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische 
Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2014); Josef Joffe, “Friedensarbeit 2.0: Gauck rüttelt an 
deutschen Selbstgewissheiten – und niemand tobt [Peace Work 2.0: Gauck rocks German self-assurances—
And nobody storms],” Die Zeit, February 6, 2014, http://pdf.zeit.de/2014/07/gauck-rede-aussenpolitik.pdf; 
Hanns W. Maull, “Intervenieren? [Intervene?],” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft [International 
policy and society], September 1, 2014, http://www.ipg-journal.de/schwerpunkt-des-monats/interventionen/
artikel/detail/intervenieren-557/; Rolf Mützenich, “Gemeinsame Erklärungen reichen nicht aus!: Weshalb 
wir in der Außenpolitik statt einer deutschen Kultur der Zurückhaltung eine europäische Kultur der 
Verantwortung brauchen [Joint declarations are not enough!: Why do we need in foreign policy instead of a 
German culture of reticence a European Culture of Responsibility],” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 
[International policy and society], February 10, 2014, http://www.ipg-journal.de/kolumne/artikel/
gemeinsame-erklaerungen-reichen-nicht-aus-255/; Günther Nonnenmacher, “Deutschland und die 
Militäreinsätze: Gaucks Leitfaden [Germany and military interventions: Gauck’s guidelines],” Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, February 1, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/deutschland-und-die-
militaereinsaetze-gaucks-leitfaden-12778867.html; Christian Nünlist, “Mehr Verantwortung?: Deutsche 
Außenpolitik 2014 [More responsibility?: German foreign policy 2014],” CSS Analysen zur 
Sicherheitspolitik 149 (Zürich: Center for Security Studies, 2014).  
2 Joachim Gauck, Germany’s Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms, and Alliances, 




responsibility” are the options for Germany in times of crisis and conflicts. She also 
advocated for a stronger military engagement in Africa—if indicated and necessary.3  
While Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank Walter Steinmeier explicitly emphasized 
a necessary reticence as far as the use of military means is concerned (as part of a 
strategic culture that is skeptical about the efficacy of military force and the ends of war 
in the international system), he also underlined that a “culture of reticence for Germany 
[must] not [become] a culture of ‘refrain from anything’” because “Germany is too big 
simply to commentate on international politics from the sidelines.”4  
The words, if not the deeds, have some recent history in Germany. In January 
2011, as Germany began its fifth term as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security 
Council, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle reassured the international 
community that his country would be a “reliable, responsible, and committed partner.”5 
However, less than three months later, when it came to prove its stance in response to the 
worsening civil war in Libya, Germany opted not to join its NATO allies in voting for the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, which 
approved establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone over the country. Instead, it 
joined India, Brazil, China, and Russia in abstaining. This unprecedented event was one 
                                                 
3 Ursula von der Leyen, Rede der Bundesministerin der Verteidigung anlässlich der 50. Münchner 
Sicherheitskonferenz [Speech by federal minister of defense on the occasion of the 50th Munich Security 
Conference], (Munich: NATO, January 31, 2014), 5, http://www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/4123416/Daten/
3885836/redevdleyensiko2014.pdf; see also Julia Leininger, “Mehr Einsatz in Afrika [More missions in 
Africa],” Die Aktuelle Kolumne (Bonn: German Development Institute, February 11, 2014); Johannes 
Leithäuser, “Mehr Verantwortung für Afrika [More responsibility for Africa],” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, January 26, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/von-der-leyen-plaene-mehr-verantwortung-
fuer-afrika-12770671.html; “Reformulation of Germany’s Foreign Policy towards Active Military 
Engagements Is Likely over the Next Three Years,” IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly, March 20, 2014, 
http://www.janes.com/article/35743/reformulation-of-germany-s-foreign-policy-towards-active-military-
engagements-is-likely-over-the-next-three-years; Ulrike Scheffer and Albrecht Meier, 
“Verteidigungsministerin setzt auf mehr Auslandseinsätze [Defense minister emphasizes more missions 
abroad],” Tagesspiegel, January 27, 2014, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/bundeswehr-
verteidigungsministerin-setzt-auf-mehr-auslandseinsaetze/9386838.html. 
4 Frank Walter Steinmeier, Rede des Außenministers anlässlich der 50. Münchner 
Sicherheitskonferenz [Speech by federal foreign minister on the occasion of the 50th Munich Security 
Conference], February 1, 2014, http://www.riga.diplo.de/contentblob/4118688/Daten/3880778/
Download2014RedeBMSteinmeier.pdf.   
5 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, “Responsibility, Reliability and Commitment: 
Germany in the UN Security Council,” Auswaertiges Amt, January 3, 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2011/110102_DEU_ Sitz_VN_Sicherheitsrat.html. 
 3 
of the most controversial German foreign policy decisions since 1989 and provoked 
vigorous domestic criticism and international concerns about Germany’s potential shift 
toward becoming an unpredictable and nonreliable partner or a return to bad habits of the 
diplomacy prior to 1945.6  
Since then, however, Germany has changed course again. It was not only eager to 
reemphasize its obligation to assume international responsibility,7 but also became 
engaged in more military missions well beyond its borders—especially in Africa—than 
ever before. To the present, German military personnel were active in up to nine such 
African missions as the European Union (EU) training missions in Mali and Somalia, the 
EU Operation Atalanta for protection of humanitarian aid and antipiracy operations at the 
Horn of Africa, and the UN peace support missions in Sudan and South Sudan. Six of 
                                                 
6 Sarah Brockmeier, “Germany and the Intervention in Libya,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 
55, no. 6 (2013): 63–90, http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/ 10.1080/
00396338.2013.862937; Joschka Fischer, “Deutsche Außenpolitik: Eine Farce [German foreign policy: A 
farce],” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 24, 2011, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/streitfall-libyen-
einsatz-deutsche-aussenpolitik-eine-farce-1.1075362; “German Foreign Policy: The Unadventurous Eagle,” 
Economist, May 12, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18683155; Helmut Kohl, “‘Wir müssen wieder 
Zuversicht geben:’ Helmut Kohl über eine Außenpolitik, der es an Verlässlichkeit mangelt [We must give 
again confidence: Helmut Kohl about a foreign policy that lacks reliability],” Internationale Politik 
[International politics] 5 (September/October 2011): 10–17; Hanns W. Maull, “Deutsche Außenpolitik: 
Orientierungslos [German foreign policy: Disorientated],” Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft [German 
Journal for Political Science] 21, no. 1 (2011): 95–119; Alister Miskimmon, “German Foreign Policy and 
the Libya Crisis,” German Politics 21, no. 4 (December 2012): 392–410; Constanze Stelzenmüller, 
“Germany’s Unhappy Abstention from Leadership,” Financial Times, March 28, 2011, http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/2490ab8c-5982-11e0-baa8-00144feab49a.html#axzz3F6o3ea00. 
7 See Angela Merkel, Deutschland weiß um seine Verantwortung in der Welt: Rede der 
Bundeskanzlerin anlässlich der Festveranstaltung zu ’50 Jahre Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis’ der Körber-
Stiftung in Berlin am 9. September 2011 [Germany knows about its responsibility in the world: Speech by 
the federal chancellor on the occasion of the gala for ‘50 Years Bergedorfer Circle’ of the Körber 
Foundation in Berlin, September 9, 2011], accessed March 12, 2015, http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/
ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reden/2011/09/2011-09-09-rede-merkel-au%C3%9Fen-u-
sicherheitspolitik.html; Angela Merkel, Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich der Tagung 
des zivilen und militärischen Spitzenpersonals der Bundeswehr in der Akademie der Bundeswehr für 
Information und Kommunikation [Speech by Federal Chancellor Merkel on the occasion of the convention 
of civilian and military top staff members of the Bundeswehr at the Bundeswehr Academy for Information 
and Communication], October 22, 2012, http://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/
Reden/2012/10/2012-10-22rede-merkel-bundeswehr.html. 
 4 
these nine engagements were first approved in 2011 or later, that is, after Berlin 
refocused on Africa.8  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The mixed and ambivalent policy outcomes since 2011 raise the urgent question 
about contemporary German military engagement in general, and particularly, in Africa: 
what are the main determining factors that explain whether and how Germany has 
engaged militarily in certain missions in Africa, yet not in other cases of crisis and 
conflict since 2011? In doing so, this study analyzes the character of German foreign and 
security policy on the continent of Africa with a particular focus on the decision for 
participation in military interventions in a collection of case studies that have received 
little scholarly attention. 
On the macro level, this study also examines the following question: how does 
German military engagement in Africa after Libya (and particularly since beginning of 
2014) correspond with—and must be understood in relation to—Berlin’s stance for a 
(more) responsible foreign and security policy? Thus, the present thesis provides 
explanatory approaches for guiding principles that shape Germany’s position and 
behavior in matters of foreign and security affairs—in Africa and elsewhere as well as 
regarding the use of military force and other policies. 
                                                 
8 “Einsatzzahlen: Die Stärke der deutschen Einsatzkontingente [Mission Numbers: The Strenght of 
German Mission Contingents],” Bundeswehr, updated May 18, 2015, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/
a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/
04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3UzLzixNSSKiirpKoqMSMnNU-
_INtREQD2RLYK/. The German participation to the EU civil-military advisory and support mission 
EUSEC RD Congo ended after nine years on September 30, 2014. The mission EUFOR RCA ended after 
11 months on March 23, 2015. And the military contribution to the martime capacity building mission 
EUCAP NESTOR ended on April 2015. See “Closing Ceremony of EUFOR RCA,” European Union 
External Action Service, March 23, 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-
rca/news/archives/20150323_en.htm; “Demokratische Republik Kongo [Democratic Republic of Congo]—
EUSEC RD Congo,” BMVg, updated September 30, 2014, http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/
a/einsatzbw/!ut/p/c4/LclBDoMwDAXRs3CBeN9dbwHdWE7yFaJQG8UpSJy-
VKpm9TT0ojuVoxYZ1VQ2mmlJ9RHPEM8MRlWXcd2UWOBp3cwd-
h8YF0LG21rnjp2babGAjyNxz5x-pL09py-aZ9F0/; “Die EU-geführte zivile Mission am Horn von Afrika 






The evolution of German foreign and security policy after the Cold War can be 
seen best in the “political and geographical dissolution of boundaries” of military 
engagement amid a changed domestic political environment as well as an international 
system in which war has reasserted its place.9  
Framed by a controversial political, scholarly, and public discussion about role 
and mission of German armed forces after the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr has 
gradually transformed from the bulwark of continental forward defense in the Cold War 
mode into an instrument to guarantee Germany’s “capability for action in the field of 
foreign policy.”10  
Germany’s multilateral out-of-area engagements began in a policy of small steps 
and ranged from humanitarian aid and peacekeeping support in Cambodia and Somalia in 
the early 1990s, through the breakthrough peace-enforcing operations in the Balkans in 
the mid to later 1990s, protection of maritime routes against piracy at the Horn of Africa, 
to the participation in the Afghan war—with or without a clear UN mandate.11  
                                                 
9 Sven Bernhard Gareis, “Militärische Beiträge zur Sicherheit [Military contributions to security],” in 
Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse [German security policy: 
Challenges, actors, and processes], 2nd ed., ed. Stephan Böckenförde and Sven Bernhard Gareis (Opladen, 
Germany: Verlag Barbara Buderich, 2014), 116; Johannes Varwick, “Bundeswehr,” in Handbuch zur 
deutschen Außenpolitik [Handbook for German foreign policy], ed. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, 
and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 246. 
10 Federal Ministry of Defense, The White Paper 2006: On German Security Policy and the Future of 
the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), 53; Sven Bernhard Gareis, “Militärische 
Auslandseinsätze und die Transformation der Bundeswehr [Military missions abroad and the 
transformation of the Bundeswehr],” in Deutsche Außenpolitik: Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und 
Normen [German foreign policy: Security, welfare, institutions, and norms], 2nd ed., ed. Thomas Jäger, 
Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2011), 148–70; Hans J. 
Gießmann and Armin Wagner, ed., Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer 
Beteiligung der Bundeswehr [Armed forces on a mission: Principles, strategies, and results of Bundeswehr 
participation] (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); Ulf von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher 
Außenpolitik [The Bundeswehr as an instrument of German foreign policy] (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013), 
167–363.  
11 Bernhard Chiari and Magnus Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Wegweiser zur 
Geschichte [Missions abroad of the Bundeswehr: Historical guidebook] (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 
2010); Gießmann and Wagner, ed., Armee im Einsatz [Armed forces in mission]; Stefan Mair, ed., 
Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräumen und Lehren [Missions abroad of 
the Bundeswehr: Guiding questions, freedom to decide, and lessons] (Berlin: German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, 2009); Germany participated with war planes in the NATO Operation 
Allied Force in former Yugoslavia from March 1999 until June 1999 without a UN mandate. See Gareis, 
“Militärische Beiträge zur Sicherheit [Military contributions to security],” 156–58. 
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This change of policy broke with the NATO centric focus of the Bundeswehr 
from 1955 until 1990 that resisted any attempt by, say, the French, the Dutch, the British, 
or the Americans to be drawn into postcolonial wars, or “out of area” operations (i.e., 
Korea, Vietnam, the 1970s Middle East, and so on) that would diminish the defenses of 
Central Europe. Throughout its increasingly self-confident evolution, however, Germany 
also decided not to deploy troops to several UN-led missions, particularly in Africa, as 
well as to some NATO, EU, or coalition-led missions, such as in Iraq in 2003, in Chad 
and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2007–2008, and most recently in Libya in 
2011. This had happened regardless of whether a UN mandate existed or whether 
Germany had agreed before to establish those military missions.12   
Diplomats, policy planners, decision-makers, and scholars alike are consternated 
when a state does not behave according to their expectations of it, in part determined or at 
least inflected by its own commitments.13 Predictability and coherence become even 
more critical in international relations when the engagement of military forces is 
concerned. Still having one of the largest armed forces in Europe, Germany continuously 
faces demands by allies and partners for more substantial contributions to military 
operations, as well as criticism for insufficient spending on its military capabilities.  
The majority of the few analyses that aimed to explain German decisions on 
military intervention, however, often remained generic or stressed single factors rather 
than the complexity of, and the linkage between, many determinants that are especially 
                                                 
12 Even if it had not prevented missions of UN, NATO, and EU, between 1990 and 2011, Germany 
agreed in 17 cases to establish a military mission, but decide afterwards not to contribute to them. The 
majority of the cases (13) relate to relatively small UN missions, mainly in Africa. For more details see 
Klaus Brummer, Die Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik: Die Große Koalition, ‘Governmental Politics’ und 
Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr [The domestic policy of the foreign policy: The grand 
coalition,“governmental politics,“ and missions abroad of the Bundeswehr] (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 
2013), 21; Deutscher Bundestag, Schriftliche Fragen: mit den in der Woche vom 4. April 2011 
eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung [Written questions with response of the federal 
government on April 4, 2011], Drs. 17/5422 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, August 26, 
2011), 5–9, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/054/1705422.pdf; Von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als 
Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik [The Bundeswehr as an instrument of German foreign policy], 357; 
Regarding the European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR, it should be noted that Germany, like the 
United Kingdom, despite an UNSC resolution and the implementation of the Joint Action by the Council of 
the European Union, decided not deploy any troops into the theater and instead only contributed with four 
soldiers at the operational headquarters in France. 
13 Oliver Schmitt, “Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Actions,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 32, no. 1 (2012): 59. 
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germane and useful to the German case at hand. Because public, political, and scholarly 
debate alike have been concentrated on German engagement in the Afghan war, analyses 
for other regions and missions, such as in Africa, also are lacking. This thesis fills these 
gaps by presenting a synthetic explanatory model of the determining factors that shape 
and influence German policy decisions on participation or nonparticipation in military 
interventions in Africa, and elsewhere. 
Focusing on the two recent Africa-related cases, the present work analyzes 
whether the decisions chiefly resulted from the specifics of the case, reflecting 
Germany’s search for its own security policy identity hinging on national interests, or 
whether the decisions were based on patterns that reflect continuing paradigms, evolving 
qualities, and inherent contradictions of contemporary German foreign and security 
policy.14 Consequently, this thesis broadens the view of determinants that shape German 
policy decisions, promotes a better understanding of the significance of military 
inventions as an instrument of German foreign and security policy, and serves to classify 
future governmental decision more accurately. 
The analysis of the current relationship between Africa and Germany is 
particularly important for several reasons. First, a clear majority of all ongoing EU-led 
Common and Security Defense Policy (CSDP) and UN missions are conducted on the 
African continent.15 Committing itself to pursue security objectives and interests only in 
multilateral cooperation, German military participation reflects this intensified 
international engagement.16 The present work reveals whether and to which extent 
                                                 
14 For the argument that Germany is still searching for its security policy [“sicherheitspolitischer 
Suchprozess”) see Klaus Naumann, Einsatz ohne Ziel?: Die Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen 
[Missions with objectives?: The political indigence of the military] (Bonn: Hamburger Edition, 2010), 27. 
15 “CDSP Map: Mission Chart,” ISIS Europe, updated October 2014, http://www.csdpmap.eu/
mission-chart; “CSDP Note: Overview Ongoing CSDP Missions,” International Security Information 
Service Europe, updated October 2004, http://isis-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CSDP-Overview-
October-2014.pdf; “Peace Operations 2013/2014,” zif-berlin, accessed October 17, 2014, http://www.zif-
berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/
ZIF_World_Map_Peace_Operations_2013.pdf.  
16 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests—
Assuming International Responsibility—Shaping Security Together (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 
2011), 5, 11. 
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decisions on military engagement or nonengagement were mainly driven by external, 
internal, or actor-related factors.  
Second, a comprehensive strategic German understanding of its interests in, and 
relations with, Africa is relatively new. Although broadly active in Africa in the deeds of 
Lettow Vorbeck or Rommel, Germany has no coherent or unitary Africa strategy before 
2011; in contrast, the inaugural 2011 strategy has already been updated—in mid-2014.17 
Thus, the examination of German military engagement since 2011 provides a deeper 
understanding of how these policies have been implemented in reality in terms of security 
politics as well as whether and how they have affected the decisions in reality.  
Moreover, amid the proclaimed change of the African continent’s nature from 
“hopeless” to “rising,”18 discussions about Germany’s international role either as a 
“Europe’s central power,”19 as a “shaping power,”20 or as a “geo-economic power,”21 
were accompanied by some scholarly claims that Germany may better fit to assume a 
more active role in Africa than other European powers because of its marginal colonial 
                                                 
17 Bundesregierung, Deutschland und Afrika: Konzept der Bundesregierung [Germany and 
Africa: Concept of the federal government] (Berlin: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2011), 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/581096/publicationFile/155321/110615-Afrika-
Konzept-download.pdf; Bundesregierung, Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung [Political 
Guidelines of the Federal Government Regarding Africa] (Berlin: Bundesregierung, 2014), 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Anlagen/2014/05/2014-05-21-afrikapolitische-
leitlinien.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.  
18 “Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent,” Economist, March 2, 2013, http://www.economist.com/
news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-
august; “Hopeless Africa,” Economist, May 11, 2000, http://www.economist.com/node/333429. 
19 Rainer Baumann, “Deutschland als Zentralmacht [Germany as central power],” in Handbuch zur 
deutschen Außenpolitik [Handbook for German foreign policy], ed. Sigmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, 
and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 62–72; German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, and German Marshall Fund of the United States, Neue Macht—Neue 
Verantwortung: Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch [New 
power—New responsibility: Elements of a German foreign and security policy in a world in change] 
(Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2013), 9, http://www.swp-berlin.org/
fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhpol_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf.  
20 Bundesregierung, Globalisierung gestalten—Partnerschaften ausbauen—Verantwortung teilen 
[Shape globalization—Expand partnerships—Share responsibility] (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, 2012), 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/608384/publicationFile/169965/
Gestaltungsmaechtekonzept.pdf. 
21 Hans Kundnani, “Germany as a Geo-Economic Power,” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 3 (Summer 
2011): 31–45. 
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history.22 Thus, the present work provides insights into whether Germany’s engagements 
in Africa since 2011 adequately reflect Germany’s role, its increased international 
weight, and its aspirations to shoulder more responsibility in global security. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Questions of “why states intervene, when, where, and how lie at heart of 
international relations,” but also significantly drive the social and historical sciences.23 
However, influenced by the continuing widespread “societal indifference”24 concerning 
the armed forces and the tendentious lack of a strategic debate about foreign, security, 
and defense policy in Germany,25 the scholarly work on German military engagements 
with particular focus on regions and missions does not belong to the mainstream of 
contemporary security studies. Hence, the factors that determine Germany’s participation 
or nonparticipation in military interventions, and particularly in Africa, must be analyzed 
within the framework of general principles and sources of contemporary German foreign 
                                                 
22 Stefan Mair and Denis M. Tull, Deutsche Afrikapolitik: Eckpunkte einer Strategischen 
Neuausrichtung [Germany’s Africa policy: Key parameters of a strategic reorientation] (Berlin: German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
products/studien/2009_S10_mrs_tll_ks.pdf.  
23 Wilhelm Mirow, Strategic Culture Matters: A Comparison of German and British Military 
Interventions since 1990, Forschungsberichte International Politik 38 (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2009), 1. 
24 On occasion of the commanders’ convention of the Bundeswehr in October 2005, then–Federal 
President of Germany, Horst Köhler, spoke about a “friendly indifference” of German society towards its 
own armed forces and called for broad societal debate not over the Bundeswehr, but over German foreign, 
security, and defense policy. Horst Köhler, Einsatz für Freiheit und Sicherheit: Rede von Bundespräsident 
Horst Köhler bei der Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr am 10. Oktober in Bonn [Commitment for 
peace and security: Speech by Federal President Horst Köhler at the convention of the Bundeswehr 




25 Christopher Daase and Julian Junk, “Strategische Kultur und Sicherheitsstrategien in Deutschland 
[Strategic culture and security strategies in Germany],” Sicherheit und Frieden [Security and peace] 30, no. 
3 (2012): 153; Gareis, “Militärische Beiträge zur Sicherheit [Military contributions to security],” 143; Hans 
J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner, “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr [Missions Abroad of the 
Bundeswehr],” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte [From politics and contemporary history] 48 (November 
2009): 7; Michael Rühle, “In was für einer Welt leben wir?: Sicherheitspolitische Folgerungen aus einer 
globalisierten Welt [In what a world do we live?: Security policy conclusions from a globalized world],” in 
Bewährungsproben einer Nation: Die Entsendung der Bundeswehr ins Ausland [Litmus test of a nation: 
The deployment of the Bundeswehr into foreign countries], ed. Christoph Schwegmann (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2011), 22–24; Varwick, “Bundeswehr,” 247; Von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument 
deutscher Außenpolitik [The Bundeswehr as an instrument of German foreign policy], 337–39. 
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and security policy and their alleged continuation, modification, or alteration. Several 
factors, which include considerations of the role and relevance of the Bundeswehr in 
international affairs, dominate the scholarly debate. They include the strategic culture and 
the conception of national role, competing international and domestic imperatives and 
constraints, national interests, and national decision-makers. 
1. Continuing the “Culture of Restraint” or Becoming a “Normal Ally”? 
Whether the literature refers to “political culture” or “political-military culture,” 
all concepts of strategic culture focus on a body of norms, ideas, attitudes, and practices, 
shared by both elites and society, that shapes, under domestic and external influences, a 
persistent set of preferences and “internal predispositions” for achieving security and 
defense objectives.26 These strategically prioritized options include orientations for role, 
relevance, and efficacy of the use of force in international affairs.27  
Proponents of this “continuation” school of thought argue that Germany’s 
strategic “culture of reticence,”28 the symptoms and causes of which include an aversion 
to unilateralism and a deep skepticism on the use of armed forces, influenced and 
persistently affects decision making and opinions while addressing international crises 
                                                 
26 John S. Duffield framed the term “political culture,” whereupon Thomas U. Berger introduced his 
analytical concept of a “political-military culture.” The thesis will make use of the more common term of 
“strategic culture” as introduced by Kerry Longhurst and others. See John S. Duffield, “Why Germany 
Confounds Neorealism,” International Organizations 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 765–803; Thomas U. 
Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 15–19; Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of 
German Security Policy, 1990–2003 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 17. See also John 
Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?,” International Studies Review 
11 (2009): 530; Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest of a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on 
Security and Defense in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20. Moreover, this 
thesis does not intend to participate within the ongoing scholarly controversy about definitions and the 
effects of strategic culture as an independent variable on a state’s behavior. For an overview of the 
discussion, see Tobias M. Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited: Link the Past to Contemporary 
German Strategic Choices, Forschungsberichte International Politik 36 (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007), 17–24. 
For the “internal predispositions” of a country and the linkage with conditions of the external environment, 
see Wolfram Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External 
and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review 61, no. 4 (December 
1967): 971. 
27 Alastair Lain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 
1995): 46; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 17; Mirow, Strategic Culture Matters, 6–7. 
28 Duffield, “Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” 788. Sometimes also named “Culture of 
Restraint.” See Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Force: ‘Total War,’ the 
‘Culture of Restraint,’ and the Quest for Normality,” German Politics 10, no. 1 (April 2001): 61–82.  
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and conflicts, all of which is a legacy of the epoch 1945–1989 in the development of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in this period.29 They claim that the persistent cultural-
normative dictates are most visible in Germany’s reluctant and only slowly evolving 
participation in multilateral, out-of-area missions since unification.30 Although gradually 
expanding the nature, scope, and geography of military engagements as the result of the 
imperative to slowly change what had been until 1990 a central tenet of political life and 
the international order, Germany’s decision-makers and public alike maintained their 
preference for political and more or less nonviolent resolutions of conflict and for 
military means only as a last resort.31  
In contrast to this careful adaptation of German strategic culture to increased 
external commitments under continued domestic antimilitary sentiments, proponents of 
                                                 
29 For an overview of detailed features of Germany’s strategic culture, see Longhurst, Germany and 
the Use of Force, 17, 47; Schmitt, “Strategic Users of Culture,” 65; Björn Conrad and Mario Stumm, 
German Strategic Culture and Institutional Choice: Transatlanticism and/or Europeanism?, Trierer 
Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik (Trier, Germany: Lehrstuhl für Außenpolitik und Internationale 
Beziehungen, 2004), 32–33. 
30 Study examples on impacts of strategic culture on decisions for German participation or 
nonparticipation in military interventions can be found in Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited and 
Baumann and Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Force.” For specific case studies for German military 
engagement in Africa, see Schmitt, “Strategic Users of Culture”; Mirow, Strategic Culture Matters; Sandra 
Pillath, Motive und Rollenkonzepte deutscher Außenpolitik: Die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr im 
Kongo und Libanon [Motives and role concepts of German foreign policy: Missions abroad of the 
Bundeswehr in the Congo and Lebanon], Studien zur Internationalen Politik, ed. August Pradetto, Anette 
Jünemann, and Michael Staack (Hamburg: Institut für Internationale Politik an der Helmut-Schmidt-
Universität, 2008), 39–60. 
31 Schmitt, “Strategic Users of Culture”; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force; Mirow, Strategic 
Culture Matters; Kai Oppermann, “National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints and the New 
‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: The Eurozone Crisis, Libya and Beyond,” German Politics 21, no. 
4 (December 2012): 509; Robert von Rimscha, “Ein Land tut sich schwer: Bundeswehr-Einsätze seit 1991 
[A country struggles: Missions abroad of the Bundeswehr since 1991],” in Bewährungsproben einer 
Nation: Die Entsendung der Bundeswehr ins Ausland [Litmus test of a nation: The deployment of the 
Bundeswehr into foreign countries], ed. Christoph Schwegman (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011), 73. 
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“change” school of thought see significant and structural adaptations.32 Germany’s 
participation in the NATO air campaign in the former Yugoslavia without a UN mandate 
in 1999, the unilateral abstention from several international military operations since 
2003, and especially the commitment in the Afghan war after 2001, marked turning 
points and contributed to unprecedented shifts in the general outlines of German foreign 
policy. As a result, Germany’s policies toward military engagements became not only 
more self-confident, but also more ambiguous.33   
Originally related to, and still mainly focused on, foreign policy decision-
makers,34 conceptions of national role encompass societal shared “beliefs or images 
about the identity of the state.”35 These images include definitions of “appropriate 
                                                 
32 Longhurst argues that Germany’s strategic culture has not changed, but successfully adapted after 
the end of the Cold War. Overhaus, Harnisch, and Katsioulis argue that the “culture of restraint” continued 
even after the increase of participation in military interventions, but the ties between Germany and its allies 
have loosened. Baumann and Hellmann, however, argue that specifically the increased participation of 
Germany in multilateral mission illustrates not a mere adaptation to an evolving international environment, 
but a significant or even structural change. Roos, and Guérot and Leonard have recently supported this 
analysis. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 147; Marco Overhaus, Sebastian Harnisch and 
Christos Katsioulis, “Schlussbetrachtung: Gelockerte Bindungen und eigene Wege der deutschen 
Sicherheitspolitik? [Conclusions: Loosened Relations and the Own Way of German Security Policy],” in 
Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder [German security policy: A record of the 
Schröder government], ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Christos Katsioulis, and Marco Overhaus (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2004), 253; Baumann and Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Force,” 20; Ulrich Roos, 
“Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung: Zwischen ernüchterndem Idealismus und realpolitischem 
Weltordnungsstreben [German Foreign Policy After the Reunification: Between Illusioning Idealism and 
Real-Political Strive for Global Governance],” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 19, no. 2 (2012): 
33; Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, “The New German Question: How Europe Can Get the Germany It 
Needs,” ECFR Policy Brief (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 6. 
33 Duffield, “Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” 787–89; Conrad and Stumm, German Strategic 
Culture and Institutional Choice, 63; Von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik 
[The Bundeswehr as an instrument of German foreign policy], 352; Wolfgang Ischinger, “Germany after 
Libya: Still a Responsible Power?,” in All Alone? What U.S. Entrenchment Means for Europe and NATO, 
ed. Tomas Valasek (London: Center for European Reform, 2012), 47–51. As diametric examples are often 
raised Germany’s participation within the NATO Operation Allied Forces, in Serb 1999 and the abstention 
of a participation in the Iraq War, 2003. [Wording is unclear on this sentence: do you mean “Germany’s 
participation within the NATO Operation Allied Forces, in Serbia in 1999 and the abstention from 
participation in the Iraq War, 2003, are often raised as diametric examples.” 
34 K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies 
Quarterly 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 233–309. 
35 Cameron G. Thies, Role Theory and Foreign Policy (Iowa City: University of Iowa, Department of 
Political Science, 2009), 1, 14–15. It should be noted, however, that national role conceptions can be 
contested both among foreign policy decision-makers and between the political elites and the general 
public. See Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflection on Role 
Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2012): 5–24. 
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orientations or functions of … [a] state toward, or in, the external environment.”36 
Emerging throughout the postwar period, the “civilian power” theorem still dominates the 
scholarly discussion and the public understanding of Germany’s foreign policy identity.37 
Framed by the key mottos of “never again,” “never alone,” and “politics before force,” it 
promotes multilateralism, integration, political solutions, and constrained use of force as 
guiding preferences in international affairs.38  
Proponents of the concept argue that increased participation in military 
interventions outside the traditional NATO context of collective defense, as established in 
Articles V and VI did not reflect a fundamental departure from Germany’s foreign and 
security policy identity as “civilian power.” Instead, Germany was able to reconcile 
increased external demands and requirements of a changed security environment with its 
own core values. The continuity of essential paradigms, they claim, would even explain 
unilateral decisions against a participation in Iraq in 2003, Chad/CAR in 2007/2008, or 
Libya in 2011.39 
                                                 
36 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 246. 
37 It should be noted, however, that the concept itself was first framed after the Cold War. Hanns W. 
Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 5 (1990): 91–106. 
Including Japan as civilian power, the concept parallels the cultural approach of “antimilitarism.” See 
Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. 
38 Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?,” Trierer Arbeitspapiere 
zur Internationalen Politik 2 (Trier: Lehrstuhl für Außenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen, 1999), 4–
9, http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/tazip/tazip2.pdf.   
39 Hanns W. Maull, “Außenpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Krisenzeiten [Foreign policy 
decision-making processes in times of crisis],” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte [From politics and 
contemporary history] 62, no. 10 (March 2012): 36; Hanns W. Maull, “Deutschland als Zivilmacht 
[Germany as a civil power],” in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik [Handbook for German foreign 
policy], ed. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 82; Hanns W. Maull, “‘Normalisierung’ oder Auszehrung?: Deutsche 
Außenpolitik im Wandel [‘Normalization’ or depletion?: German foreign policy in a state of flux],” Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte [From politics and contemporary history] B11 (2004): 19–23; Mirow, Strategic 
Culture Matters, 75; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine ‘neue’ deutsche 
Außenpolitik? [Continuity through change: A ‘new’ German foreign policy?],” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte [From politics and contemporary history] B11 (2004): 31. Proponents of the civilian power 
theorem argue that these unilateral deviations from the concepts could be explained as unique, contextual-
based exemptions, but do not question the validity of the entire concept as such.  
 14 
Yet, another scholarly stream contests the applicability of “civilian power” as a 
guideline for contemporary and future German foreign and security policy.40 In this 
view, Germany, beginning with red-green coalition under Federal Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder from 1998 until 2005, underwent a progressive but dramatic change of its 
foreign policy identity toward becoming a “normal ally.”41 This normalization manifests 
itself in increased aspirations to shoulder more responsibility, including participation in 
military interventions, but also in a much more emancipated, self-confident weighing 
between national interests and external expectations.42 As a normal country, Germany 
considers contributions to military interventions as a basic requirement for its security 
policy, but is also able to oppose them.43 
                                                 
40 Dieter Dettke, “Deutschland als europäische Macht und Bündnispartner [Germany as a European 
power and alliance partner],” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte [From politics and contemporary history] 15-
16 (April 2009): 45; Werner Link, “Vom Elend des ‘offensiven Idealismus:’ Eine Antwort auf Hellmanns 
‘Traditionslinie‘ und ‘Sozialisationsperspektive’ [From the misery of an ‘offensive idealism’: A response to 
Hellmann’s ‘line of tradition’ and ‘perspective of socialization’],” WeltTrends 12, no. 3 (2004): 49. 
41 Oppermann, “National Role Conceptions.” 
42 Gunther Hellmann, Reinhard Wolf, and Siegmar Schmidt, “Deutsche Außenpolitik in historischer 
und systematischer Perspektive [German foreign policy in a historical and systematical perspective],” in 
Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik [Handbook for German foreign policy], ed. Sigmar Schmidt, 
Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 36–37; 
Gunther Hellmann, “Das neue Selbstbewusstsein deutscher Außenpolitik und die veränderten Standards der 
Angemessenheit [The new self-confidence of German foreign policy and the changed standards of 
appropriateness],” in Deutsche Außenpolitik [German foreign policy], 2nd ed., ed. Thomas Jäger, 
Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft 2011), 735–58; Roos, 
“Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung [German foreign policy after reunification], 33–34; 
Oppermann, “ National Role Conceptions,” 506–507, 514; Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited, 12–
13; Martin Wagner, Auf dem Weg zu einer ‘normalen’ Macht?: Die Entsendung deutscher Streitkräfte in 
der Ära Schröder [On the way to a ‘normal’ power?: The deployment of German armed forces in the 
Schröder Era], Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 8 (Trier: Lehrstuhl für Außenpolitik und 
Internationale Beziehungen, 2004), 2. It should be noted, however, that some scholars refuse the concept of 
normalization. Their critique focuses on the question concerning appropriate parameters to compare the 
nature and the evolution of German foreign and security policy and demand a more nuanced perspective. 
See Sebastian Harnisch and Kerry Longhurst, “Understanding Germany: The Limits of ‘Normalization‘ 
and the Prevalence of Strategic Culture,“ in German Culture, Politics, and Literature into the Twenty-First 
Century: Beyond Normalization, ed. Stuart Taberner and Paul Cooke (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 
2006), 50; Stefan Fröhlich, “Herausforderungen der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik bis 2030: 
Grundlegende Problemstellungen [Challenges of German foreign and security policy until 2030: General 
problems],” Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 5, no. 3 (2012): 404–405. For a critique to apply 
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Außenpolitik [The Bundeswehr as an instrument of German foreign policy], 245–46. 
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2. Reflexive Multilateralism or Domestic Politics? 
These thoughts echo in the literature of Germany’s foreign and security policy the 
refrain of “two-level logic,”44 arguing that paradigms and decisions alike, including those 
for the deployment of military forces, are shaped, incentivized, and constrained by both 
international and domestic imperatives and conditions. Depending on the context, 
however, international and domestic conditions may not only contradict themselves, but 
also their impact on policy choices may vary,45 which causes inconsistent behavior.  
Some scholars of the question contend that international demands and 
responsibilities still decisively influence, or even dominate, German foreign and security 
policy, including Berlin’s decisions on participation in military interventions.46 Chief 
among the external expectations of Germany’s allies and partners since unification in 
1990 have been the promotion of a European integration; burden-sharing within the 
transatlantic and European cooperation; and the translation of Germany’s economic-
political heft into more global responsibility, including commitments in military 
missions, so as to end the Federal Republic’s “check-book diplomacy”47 (noticeable in 
the 1990–1991 Gulf War) as well as its much storied security free-riding—an old saw 
                                                 
44 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
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Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik [The Bundeswehr as an instrument of German foreign policy], 16. 
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the UK,” European Security 23, no. 3 (2014): 3-4; Bernhard Rinke, “Die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr 
im Parteienstreit [Missions abroad of the Bundeswehr in party controversy],” in Armee im Einsatz: 
Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr [Armed forces on a mission: 
Principles, strategies, and results of Bundeswehr participation], ed. Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner 
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47 Longhurst, “Germany and the Use of Force,” 148–49. 
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going back to the early days of the Cold War.48 These expectations were reflected in 
Germany’s normative and practical imperative to organize and implement foreign and 
security policy exclusively within multilateral frameworks, as all relevant strategic 
documents and government declarations repeatedly emphasize.49  
This strong emphasis on the principle of collective action, Markus Kaim argues 
however, narrows Germany’s room for manoeuver in international affairs, creating a 
“multilateralism trap.”50 Accordingly, after a collective decision for participation in 
NATO or the EU, Germany could not refuse to contribute substantially, even if the 
domestic context may prefer such nonparticipation.51 Thus, as a kind of “reflexive 
multilateralism,”52 Germany participates, and continues to be engaged, in missions that 
may not be justified by national interests or for which a broad political and public 
consensus may not exist. Political debates and public opinion surveys concerning military 
                                                 
48 Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung, 
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Society 112, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 88–91; Hans-Ulrich Klose and Ruprecht Polenz, “Wahre Werte, falsche 
Freunde: Deutschlands Partner sitzen im Westen—eine Erinnerung aus gegebenem Anlass [True values, 
false friends: Germany’s partners are sitting in the West—A reminder in view of the occasion],” 
Internationale Politik [International Politics] 5 (September/October 2011): 18, https://zeitschrift-
ip.dgap.org/de/article/getFullPDF/19141.  
49 Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006, 5–8; Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy 
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in a multilateralism trap?],” in Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräumen 
und Lehren [Missions Abroad of the Bundeswehr: Guiding Questions, Freedom to Decide, and Lessons], 
ed. Stefan Mair (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), 43-44. See also Von 
Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik [The Bundeswehr as an instrument of 
German foreign policy], 356; Gießmann and Wagner, “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr [Missions abroad 
of the Bundeswehr],” 7. 
51 Kaim, “Deutsches Interesse versus Bündnisverpflichtung [German interests versus alliance 
solidarity],” 177. 
52 Roos, “Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung [German foreign policy after reunification],” 
33. 
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interventions in the Balkans, Africa, and Afghanistan from the late 1990s until 2010 seem 
to support these claims.53 
Although Germany has maintained its preference for multilateral cooperation, 
other scholars argue that the nature of its multilateralism has changed. Embedded in 
gradual shifts of Germany’s foreign and security policy self-conception, including a 
heightened sense of self-confidence and responsibility,54 German multilateralism, they 
postulate, has become more pragmatic, selective, and instrumental.55 The reticence to 
participate in missions in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 may reflect a certain 
resistance to external expectations of unquestioning multilateralism.  
In contrast to the international dimension of Germany’s two-level logic, another 
scholarly group sees a “domestic politicization”56 of German foreign policy because 
electoral considerations, party and coalition politics, and public opinion increasingly 
                                                 
53 For role and relevance of external demands and internal alliance solidarity in contrast to the political 
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“Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung [German foreign policy after reunification],” 33–34. 
56 Oppermann, “National Role Conceptions,” 509.  
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influence and contest foreign policy choices.57 Because the preservation of office 
concerns these leaders most fundamentally, decision-makers attentively and continually 
monitor the preferences of the German public and the mainstream media for direction in 
military solutions, aligning their behavior with the popular mood to avoid any harmful 
repercussions to their electoral prospects.58 The general skepticism of the German public 
toward international deployments of the Bundeswehr—particularly if they involve high-
intensity combat missions, as in Afghanistan59—appeals to decision-makers and 
parliamentarians alike, framing, constraining, and mediating their attitudes toward, and 
decisions about, the use of military means as an instrument in political affairs. Hence, 
public opinion facilitates, if not encourages, ambiguity in the face of critical decisions for 
military interventions. 
Additionally, some scholars argue that Germany’s foreign and security policy has 
become more volatile through the dynamics of party and coalition politics in the recent 
past versus the old order that was obtained in the pre-unified Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG).60 Since unification in 1990, Germany’s executive and legislative 
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branches both represent a more heterogeneous spectrum of foreign policy orientations. 
Whereas a Cold War consensus about security policy operated in the FRG from about the 
middle of the 1950s until 1989, post-unification coalition politics increased the pressure 
for consensus building, resulting in varying or even inconsistent foreign and security 
policy preferences toward military interventions after a governmental change, which 
influences decision-making processes. Furthermore, party politics may restrain 
Germany’s international affairs as they reflect and intensify public debates for 
appropriate foreign policy reactions as well as imposing pressure on key actors within the 
decision-making process.61  
3. National Interests—Which, Where, and How? 
In his speech for the introduction of the new White Paper 2006, then-Minister of 
Defense Franz Josef Jung underlined that German out-of-area missions must correspond 
to the values of the Basic Law—as the Federal Republic’s constitution is called; the 
objectives and responsibilities of international commitments; and national interests.62 
The orientation toward values and interests as guiding principles for German foreign and 
security policy in general, and in particular for decisions on military engagement, has 
been repeatedly emphasized in all official strategic papers as well as by politicians and 
scholars alike from the birth of such white papers in 1969 until the present.63 However, 
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international relations theory scholarly work rejects an overly generic definition of 
interests in the current policy documents, which fail to distinguish clearly between 
national and multilateral objectives, let alone elucidating when, where, and how Germany 
is willing to pursue them.  
Most importantly, these critics charge that both strategic documents and political 
debates proceed without any coherent or consistent articulation of priorities among these 
interests for support of military engagements in certain preferred mission frameworks.64 
As a consequence, some argue, Germany’s decisions to participate in the ISAF, KFOR, 
or EUFOR Congo missions were not derived from German national interests, as officially 
claimed; rather, these interests were “discovered” immediately before the start of the 
missions to legitimate domestically the deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers.65  
The uncertainty about how to use military force within foreign affairs to pursue 
German national interests in the shadow of the NATO mission in Afghanistan culminated 
in media uproar and intense debate in May 2010, when then-Federal President Horst 
Köhler declared that Germany, as a foreign-trade–dependent country, must protect its 
interests, such as free trade routes, with means up to and including, in extreme cases, the 
military.66 Although clearly referring to interests as stated in the White Paper 2006, a 
document that hardly any citizen of the FRG had ever read, Köhler’s remarks were 
almost completely understood by his outspoken and populist critics as to call to return to 
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German saber-rattling. Köhler ultimately resigned amid the continuing public furor, 
which characterized him as illegitimately promoting military interventions to enforce 
Germany’s economic interests and to militarize German foreign policy.67 Köhler had 
broken taboos about security policy and armed forces, and, at least in the eyes of his 
critics, had exceeded his role as federal president versus the chancellor and, in this case, 
her cabinet. 
4. Policy and Decision Makers—Movers and Shakers? 
Although the literature is divided about the extent to which leaders’ dispositions, 
attitudes, and beliefs rather than situational factors determine their actions, it supports the 
significance of key stakeholders in shaping and changing general foreign policy 
guidelines, as well as their relevance within event-driven decision-making processes.68 
Scholarly work on Germany’s participation or nonparticipation in multilateral military 
operations until 2011—from Yugoslavia in 1999, through Iraq in 2003, to Libya in 
2011—shows that the triad composed of the federal chancellor, minister of foreign 
affairs, and minister of defense significantly influenced the political debate and the 
decision-making. Federal Chancellor Schröder’s emphasis on more self-confidence and 
Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s reluctance to depart from a “culture of restraint” may 
reflect two poles of German strategic thinking, which affected decision making for 
military engagements. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The majority of the literature focuses on the discussion of whether and to what 
extent continuity or change in the axioms of foreign policy explains contemporary 
German foreign and security behavior. The attempts to design approaches for the 
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foundation, function, and scope of German foreign policy predominate. As the 
introduction to the literature review highlighted, however, scholarly work that 
conceptualizes the evolving role and relevance of armed forces and their engagement in 
military interventions as an instrument for German foreign policy is underrepresented. 
Moreover, many analyses remained generic or stressed single factors rather than the 
complexity of and the linkage between external and internal determinants within the 
explanation for a specific policy decision. Among other things, the mission framework 
itself, the influence of current military interventions, and domestic conditions are 
undersold. 
Decisions on participation in military interventions may be single-case political 
answers69 to a set of interacting factors and/or they may reflect deeply ingrained tenets. 
Instead of isolating a predominant single cause, this thesis argues that within a complex 
and unique context for a decision-making process for German military engagements, 
factors on the external, internal, and actor level as well as the interplay between these 
factors determined, to a varying degree, the outcome. By doing so, the present work 
explains persistent and changing paradigms of German foreign policy behavior, but also 
the specifics of the particular case of German policy in Africa. 
On the external level, multilateral commitments to and expectations from allies 
and partners still create important incentives to back military interventions with the 
Bundeswehr. Germany’s changed power position in the international and European 
environment, its economic strength and continued striving, even if carefully pursued, for 
more responsibility in international politics, such as a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), have even increased external demands for a more 
active role in security affairs. The experiences of fallen soldiers and controversies related 
to the long-lasting, cost-intensive Afghan war, however, intensified the immanent 
skepticism of politicians and public alike for contributions in similar scenarios.  
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The nature and framework of potential missions affects the decision-making 
process critically. Given the burdens of ongoing military commitments, limited military 
capacities, and a predominant strategic culture that prefers to avoid risk, military 
endeavors, which are limited in scope, duration, resources, and risks for soldiers on 
ground, receive the broadest political consent and public support. As a result, the majority 
of all new missions in which German troops have been engaged since 2011 include 
contributions to nonlethal training support, peace support operations, or single personnel 
in multinational headquarters. 
In face of a “domestic politicization” of German foreign and security policy, 
factors on the internal level increasingly influence the decision on German militarily 
engagements in Africa. Political contestation and party politics affect voting behavior in 
the parliament and the sensitivity to public skepticism just as electoral concerns constrain 
the attitudes of all political factions toward both the appropriateness and the feasibility of 
a German participation in military interventions. 
Finally, strategic-cultural and conceptual standards influence state actors in 
mitigating between external and internal factors as well as the domestic political debate, 
hence, the decision-making process. With shifting conceptions of Germany’s role and 
changing perceptions of the role, relevance, and efficacy of the use of force, the tensions 
between imperatives of German foreign and security policy intensify, contributing to 
ambiguous and ambivalent policy outcomes. 
Anchored in the case studies of Libya and Mali, this thesis finally argues that 
within a complex interplay of determinants on three interrelated levels, six factors—
strategic approaches (if applicable), multilateral imperatives, the mission framework, 
cultural and conceptual axioms, domestic politics, and policy-makers—chiefly inform 
Germany’s decision-making process on whether and how German soldiers should be 
deployed in a certain mission. 
Magnified by an uncertain and shifting security environment, by the salient 
Afghanistan war experience, and by indecisive notions of interests, the question of how—
under what conditions, in which scenarios, and for what tasks—German soldiers are 
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expected to act plays a dominant role in the decision making by makers of policy as to 
whether Germany should embark on military engagements—in Africa and elsewhere. 
Apart from collective defense efforts, modestly shaped and clearly delineated military 
contributions to such noncombat missions as humanitarian aid, training support, or 
peacekeeping/peace-enforcing operations, will most likely constitute Germany’s foreign 
and security policy touchstone on the use of military force between what is (mainly) 
externally required versus what is politically desired and indispensable, militarily 
affordable and feasible, and domestically justifiable. German participation in wars or in 
war-like operations as in the case of Afghanistan remains and increasingly becomes an 
exception. 
Finally, this study concludes that the active but modest instances of Germany’s 
military engagement in Africa after Libya, and particularly after the beginning of 2014, 
correspond with Berlin’s stance for a more active and responsible foreign and security 
policy in a changed world. Such a policy plays out among three interrelated premises of 
contemporary German foreign and security policy in Africa: “empower others,” “being 
responsible,” and “being restrained.” The duality of the latter two tenets characterizes 
contemporary German foreign and security policy—particularly concerning the use of 
military force. At the same time, the tension between responsibility and restraint 
challenges state actors to find a balance. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To identify reasons and causes of a state’s decision to participate or not to 
participate in an international military intervention, requires investigation of the foreign 
policy decision-making process of the respective state. This thesis combines a historical-
descriptive approach, trying to portray the overall picture of a state’s foreign policy over 
or within certain phases, with an explanatory analysis of foreign and security policy by 
seeking to identify and validate factors that affect national foreign policy and determine 
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the political decisions. The decision-making process itself and the influencing factors 
serve as an explanation for foreign and security policy actions.70  
To provide substance to the analysis, the present work follows the methodology 
of process tracing. Process tracing is a tool of qualitative analysis that seeks to identify 
and draw a causal sequences between one or more independent variable to one dependent 
variable based on qualitative data.71 The core of the study is the extraction of facts 
through text analysis. Governmental sources, such as strategic policies, governmental 
declarations, protocols of parliamentary debates and decisions, and official statements of 
politicians, such as interviews and speeches, will not only serve as primary sources but 
also provide evidence for conditions and changes of governmental as well as individual 
perspectives on military interventions as an instrument in international affairs. Secondary 
sources, such as surveys of public opinion, media releases, and scholarly work, extent 
and deepen the insights.  
The scope of the study encompasses three dimensions.72 Based on text analyses, 
the descriptive dimension provides the narrative of context and sequence of events within 
the decision-making process. The analytical part of each case, the analytical-connecting 
dimension, explains the degree to which each factor influenced the decision and how the 
linkage between them affected the outcome. The final analysis, the comparative-
generalizing dimension, summarizes, compares, and assesses the results of the studies 
within the general context of paradigms for and evolutions in Germany’s decisions on 
participations in military interventions.   
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The thesis encompasses two case studies of contemporary German decisions on 
military engagement in Africa since 2011: Libya and Mali, after having analyzed the 
chief developments in paradigms of German foreign and security policy until 2011. The 
cases, timeframe, and regional selections are based on two relevant aspects. First, the 
thesis seeks to explore the complexity of relevant factors for the decisions on military 
engagements as a potential answer to a new crisis and not to ongoing crisis management. 
Extension of existing mandates for participation in international military missions, even if 
intensively domestically debated, do not completely explain the interactions between 
external and internal factors. Moreover, not one single extension has been refused by the 
German parliament until today. Second, the scholarly work on developments of 
Germany’s international military engagements lacks the analyses of contemporary cases, 
especially in Africa. Starting with the examination in 2011 will also allow for analysis of 
the impact and relevance of the two strategic concepts of the German government for 
Africa.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of five chapters. After this introduction, chapter II introduces 
and elucidates the explanatory model for Germany’s decisions on participation in 
international military interventions, as drawn by the author.  
After a description of the context and an illustration of the sequence of events 
leading to the decisions on participation or nonparticipation, the explanatory model 
serves in chapters III and IV as roster to analyze the influence and significance of each 
determinant, the potential interdependences between them, and the linkages between the 
levels on the respective decision of the German government. Chapter III presents and 
analyzes context and decision-making process under the influence of factors in the 
external, internal, and actor level for the (official) nonparticipation in the NATO 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. Chapter IV repeats the process for the 
German participation within the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) and the 
International Support Mission under African lead (AFISMA) in Mali. Briefly looking at 
the evolution of German military engagement in Africa up to 2015, the conclusion 
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addresses the role of Africa in German strategic thinking and looks forward to the future 
nature of German foreign and security policy under Germany’s aspiration for more 
international responsibility and under a shifting perception concerning the role and 
relevance of the use of military force within it. 
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II. GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONS 
FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS—AN 
EXPLANATORY APPROACH 
For decades political scientists, foreign and security policy experts, and even 
historians have debated which set of factors most determines and influences the foreign 
policy decisions of nation states. Several competing theoretical paradigms stress either 
the importance of structural or material (power) conditions, institutional frameworks, 
domestic political constraints, political-strategic cultures and norms, or personality 
aspects. Whereas the neorealist school of thought still dominates the scholarly discussion, 
there exists today a widely accepted consensus that single-factor approaches lack the 
capacity for explaining political reality comprehensively. Instead, a complex and 
simultaneous interplay of several interlinked—supporting or competing—factors is more 
likely to illuminate the scope, direction, and timing of policy decisions. Such a 
generalization applies especially to German security and defense policies for the reasons 
examined below. 
The controversy about continuity and/or change in Germany’s foreign and 
security policy after 1990 reflects this international scholarly debate.. Explanatory models 
ranged between the poles of a power-political resocialization of Germany, emphasizing 
the maturation and normalization of a rational-calculated and national-interest orientated 
German foreign and security policy after 1990, and the theories of strategic culture and 
national role, stressing the continuing predominance of a civil power–related and military 
force–averse disposition of Germany’s key stakeholders and general public derived from 
the experience of the age of total war.73 This debate has been particularly nourished 
through controversial decisions about Germany’s participation or nonparticipation in 
such international military missions as Iraq in 1990 and 2003, Chad/CAR in 2007/2008, 
or recently Libya in 2011. Accordingly, scholarly work has provided a variety of often 
                                                 
73 For a controversial discussion of power-political resocialization of Germany’s foreign and security 
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single-level or single-factor explanations for these decisions, focusing on either 
structural, institutional, cultural, or actor-related determinants.74 
Instead of isolating a predominant single cause, this thesis examines various 
approaches to German foreign and security policy decisions and introduces a synthetic 
explanatory model to capture the range of determinants that shape policy decisions—on 
German participation in military intervention in Africa, as well as others. In particular, 
the present chapter demonstrates the interdependencies between the three levels and the 
complex linkages between the determinants.  
A. INTEGRATIVE THREE-LEVEL MODEL: INFLUENCES ON GERMAN 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS 
The political analysis of foreign (and security) policy lacks a unifying and 
universally valid theory. During the last five decades, several school of thoughts emerged 
that studied foreign policy, the action of states within the international system, from 
various perspectives and basically established three distinct levels of influence on a 
state’s foreign policy: the international level, the domestic level, and the individual level 
of policy-makers.75 The complexity of different paradigms for the analysis of foreign and 
security policy has brought up integrative and multilayer approaches, trying to 
systematically portray the effects of factors on different levels on foreign policies and 
decisions states.76 
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Starting out from Robert Putnam’s metaphor of a “two-level game,” German 
foreign (and security) policy is formulated and implemented between the poles of the 
international and domestic level, both simultaneously incentivizing and constraining the 
state’s foreign and security policy actors in an interdependent relationship.77 On the 
international level, German foreign and security policy actors basically attempt to achieve 
national interests and to influence the interaction of international political events with the 
governments of other states. The power and interests of their governmental partner will 
primarily restrict their opportunities to act. Simultaneously, governmental representatives 
are urged to mobilize enough political support for their foreign and security policy 
actions on the domestic level, within the executive itself, the parliament, and the general 
public. These requirements limit the opportunities to act for the key state stakeholders on 
the international level as they need to implement a foreign and security policy measure 
within the state-internal process. The primary strategy of German foreign and security 
policy decision-makers thus is to conciliate the imperatives of the two levels so that they 
do not contradict openly.78 
Although an integral part of the domestic level, state actors, in particular 
executive representatives, are key for foreign and security policy, including decisions for 
the deployment of military forces. Functioning as gatekeepers and binding elements 
between the two levels, political state actors finally make collectively binding decisions 
within international relations.79 This thesis therefore extends the two-systems approach—
external and internal—with a study of the actor level.   
This thesis furthermore argues that the three levels, even if distinct definable, are 
not only interdependent, but also internally linked and mutually interpenetrated.80 
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Following this approach, this thesis particularly addresses criticisms on two-level-logic 
analyses, which may lack to identify and to stress to relations between distinct 
determinants within the systems and the potential effects of the interrelations—
reinforcing or contradicting—on the outcomes.81 
Thus, first, across several issue areas of politics, including economy, finances, and 
security, the external and internal system have extended into the other domain and fused, 
thereby diminishing the clear distinction between international affairs and domestic 
politics substantially.82 Second, determinants are mutually dependent, and hence, often 
need to be framed in relation to other factors. The constellation of national interests, for 
example, requires considering the status of the state within the international system, but 
also the key stakeholder’s perception of the state’s role in international affairs. A nation 
state’s strategic culture will not only reflect domestically embedded norms and values, 
but also evolutions and foreign and security experiences in the external system. Likewise, 
the amount of domestic political consensus on the ends and means of foreign policy 
impinges upon which policy concerns receive primary attention, how policy goals are 
formulated, and which options are pursued.83 As a consequence, foreign and security 
policy decisions are a response by political state actors to overlapping impulses or 
contradictions between external and internal referents rather than to single factors.84 
In summary, German decisions on participation in certain military missions can 
fruitfully be analyzed through the lens of an extended, integrative three-level model, 
which incorporates determinants on the external, internal, and actor level (see Figure 1). 
The model presented here likely is applicable to all states. In the German case, however, 
the model well reveals the permanent interplay and the inherent tensions between 
imperatives and determinants of the external and internal level as well as the impact of 
state actors. This complex back-and-forth characterizes German foreign and security 
                                                 
81 For a description of relevant issues, see Peters, “Ansätze und Methoden [Approaches and 
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policy and its evolution, determines decisions on military engagements, and results in the 
divergent, if not contradictory, policy outcomes at issue in this study.85   
 
 Integrative 3-Level Model of Determinants for Decisions on German Figure 1. 
Military Engagement 
B. DETERMINANTS ON THE EXTERNAL LEVEL 
Political science of the early twentieth century gave prominent weight to external 
influences on the foreign policy of states. According this perspective, a state’s foreign 
policy behavior primarily depends on position it occupies amid the international system. 
The role of political and economic power distribution within the international system and 
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the role of international institutions received paramount importance to explain a state’s 
external actions.86 Moreover, the security environment, national interests and strategies, 
the evolution and status of a state’s military engagement, and the anticipated mission 
framework itself are key (and related) determinants that influence and shape German 
decisions for deployment of military forces. The relative impact of all of these factors has 
been historically interlinked with particularities in Germany’s domestic domain, which 
became even more salient, as the two systems increasingly interpenetrated each other. 
1. International Power and Security Environment 
From the perspective of the neorealist school of thought, the distribution of power 
within the international system shapes and constrains a state’s opportunity to act and the 
implementation of its foreign policy. In the absence of an overruling central power, the 
uncertain conditions of an anarchic system structure force states to act as egoistic units in 
a self-help system. Consequently, all states follow system-immanent incentives to 
accumulate those resources that secure their survival: power, security, and autonomy to 
act.87  
The FRG’s power position and security orientation after the World War II was 
determined by its status as a divided frontier-state within the East-West conflict, political 
standards and expectations of the Western allies, and its own efforts to break with its 
National Socialist past. International priority of all West, East, and later unified German 
governments since World War II has been to regain national sovereignty as well as to 
strongly integrate into multilateral Western institutions, hereby, projecting Germany’s 
strong commitment as a reliable, respected, and benign partner and ally. Rooted in the 
raison d’état of the Federal Republic, post–World War II West Germany arose as a state 
that—politically and societally—deliberately renounced strong power politics88 on the 
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“classical” model, for example, the ambition for territorial expansion or for Great Power 
status. Instead West Germany committed itself to formulate and exercise foreign and 
security policy exclusively in political and economic cooperation with other states, based 
on the principle of the rule of law and the welfare of humanity, and with strong 
prioritization of peaceful against violent means in conflict resolution.89 The new armed 
forces, created out of the rigors of the Cold War, were integrated in Euro-Atlantic defense 
in the 1950s. These core paradigms of (West) Germany’s external actions gave rise to the 
societally internalized and politically implemented strategic “culture of reticence” which 
after 1990 became coalesced in the ideal of a “civil power,” both reflecting the domestic-
ideological dimension of Germany’s self-restrained foreign and security policy. 
With the end of the Cold War and the acquisition of its full sovereignty, 
Germany’s position in the international, but especially the European, system changed 
dramatically in a manner that was not immediately apparent in the 1990s. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the gradual expansion of NATO and EU toward the East, shifted 
the reunified Germany back toward the center of an increasingly integrated Europe, 
strengthening its political potential as Europe’s central power.90 Simultaneously, with the 
impact of globalization and a focus on the Asia-Pacific realm to the detriment of 
Europe’s former leading role, Germany gradually evolved to a strong “commercially 
realist”91 or geo-economic power by defining national interest increasingly in economic 
terms, promoting the European political-economic integration, and partaking of an 
intensifying globalization of economic relationships. Economic strength—export-
orientated commerce and trade in high quality manufactures—consolidated as a key 
source of Germany’s international power; it played a dominant role in shaping 
Germany’s foreign and security policy amid the reform of the German social market 
economy in the 1990s in the face of national unity, a single European market, and 
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globalization. Consequently, as post–Cold War Germany has always used economic 
rather than military means to achieve its foreign policy goals, it became increasingly 
dependent on an unhampered international trade and global economic stability.92 
The interdependency between a changing external power structure, intensified 
through the rise of such new powers as China, India, Brazil, and Russia at the close of the 
1990s, and the increasing German power-potential in international affairs, led allies and 
partners to demand that Germany transform its political heft into more global 
responsibility, including commitments in military interventions. This external influence 
remains strong until today.93 To mitigate initial concerns of neighbors and allies about an 
overall powerful, ambitious, and possibly unpredictable Germany (German Sonderweg of 
Schaukelpolitik—swinging between East and West), on the other hand, German 
governments continually emphasized political continuity and that a united and stronger 
Germany remains a trustful and reliable partner who fulfils its obligations of solidarity 
and burden-sharing within the transatlantic alliance and the European cooperation.94 The 
gradual extension in the 1990s of German participation in multilateral military out-of-
area mission under the umbrella of the UN, NATO, and EU reflected these self-
commitments. At the same, however, German foreign and security policy became 
increasingly ambiguous. Despite the self-imposed limitations of autonomous external 
actions based on the imperative of multilateral cooperation, Germany’s foreign and 
security policies and decisions showed a “re-socialization to power-politics” 
(machtpolitische Resozialisierung),95 a cautious and still restrained, but deliberate 
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efficiency enhancement of national power in relation to other states. In a process often 
described as “normalization” or “maturing,” Germany’s foreign and security policy 
gradually evolved into a posture—a shifting national self-image in international affairs—
that reflected a heightened sense of responsibility, self-confidence, national interests, and 
aspiration to shape, including a more rational view on the use of military force in 
international affairs.96  
Besides the distribution of power in the international system, evolutions in the 
security environment influence the decisions on German military engagements. Regional 
or international crises have as “strategic dilemmas” the potential to challenge an existing 
status quo, such as international law and regional or global order, and hence, demand a 
response from the great powers and/or systems of collective security, which may involve 
the use of military force.97 These challenges are strategic as they directly affect foreign 
and security orientations of states and organizations alike. They also are dilemmas as they 
demand attention, but allow a variety of means for a proper response, including those that 
confront national or domestic sentiments. In the case of Germany, these sentiments 
include constitutional challenges or the tensions among the strategic culture of (military) 
reticence, aspirations of more responsibility, national interests, and multilateral 
expectations. 
Four dimensions of shifts in the security environment through strategic dilemmas 
are of particular importance for Germany’s decision on military engagement. First, 
dramatic international events that have a great visibility, such as the 1990 Kuwait 
invasion, the Yugoslav war of 1991, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, or the terrorist 
attacks in the United States in 2001, can pose “external shocks” that trigger major policy 
changes.98 Affecting governmental actors, parliamentarians, and the general public alike, 
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these events may constitute a catalyst for policy restructuring, resulting not only in 
debates, but also in changed perceptions of and guidelines for the use of military force. 
Some scholars argue that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999 
presented Germany with the most serious strategic dilemma of the post–Cold War era. 
Wars of independence in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally Kosovo, caused fierce 
domestic debates about proper foreign policy responses. 
Accompanied by the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, which allowed the 
deployment of German military forces within systems of mutual collective security, the 
German governments first decided to support NATO air strikes against the Serb artillery 
in 1995, to send Bundeswehr ground forces into peace enforcement operations in 1996, 
and finally to allow pilots to conduct air strikes within the NATO campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.99 With the first combat operation since the end 
of World War II, the latter decision marked a decisive shift in German foreign and 
security policy, intensifying the public debate about Germany’s role in the world, its 
strategic culture, and appropriate political means. 
Second, consequently, strategic dilemmas affect the public opinion and the 
political debate on adequate foreign and security policy reactions as they gain salience in 
the general public, which influences governmental actors and parliamentarians in their 
individual considerations in decisions about the use of military force. 
Third, in a complex and interconnected security environment, international crises, 
such as regional conflicts, disintegration of states, or humanitarian crises, have an impact 
on the security of the international community as a whole.100 The UN, NATO, and EU, 
as primary responder to international crises, can additionally cause and intensify pressure 
on Germany to act within their multilateral frameworks, including the participation in 
military operations on all levels. 
Finally, strategic dilemmas particularly press and incentivize key stakeholders in 
the German government, especially the chancellor, minister of foreign affairs, and 
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minister of defense, to mitigate between the two poles of external and internal demands 
and to develop, in coordination with international and domestic actors, policies which “do 
not openly contradict either of them.”101 As highlighted above, depending on the 
relations between all factors of the external and internal system within a strategic 
dilemma, the policy choices—the decisions on whether and how to participate in military 
operations—can be expected to vary.  
2. National Interests and Strategies 
Political and economic power gives a state the opportunity to implement its 
national interests. National interests are understood as the sum of demands and 
expectations that a state formulates toward the international system to safeguard and, if 
possible, improve its security and welfare.102 Since they function as general guidelines 
for a state’s external actions and orientation for decisions of governments, national 
interests should help to define short- and medium-term priorities of foreign and security 
policy, hence, the choice of appropriate instruments and means to achieve them, 
including the role and relevance of military force. National interests, however, are not 
fixed and sacrosanct, but underlie influences of changes in the international system and 
the domestic contestation.103  
The significance of Germany’s interests in foreign affairs as inherent and 
adequate reasoning for an international engagement of the Bundeswehr has been the 
subject of endless domestic debate for decades on end.104 This debate began promptly in 
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May 1949 and has never stopped; it is marked by intense positions and a struggle for 
consensus amid much dissent. Two dominant aspects frame the ambivalent influence of 
this debate on the decision-making process. First, given the conditions of persistent and 
changing determinants of Germany’s role in a changing security environment, all official 
strategic papers since the mid-1990s refer to values and interests as an orientation for 
German foreign and security policy in general, and in particular as a criteria for the 
decisions on military engagements, as it has been repeatedly claimed by the scholarly and 
strategic community.105 According to the German Ministry of Defense White Paper 
2006, interests of German security policy range between “preserving justice and freedom, 
democracy, security and prosperity for … [German] citizens”; “preventing regional crises 
and conflicts that may affect Germany’s security, wherever possible”; “help uphold 
human rights”;106 and “promoting free and unhindered world trade as a basis for … 
prosperity.” The White Paper also acknowledges that in an age of globalization German 
foreign and security policy interests “are not static, but contingent on international 
constellations and developments,”107 and cannot be defined solely in terms of geography.  
Although clearly connecting interests with goals of German security policy, 
including multilateral implementation, consolidation of the transatlantic alliance, and 
promotion of the European integration, German strategic documents, however, 
continually fail to clearly operationalize when, where, and how Germany is willing to 
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pursue or even defend them, as well as which interests and goals have priority.108 The 
vague nature of German national interests in strategic documents and debates gives 
German key stakeholders the opportunity to interpret them differently, depending on their 
perceived need to mitigate between external and internal drivers. It further contributes to 
the fact that Germany may participate in military missions rather based on externally 
dominated factors instead of its own reasonable operationalized national interests. It also 
lends strong support to the claim that Germany’s decisions to participate in the KFOR 
ISAF, or EUFOR Congo missions were not derived from German national interests, as 
officially argued; rather, these interests were “discovered” immediately before the start of 
the missions to legitimate domestically the deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers.109  
Conversely, the official and public reference to national interests as rationale for 
German foreign and security policy actions has significantly increased since 
reunification, giving them potentially a stronger influence on decisions for participation 
in military inventions. Beginning the end of the Helmut Kohl era, particularly 
intensifying during the term of office of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and 
continuing today with Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, the term national interest 
became an increasingly important reference to legitimize German foreign and security 
policy.110 Although vaguely formulated and differently interpretable, stronger 
emphasized national interests may both be partly explained by and contribute to the 
evolved but simultaneously ambiguous notion of a more self-confident, power-oriented, 
and normalized German behavior in international affairs as well as a more pragmatic and 
instrumental understanding of multilateralism. The decisions on participation or 
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nonparticipation in the multilateral military interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Chad/CAR 
reflect this change from 1998 until the present. 
Despite the surfeit of single strategic concepts and its rather ad hoc, cabinet-
oriented coordination of foreign and security policy,111 over the last two decades, a 
united Germany has developed a strategic understanding of its policy implementation, 
aiming at interlinking and coherently coordinating all policy instruments within a 
comprehensive approach and within networked security structures—on both a national 
and a global scale—to an overall concept that is tailored to the problem.112 Milestone 
documents that have introduced and manifested Germany’s idea of “networked security,” 
“comprehensive approach,” and “whole of government approach,”113 include the federal 
government’s overall concept for “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”114 (2000); the “Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention”115 
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(2004); the “Over Sectoral Concept for Crisis Prevention”116 (2005); the White Paper117 
(2006); and Defense Policy Guidelines”118 (2011). Still, Germany continually faces 
challenges to implement its approach already on a national level, as institutional 
structures (diversity of governmental bodies related to foreign and security policy issues 
as exist in the Berlin Republic federal structure), constitutional regulations (for example, 
the ministerial principle, that is, the primacy of the Finance Ministry for the budget; the 
primacy of the Foreign Ministry for external affairs, and so on), and particular interests, 
can hamper an efficient and coherent horizontal and vertical coordination119 as well as 
influence the intragovernmental decision-making process when compared to other 
leading powers. 
Finally, Germany’s struggle to define—and implement—an overarching national 
strategy120 also influences German decisions on military engagements, as it complicates 
the formulation of a consistent national position on security issues as well as increasing 
the dependency on situational-contextual factors. 
3. Multilateral Integration 
Germany’s normative imperative to organize, legitimize, and implement foreign 
and security policy exclusively within multilateral frameworks, based on international 
agreements, is an important but evolving factor for decisions on military engagements.   
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Based on the experiences of the world wars and the disaster of National 
Socialism, Germany’s raison d’état during the Cold War was rooted in the conviction, 
championed by Konrad Adenauer and later by the SPD, that it could regain and maintain 
its capacity and sovereignty to act in international affairs only by embedding its foreign 
and security policy in Western-oriented international and supranational institutions, 
hence, by refusing any unilateral power and interests politics or the swinging between 
East and West that had been the norm of German geography and power for centuries 
before.121 Framed by the key mottos of “never again” and “never alone,”122 it formed a 
multilateral-oriented political understanding that became one of the two most 
characterizing paradigms of German foreign and security policy.123 Germany’s strict 
orientation toward peaceful conflict resolution, strongly linked with the reluctance of 
using military force, is the topic of following sections.    
Repeatedly emphasized in official papers and by politicians alike after 
reunification, the principle of multilateralism is thus often considered as one indicator of 
continuity of German foreign and security policy.124 Consequently, Germany has 
continuously committed itself to pursue its foreign policies and security interests in 
coordination and cooperation with partners and allies, based on its integration into the 
UN, NATO, and EU, and to organize its participation in out-of-area missions exclusively 
within the multilateral context of these mutual collective security systems..125 
As the sole universal international organization, the UN plays an outstanding role 
in guiding Germany’s foreign and security policy and decisions on military engagements. 
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Its charter not only provides the fundamental international law framework for 
international relations, but also defines the objectives, such as the safeguarding of world 
peace and international security, that generally legitimize the use of German military 
forces outside its own territory, through a mandate of the UNSC.126 As its biggest 
financial contributor and based on its enhanced power position since reunification, 
Germany justifies its claim for a permanent seat in the council, without having yet 
achieved the goal. Germany’s aspiration to shoulder more responsibility and to design 
UN policy more actively, however, still does not reflect the level of its actual 
participation in UN missions. Germany has indeed mostly participated in UN-mandated 
missions, but to a significantly lower degree in UN-led missions, most notably in actual 
participation or the level of capacities, particularly in Africa.127 
NATO is the “anchor of the West” and the “cornerstone of German security and 
defense policy”; it formalizes the transatlantic partnership between Europe and North 
America and binds 28 of the most powerful states in the world along the principles of 
collective defense, mutual solidarity, political consultation, burden-sharing, and military 
integration.128 Despite the buildup of European capabilities under the umbrella of the EU, 
NATO still constitutes the most important key framework for political consultation in the 
West and military alliance for Germany, resulting in the biggest contributions to military 
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interventions since reunification, such as in the Balkans or in Afghanistan.129 The 
solidarity and cohesion within the alliance remain the “backbone” of Germany’s well-
being, as it defines the ensured security of each single member as shared interests of all. 
For Europe, and Germany within it, the EU represents a successful European 
political and security order, which is capable of assuring its members of stability, 
security, and prosperity. Intending to further strengthen the EU as “the core of the 
European area of stability,” Germany has been a key proponent since 1992 of an 
intensified European integration through the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) as well as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which seeks to 
develop and provide a broad spectrum of combined civilian and military instruments for 
international security-building missions, in parallel with and complementary to, but 
without redundancies toward NATO.130 Multinational cooperation and incorporation 
under the umbrella of NATO and the EU has gradually extended Germany`s 
commitments toward reliable contributions to military capabilities within a combined 
headquarters, multinational command and control facilities, and standing crisis-response 
capabilities, such as the NATO Response Force (NRF) or the EU Battle Group 
(EUBG).131 The duality of implementing German interests through European integration 
and transatlantic anchorage simultaneously often resulted in a “both-and-policy” 
(Sowohl-als-auch-Politik), which drew Germany repeatedly in a mediating role between 
NATO-maximalists and minimalists,132 but also increased the external demands to put its 
weight into international military interventions. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the general parameters of Germany’s foreign and 
security policy have changed decisively with the disorder in the world, which framed, 
incentivized, and constrained its decisions to send the Bundeswehr beyond Central 
Europe, its Cold War strategic focus. Shifts of global power relations, the emergence of 
new security concerns, as well as the complex and continuously changing security 
environment, have led to dramatic extension and enlargement of such multilateral 
institutions as NATO and the EU, broadening their responsibilities and extending their 
scope for security and defense concerns. Policy and organizational changes of these 
institutions, which form the foundation of Germany’s own foreign and security policy, 
have not only caused institutional and constitutional adjustments in Germany,133 but also 
intensified the external expectations on Germany’s self-imposed multilateral cooperation 
and integration, pulling its military capacities into new missions.134 
With the theory of a “multilateralism trap” in mind, the expectations of security 
policy institutions substantially determine decisions on German participation in military 
missions, however, without causing automatic (and/or unilateral) German actions. 
Accordingly, collective consensus decisions for establishing a mission under the umbrella 
of NATO or the EU, pose high political costs for a refusal to contribute to it, even if the 
domestic context may prefer nonparticipation.135 Consequently, decisions against a 
German participation within multilateral military engagements, especially against those 
based on the consensus principle, were and remain an exception.136  
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Germany lacks the willingness and the material capacities to sustain a decisive 
shift toward a unilateral approach for its foreign and security policy. Even a case-by-case 
abstention from multilaterally agreed military missions would reduce its credibility 
within NATO or the EU and might even lead, in the long-term, to political isolation. 
Simultaneously, Germany would lose influence on the institutional decision-making, 
partners and allies, as well as resources.137  
Showing the linkage between external and internal systems, multilateral 
integration weighs particularly heavy in German political calculations because of its 
salience in Germany’s strategic culture and officially formulated national interests, but 
also for reasons of political exertion of influence and responsibility, which gives a self-
imposed push toward credible commitments in international affairs.  
Germany deliberately seeks to increase and maintain transparency of, and trust 
for, its political actions through solidarity and burden-sharing within the transatlantic and 
European cooperation.138 Participation in international military operations, 
simultaneously, also follows the strategic calculus to preserve and exploit the capacity to 
act.139 This participation is an important political capital to self-confidently implement a 
security policy that roots on national interests as well as to influence multilateral planning 
and execution.140 Consequently, even if examples of the last two decades, such as the 
abstentions from the Gulf War in 1991, the NATO training mission in Iraq in 2004, and 
the EU operation in Chad/CAR in 2007/2008, suggest that Germany’s approach to 
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multilateralism has slightly adjusted toward a “strategic”141 or flexible “multilateralism 
by demand,”142—stronger incorporating national interests and aspirations for more 
responsibility—Germany’s general foreign and security policy orientation remains 
multilateral.143 Germany’s dominating concern about the preservation and promotion of 
its economic strength, however, may additionally explain and contribute to a more 
selective implementation of multilateralism in the future. As geo-economic power 
defining national interests increasingly according to economic terms rather than to 
broader values, Germany may shift from an institutionalized multilateralism toward a 
more selective form, as bilateral approaches to key economic partner become 
paramount.144 
Finally, multilateralism also imposes constraints on Germany’s decisions for 
military engagements. The designation of operational and functional capabilities to the 
integrated structures within NATO and the EU come automatically with “certain 
restrictions on national sovereignty and free decision-making.”145 However, these 
restraints are less today in the institutions of command of forces than as existed, in say, 
1980. Once a decision for a multinational military mission has been made, the 
expectations of allies and Germany’s self-imposed commitment as a credible and reliable 
partner establish high political burdens for failing its obligations and withdrawing its 
forces. In the same way, the salience of multilateral integration constrains the 
Bundestag’s approval for international military missions, even if, according to a fateful 
“out of area” and collective security ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
1994, the government needs to secure it with a legislative approval. If not willing to 
question Germany’s treaty obligations, German parliamentarians admit that the 
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Bundestag cannot really refuse its approval.146 Consequently, no governmental request 
for a German participation in international military missions has yet been denied.  
4. Evolution and Status of Military Engagement 
Decisions on participation in military interventions must not only be analyzed in 
their proper context of changes within the power and security environment, but also 
within the evolution and status of the country’s military engagement itself.147 The 
“military legacy” of a nation state comprises many factors. These include the evolution as 
well as the status of armed forces in law, politics, and society; the political and strategic 
as well as civil military conception of armed forces; and the modus operandi of using 
armed forces in international affairs and their capacities. The suite of these factors in their 
variety not only relate to norms and precepts that characterize a state’s foreign and 
security policy,148 but also, in turn, such a legacy of war and armies can be expected to 
affect foreign affairs’ behavior and decisions.  
Embedded in a much broader framework, therefore, the nature of former or 
current military engagements, their success or failure, and their costs and implications—
human, political, normative, and financial, are expected to affect the decision making for 
the participation of national forces in international military interventions as would be the 
case in any democratic nation alert to the burdens of policy in a violent world marked by 
the limits of policy amid constrained resources. Learning processes and reorientations149 
influence the view on and the thinking of military means. 
 At the same time, the calculations for missions abroad relate to personal and 
societally dominant standards and attitudes toward the use of military force as an 
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instrument of foreign and security policy. In doing so, the evolution and status of a state’s 
military engagement and its strategic culture concerning the perception on role, 
relevance, and efficacy of the use of military force are coalesced—demonstrating the 
interdependent relationship between the two factors on the external and internal level. 
This section focuses on the conception and actual use of the Bundeswehr, whereas the 
perceptual aspects are elaborated in a following section. 
Between 1949 and 1990, the use of military force within the FRG’s foreign and 
security policy had been strongly “hedged” (eingehegt)150—legally, politically, 
normatively, and structurally restricted by the realities of defeat in 1945, national 
division, and the structure of the Cold War in Europe.151 After the capitulation of the 
German Reich on May 8, 1945, all four occupation zones were completely demilitarized. 
Under the external conditions of a deteriorating security situation amid an intensifying 
East-West conflict on one hand in 1948, and the domestic aspirations for more 
sovereignty as well as the efforts for reintegrating the state into the Western community, 
on the other, the two German states were armed, with the foundation of the Bundeswehr 
in 1955 and the East German People’s Army in 1956—despite fierce domestic 
resistance.152 The sole raison d’étre of the new German Armed Forces was however, the 
national defense in Central Europe within the transatlantic alliance.153  
Framed by strict legal regulations (such as Basic Law article 87a),154 a “structural 
non-aggression capability”155 of the Bundeswehr, as well as constitutional and civilian 
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values oriented philosophy of the soldiers (Staatsbürger in Uniform—citizens in 
uniform), German politics and society during the Cold War period concurred in refusing 
the use of the Bundeswehr far beyond Germany’s borders—culminating in the tenets of 
no missions “out-of-area” and “out-of-history.”156 The latter refers to a historically 
reasoned restriction partially arising from Article VI of the Washington Treaty, but also 
the West German national interest, which became later known as the “Kohl doctrine”157 
with his public refusal to deploy the Bundeswehr to Yugoslavia in 1991,158 arguing that 
no German soldier should be present in a country that had been occupied by the 
Wehrmacht.159 Nonetheless, until 1990, German soldiers took part in numerous 
engagements around the globe on a very small scale and subordinate to the forward 
defense in Central Europe. All deployments, such as the dispatch of a hospital ship to 
South Vietnam in the middle 1960s, however, included without exception, humanitarian, 
technical, logistic, or medical support missions, below the level of military missions in 
the sense of the Basic Law.160 
Based on disruptive changes in global politics around 1990 that changed the 
determinants of German security policy, increasing external demands, and a cautiously 
rising understanding of Germany’s international responsibility, the united Germany under 
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl gradually freed the Bundeswehr from the taboo of being 
used as a means in foreign and security policy—getting access to out-of-area and out-of-
history missions without loosening its culture of military reticence. Paradigmatic for the 
struggle of the young united Germany to define its position to military means between the 
poles of increasing multilateral expectations and a matured military restraint became the 
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Iraq War in 1990/1991. Unable to bring itself to contribute militarily to the coalition 
forces, the federal government made considerable financial contributions. This decade-
long praxis of West Germany was quickly criticized as “Scheckbuch-Diplomatie” 
(checkbook diplomacy).161  
After Iraq, the German public became more and more familiar with missions 
abroad of the Bundeswehr. It was a gradual process, however.162 With mine-detection in 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf 1990–1991, medical support in Cambodia 
1991–1993 (UNTAC), embargo monitoring in the Adriatic Sea 1992–1996, logistic 
support in Somalia 1993–1994 (UNOSOM II), and the NATO missions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1994/1996 (IFOR and SFOR), the focus still remained on Europe and its 
periphery as well as on peacekeeping operations. Likewise, the numbers of soldiers 
deployed soldiers did not exceed the limit of 3,000 until the end of Kohl’s term of office 
in 1998.163 The primary noncombat role of the Bundeswehr gave rise to societally shared 
and politically enforced image of German soldiers as aid workers in uniform 
(Entwicklungshelfer in Uniform) or an armed technical emergency service (Technisches 
Hilfswerk mit Gewehr).164  
Since this early phase of international missions after reunification, the scope, 
quality, and nature of German participations in out-of-area military interventions have 
changed dramatically—with likewise substantial influences on the perception of the role 
and significance of the Bundeswehr and its soldiers as a means in international affairs. 
Beginning with the red-green government of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, and backed through a ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1994, German soldiers participated not only in more and more 
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out-of-area missions (more than 10,000 at once during the first term of office), but also in 
combat-operations outside Europe. The broad spectrum of missions included the NATO 
combat operation in Kosovo 1999 (Allied Forces), peacekeeping mission in Kosovo since 
1999 (KFOR), and sea route protection operation in the Mediterranean Sea since 2001 
(OAE), but also EU operations in Macedonia 2003 (Concordia), in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2003 (Artemis) and 2006 (EUFOR DR Congo), and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 2004 (EUFOR Althea as successor of SFOR). The affirmation of 
Germany’s unlimited “political and moral solidarity”165 with the United States after the 
9/11 attacks, led the Bundeswehr into the “war against terrorism” and peace-enforcement 
operations in Afghanistan since 2001 (OEF and ISAF), with approximately 5,000 soldiers 
at the peak in 2010. 
Despite the incremental transformation of the Bundeswehr into “armed forces in 
mission” with all capabilities engaged abroad, the public and political apprehension 
concerning the actual role, nature, and significance of its international engagements took 
many years and remained domestically strongly disputed. Particularly the long-lasting 
political defensive stance toward the terms war (Krieg) and fallen (Gefallene) and the 
attempts to frame the Bundeswehr’s Afghan mission as a situation of stabilization and 
reconstruction rather than as condition of war, followed coherent political calculations in 
face of a consistently perceived military- and casualty-averse German public.166 The 
Kunduz airstrike in September 2009 and rising numbers of fallen due to the increasingly 
active involvement of German soldiers in fighting missions against insurgents, however, 
altered not only the perceptions of governmental actors and the parliamentarians, but also 
the conception and self-image of the Bundeswehr. Whereas politicians acknowledged the 
war-conditions and the requirements to project military power “with all necessary 
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means,”167 the Bundeswehr was transformed in its structure and capacities to a mission-
focused professional army, capable and willing of fulfilling complex tasks in a 
comprehensive security environment.  
Although the gradual extension and appreciation of Germany’s multilateral out-
of-area engagements would make contributions to similar missions more likely, 
particularly the experiences of fallen soldiers and the controversial discussions about the 
actual relevance and success of long-lasting, risky, and resource-intensive mission, such 
as in Afghanistan, feed domestic reservations. These aspects can provoke new shifts in 
perceptions and attitudes of governmental actors, parliamentarians, and the public toward 
military operations and constraining decision making for future participation.   
5. Mission Framework 
The diversity of international crises and their respective context demands the 
international community to respond differently to particular challenges as these emerge in 
fact. Political considerations may include distinct or interconnected diplomatic, 
economic, and military means in varying intensity and with different durations of actions. 
Consequently, the framework, characteristic, and scope of a potential German 
participation in a particular international military mission also shape the decision-making 
process. 
The controversy about the continuing extensions, increasing external demands, 
and changing nature of German engagements in international military missions 
throughout the mid-2000s sparked a debate in parliament about adequate criteria for 
decisions on military engagements. Politicians and scholars who defined these criteria, 
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however, emphasized that they should not be considered as a universal checklist, which 
may foster a machine-like automatic response in the decision-making process, but rather 
as guidelines (Maßstäbe) to “organize thoughts”168 and to answer critical questions for 
each case.169 The initiatives culminated in the wake of the German abstention from the 
UNSC resolution concerning Libya in 2011, as the Green faction of the Bundestag 
officially requested the German government to develop a catalog of criteria for future 
out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr.170 Although the request ultimately was refused 
by the Bundestag,171 the widely agreed guidelines notwithstanding influenced these 
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particular German decisions based on five central categories,172 hereby, linking elements 
from the external with the internal system, whereas the relation to German interest and 
objectives has been already illustrated. Since the relevance of national interests is 
discussed separately, only the four remaining categories are elaborated in the following. 
The first category relates to the legality and the legitimacy of a military mission 
under the international law. As noted earlier, decisions on deployments of German 
soldiers generally follow the two key guiding premises of multilateral integration and the 
strict commitment to international law and the Charter of the United Nations. A ruling of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 held that the German Basic Law 
legitimizes Germany to actively participate in “systems of mutual collective security,” 
including the employment of the Bundeswehr within the framework and according to the 
rules of these systems.173 Subsequently, the UNSC mandate became the predominant 
domestically imposed and accepted justification for multilateral military actions. The 
controversial discussions about Germany’s participation in the NATO air campaign in 
Yugoslavia in 1999, or in 2015, with the dispatch of a training mission of Kurdish 
fighters in Iraq without a UNSC mandate, reflect the outstanding importance for German 
foreign and security policy.174 The application of the principle of the “responsibility to 
protect” as a legitimate extension of the international law, hence, as a legitimate cause for 
military missions, is also the subject of intense debates in Germany.  
The second category refers to the conceptual framework, the prospect of success, 
and the potential risks of a military mission. Although such strategic dilemmas as the 
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genocide in Rwanda in 1994 or massacres during the war in former Yugoslavia have 
gradually led to a somewhat greater use of military force as a policy of last resort, 
Germany continuously prefers to embed military means within an overarching concept of 
policy grounded in multilateralism and a deep skepticism about the use of force in favor 
of diplomatic and peaceful means for conflict resolution.175 The lack of such a political 
master plan on the model of other democracies, setting clearly defined and achievable 
objectives that should aim at the roots of an international crisis, is expected to 
substantially hamper a positive German decision about participation in military missions. 
Other aspects of feasibility that relate to the higher likelihood of (sustainable) success, 
such as the anticipated duration of the mission, clearly defined and appropriate rules of 
engagement, and an existing exit strategy, can have an additional influence.176  
In light of Germany’s experience of war and its effects, risk considerations in 
conjunction with the nature of a mission also strongly influence decisions on German 
participation. The extension of Germany’s multilateral out-of-area engagements from 
humanitarian aid and peacekeeping support in Cambodia and Somalia in the early 1990s 
to the participation in the Afghan ISAF mission since the early 2000s found only 
grudging and reluctant political acceptance. Such an attitude contrasts with the 
willingness, say, elsewhere (in the UK and France, for instance, even Denmark today) to 
send soldiers into combat missions or even war, facing high risks of dead soldiers. Such a 
willingness evolved only gradually, however, and has always seen a public aversion to 
the use of force and deaths in action.177 Likewise, based on the common assumption that 
missions in Africa are more dangerous than missions in other regions of the world, 
Germany, like other Western countries, reluctantly contributed to UN peacekeeping 
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operations and other missions in Africa during the last two decades.178 Overall, reflecting 
the persistent and predominant German culture of military restraint, contributions of 
troops in action, which are limited in scope, duration, resources, and risks for soldiers on 
ground, are most likely to receive broad political and public consent when the political 
conditions are correct and the formation of policy to guide such action is cultivated with 
care and in detail. 
Given the personal, material, and financial limitations of the German Armed 
Forces, considerations about the availability of national capacities and capabilities for a 
certain type of mission/task in relation to ongoing commitments, the relevance of 
Germany’s contribution to the overall performance of a mission, and the implied costs,179 
constitute a third guiding category that affects decision-making processes. Particularly 
through the quantitative and qualitative increase of Bundeswehr engagements in 
international missions, calculations between what is externally required or relevant and 
what is domestically available, affordable, and feasible can influence interministerial and 
parliamentary considerations about the nature, size, and quality of a certain German 
contribution.  
Finally, the relevance and the potential dynamic of a crisis pose the fourth guiding 
category.180 Despite the common acceptance to respond to a crisis, assessments of its 
strategic significance influence the decision-making process for military missions. The 
more a crisis constitutes a strategic dilemma, hence, has the potential to shock a regional 
or the international order, the more likely is a political and public consensus on a 
multilateral reaction, incentivizing and pulling German military contributions to it. In 
interrelation with the previous category, Germany is likely to support exclusively 
political efforts or actions of regional organizations, if a crisis is limited in geographic 
and security terms.   
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C. DETERMINANTS ON THE INTERNAL LEVEL 
Within the integrative model for decisions on German military engagement, after 
reunification, the internal level of German foreign and security policy has become more 
demanding and less an object of consensus as in the high tide of the Cold War.181 
Because the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy has increasingly blurred 
and hence, the external and internal levels have interpenetrated each other, the domestic 
area influences foreign and security policy choices more directly, and the effect of 
internal determinants within those choices is much stronger. Chief among the interrelated 
internal factors that relate to a “domestic politicization”182 of German foreign and 
security politics, including the decisions on participation in international military 
missions, are strategic culture and conception of national role, the parliament and 
political contestation, and the public opinion. This process has also unfolded in the last 
ten years183 as the domestic political landscape has changed from its former order, to 
more parties and a wider ideological divergence of points of view about defense policy 
with the onset of grand coalition governments amid heightened international crises since 
September 11, 2001.   
1. Strategic Culture and Conception of National Role 
A state’s strategic culture and conception of national role are encompassed as 
“internal predispositions” with commonly shared norms, values, and attitudes regarding 
the identity of the state; the state’s role within international affairs; and normative 
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preferences for achieving foreign and security objectives.184 Two major characteristics 
determine the influence of both conceptions on Germany’s foreign and security policy 
and decision making regarding the participation in military interventions.185 First, 
strategic culture and conceptions of national role frame foreign and security policy 
through the provision of collectively shared, precast orientations, directions, and 
strategies for the way to behave in face of a problem. Socially constructed and 
historically grown, both conceptions shape the attitudes and standards of the general 
public and political elites alike in the way they consider certain policy options as 
legitimate, feasible, appropriate, and favored, including the role, relevance, and efficacy 
of the use of military force. Second, as normative frameworks for the perception and 
interpretation of aspects within and between the external and internal systems, both 
conceptions influence public opinion and attitudes of key stakeholders while attaching 
weight to internal and external factors and prioritizing between them in case the two 
systems come into conflict.186 Both concepts, therefore, not only can directly affect 
decisions on military engagements, but also influence decision-makers in mediating 
between factors in the external and internal systems. This thesis looks at both 
characteristics within the decision-making process.187   
Essentially, both concepts, however, are neither static nor homogenous, and 
therefore one potential source to explain variations in policy outcomes. Basically shaped 
through the interactions and tensions between the two systems, strategic culture and 
national role concept can gradually change, shift, and adapt, as evolutions in the external 
and internal systems occur. Likewise, facilitated through varying perceptions of 
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consistent or changed guiding paradigms of foreign and security policy, differences 
between the individual beliefs of key stakeholders concerning the state’s role and 
appropriate behavior in international affairs can occur. 
Based on its particular historical and political experiences, the FRG, as any other 
country, has developed a certain set of norms and axioms of action that characterized its 
tenets, standards, and preferences for foreign and security affairs.188 In the case of West 
and then united Germany (but also the GDR in its time), the country’s negative 
experiences in World Wars I and II had a distinct and widely shared set of norms and 
values that shaped Germany’s strategic culture and the understanding of its role and 
status in the world. After the war, both Germanies developed an aversion to war with the 
motto of “never again,” while, at the same time, the two states carried a huge military 
burden in the Cold War confrontation. This experience has resulted in a “culture of 
restraint” and a self-image of a “civilian power,” which aversion to unilateralism and 
skepticism on the use of armed forces formed following three deeply internalized foreign 
policy principles: 1) “never alone”—a consequent orientation to the West 
(Westorientierung), an integration into Western institutions, and a multilateral oriented, 
coordinated, and implemented foreign policy (European integration, transatlantic 
partnership, and German-French partnership); 2)  “never again”—a commitment to 
value-oriented foreign policy; and 3) “politics before force”—a skepticism toward 
military instruments of power as a means to their own end and a constrained use of force 
in all kinds of international affairs other than national defense.189 
Consequently, beginning in 1955, the political rather than the military efficacy of 
the Bundeswehr dominated considerations about the role and relevance of military means 
in the FRG’s foreign and security policy. This generalization especially applied to the 
formation of domestic consensus in Bonn about foreign and defense policy. The West 
German armed forces allowed the young state to enter the Western community and to 
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become an integral part of the Western alliance system.190 As such, the FRG was not a 
pacifistic state at all, while its population nurtured a strong pacifist or, more properly, 
antimilitary streak; however, the use of military force was justifiable only to protect its 
free and democratic order (freiheitliche und demokratische Grundordnung) instead of 
enforcing national interests or of changing a certain political status quo (i.e., a violent 
reunification of Germany).191 
Notwithstanding political calculations, the experiences of total defeat, the collapse 
of state structures, and the ruin of societal values caused fierce resistance among the West 
German society against Germany’s rearmament (Wiederbewaffnung) as high refusal rates 
in the early 1950s demonstrated with the principle of “ohne mich” (without me).192 
Although throughout the Cold War period a “general acceptance of the Bundeswehr”193 
among German citizens arose especially after the Hamburg flood of 1962, the deeply 
ingrained aversion to all military in the German society remained and matured.194  
The end of East-West confrontation and the unification of Germany in 1990 
brought to the Federal Republic not only full sovereignty through the Two Plus Four 
Agreement, but also a fundamental transformation of the country’s foreign policy and 
security environment. This change only slowly became clear, while the dictates of 
domestic reconstruction were foremost in the early 1990s. Although free to change its 
role in and approach to international affairs, post–Cold War Germany, however, 
reaffirmed its raison d’état with the firm commitment and integration into the Western 
alliance system which had well served its national interest, the aspiration to intensify the 
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European integration, and the self-imposed limitations of military options—marking a 
high degree of continuity of Germany’s foreign and security policy.195 Yet the 
international system from 1990 through 2003 found not perpetual peace, as in Central 
Europe, but the revival of war as a means of policy.  
The developments of this period of peace and war at the same time significantly 
intensified the “inherent contradictions”196 within and between Germany’s core 
principles and approaches to foreign and security policy. On the one hand, the two 
predominant normative imperatives of multilateralism (“never alone”) and of reticence in 
using force (“policy before force”) increasingly collided within the decision making on 
Germany’s participation in military intervention amid a deteriorating global security 
environment, a consolidating German unification, and a uniting Europe. On the other, 
Germany’s traditional foreign and security policy tenets became contested with Berlin’s 
growing resocialization to the rigors of (economic) power politics, increasing claims for 
more international engagement and responsibility,197 and evolving key actor’s attitudes 
toward the role, relevance, and efficacy of the use of force in international affairs. These 
complex tensions resulted in—and were reflected by—gradual, shifts of emphasis on 
certain elements within Germany’s strategic culture and self-conception.198 
Consequently, while Germany’s policies toward military engagements became not only 
more self-confident, gradually freeing the Bundeswehr from its customary constitutional 
and continental restrictions, it was exactly this wave-line like shift of emphasis that 
resulted in often unexpected ambiguous and ambivalent policy outcomes.199 This 
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understanding helps to combine the arguments of the two schools of thought concerning 
“continuation” and “change” in Germany’s strategic culture as well as role conception 
and the respectively evolving impacts on decisions for military engagements.  
It is the duality of “change in continuity” and “continuity in change” that 
condenses this particular phenomenon of German foreign and security policy. 
Immediately after Germany’s reunification in 1990 and 1991 at the time of the Gulf War, 
then-Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and then-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher (FDP) stressed Germany’s “growing responsibility in the global 
community,”200 calling for a change of the Basic Law to allow the Bundeswehr to 
participate in military missions based on systems of collective security as contained more 
or less in Article 24 of the Basic Law versus the continental restriction of Article 87a.201 
The change of perception of the Bundeswehr toward a more accepted and justifiable 
instrument of foreign and security policy, however, only gradually took shape until a 
climax in 1994; this process did not run smoothly, and has not yet been finished as of this 
date. In conjunction with personal war experiences, post–Cold War German politicians 
remained very sensitive in the first years following unity to the decade-long prevailing 
mood in politics and society widely to refuse the use of military force other than for 
national defense as in Article 87a of the old model circa 1980.202 The “culture of (foreign 
policy) reticence,” as characterized by then-Foreign Minister Genscher, remained vivid 
and fundamental as a thing of consensus.203  
However, a new generation of leaders came into power, beginning in 1998 with 
Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who, unlike his predecessors, was essentially free 
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of direct experience of the world before 1945. These figures adapted what can only be 
described as a more nationalist interpretation of the lessons of the past which fostered 
German interests in an altered Europe, and especially a closer relationship to Russia as a 
revival of a neo-Bismarckian statecraft that downplayed Atlanticism. Germany’s foreign 
and security policy implementation in the latter 1990s thus “normalized” along the lines 
of more self-confidence and a stronger focus on economic and domestic imperatives 
imposed by globalization and structural determinants in European politics, society and 
economy. All of it resulted in a rather pragmatic understanding of multilateral 
commitments and expectations. It also led, however, to the conviction that military 
capacities are important to “meet international obligations”204 and that participations in 
military interventions send a signal to shoulder more responsibility in global security 
among the other Western powers.205  
In parallel, the quantitatively and qualitatively changing reality of international 
deployments and structural reforms gradually transformed the Bundeswehr toward an 
“Army on Operations.”206 Yet, increasing numbers of German soldiers in military 
interventions, including those in combat missions in Kosovo in 1999, and abstentions 
from such participations in multilateral operations as Iraq in 2003 or in Chad/CAR in 
2007/2008, raised questions as to what extent the role concept as “civil power” is still 
valid or had gradually lost its unequivocal determining significance.207  
The question became even more urgent as political elites slowly began to rethink, 
against the backdrop of the global security challenges of the twenty-first century, the role, 
relevance, and efficacy of the employment of military force in German foreign and 
                                                 
204 Federal Ministry of Defense, Bundeswehr on Operations, 48. 
205 Germany’s claim for a permanent seat in the UNSC underlines the changed perception of its power 
status, role, and responsibility in the world. See Hilz, “Kontinuität und Wandel deutscher Außenpolitik 
[Continuity and Change of German Foreign Policy],” 48; Roos, “Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der 
Vereinigung [German foreign policy after reunification],” 27; Oppermann, “National Role Conceptions,” 
506–507. 
206 Federal Ministry of Defense, Bundeswehr on Operations, 3. 
207 Even the leading proponent of the “civil power” thesis, Hanns W. Maull, acknowledges that 
evolutions in German foreign and security policy decision suggest that the old role concept has shown 
serious “wear marks.” See Maull, “Deutsche Außenpolitik [German foreign policy],” 114. See also Roos, 
“Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung [German foreign policy after reunification],” 27. 
 67 
security policy. Although a clear preference for civilian solutions remained, military 
capabilities became increasingly seen as an important complementary (embedded) mean, 
whose use could be “imperative and indispensable” and therefore should never be 
“categorically ruled out or merely regarded as a last option when all other approaches 
have failed.”208 
Such a shifting understanding of the role of the Bundeswehr, however, 
consistently stays in stark contrast to the public perception of an appropriate use of 
military force. Contrary to the political elites, the German public in general remains 
skeptical overall “vis-à-vis military force and its use as a foreign policy instrument,”209 
preferring only limited mission frameworks and averting participation in combat 
missions.210 
The government of Chancellor Merkel up to 2011 continued the shift toward a 
more self-confident implementation of German foreign and security policy.211 It also 
cemented the extended role and mission of the Bundeswehr as an instrument for 
international crisis prevention and conflict resolution within the Ministry of Defense 
White Book, 2006, and the Ministry of Defense’s Defense Policy Guidelines, 2011. At 
the same time, however, Merkel’s government showed a deeply ingrained and continuing 
aversion to high-risk, high-intensity ground operations as the Afghan campaign struck 
headlines with growing conflict in the 2010 Kunduz combat. Amplified through the 
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experiences of fallen soldiers and the controversial debate concerning the nature of the 
ISAF mission in Afghanistan, German foreign and security policy debates and decisions 
reflected a persistently restrained view on the use of military forces. Merkel’s strictly 
(geo)-economic–orientated Realpolitik reinforced the culturally deeply embedded risk-
averse attitude, tending to favor a reputation as a stable and reliable economic partner 
over the commitment as a reliable partner in security affairs.212 
2. Parliament and Political Contestation 
Depending on the domestic political constitution, internal political actors can 
influence a state’s foreign and security policy and decisions. In a parliamentary 
democracy like in Germany, the constitutional role of the Bundestag as parliament itself 
and the political contestation between parties within the parliament as well as between 
the parliament and the government are of particular relevance, as all political factions 
struggle for public support and governmental responsibility.213 In political debates within 
the parliament that precede German foreign and security policy decisions, including those 
for the deployment of the Bundeswehr, oppositional parties regularly try to question 
critical decisions of the government and to provide alternatives, to increase their chances 
for the next elections. The government, however, seeks to adjust and optimize own 
actions, to minimize the political contestation by the opposition.214     
Resting on the German Basic Law, the Bundestag as the highest German 
legislative body possesses a number of important rights and responsibilities within the 
framework of foreign and security policy, including parliamentary oversight of executive 
actions and the exertion of indirect influence, such as budget legislation.215 A ruling of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court on July 12, 1994, in which an important change 
                                                 
212 Szabo, “Germany’s Commercial Realism,” 119. 
213 Andreas Hasenclever, “Liberalismus [Liberalism],” in Handbuch der Internationalen Politik 
[Handbook of International Politics], ed. Carlo Masala, Frank Sauer, and Andreas Wilhelm (Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 77–101; Oppermann and Höse, “Die innenpolitischen 
Restriktionen deutscher Außenpolitik [Domestic political constraints of German foreign policy],” 48–72. 
214 Oppelland, “Parteien [Parties],” 269–71. 
215 For a detailed overview of legally assigned responsibilities see Gareis, “Making of Germany’s 
Security and Defense Policy,” 55, 60–61.  
 69 
was made to the heretofore primacy of Article 87a concerning the defense mission of the 
Bundeswehr, however, held that the Bundeswehr is a “parliamentary army” whose armed 
deployment abroad requires the government to secure the Bundestag’s approval. This 
revision by the constitutional court emerged in the wake of unity, the 1990/1991 Gulf 
War, and the rise of chaos in the former Yugoslavia as well as the requirements of UN 
peacekeeping in the 1990s. The subsequent law on parliamentary participation in 2005 
cemented the constitutive parliament’s right of prior approval and constrained the 
deployment of German soldiers into international military engagements.216 
Accordingly, the standard procedure starts with a decision of the Federal Cabinet 
for a request on approval for the deployment of armed forces, which must be forwarded 
to the Bundestag in due time before the start of the planned mission. After a first 
consultation or reading in the full chamber of the Bundestag, the request is further 
discussed in committees, headed by the committee for foreign affairs (Auswaertiger 
Ausschuss). Often as called as the “king committee,” it consists of members from all 
factions of the Bundestag and is one of the few committees with constitutional status.217 
It is in charge of preparing the vote for the governmental requests and giving 
recommendations for the Bundestag. Before its full plenum decision whether to approve 
the request, which requires a simple majority, the Bundestag may use further informal 
means to influence decision making or the content of the envisioned mandate throughout 
the process of direct consultation or in interaction with the government.218  
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Despite the significant constitutional changes in procedures for the deployment of 
the Bundeswehr in missions abroad, five important aspects, however, may mediate the 
role of the Bundestag and its significance as entire entity within the decision-making 
process in relation to all political actors.  
First, irrespective of the obligation to the role of parliament, the cabinet (that is, 
the chancellor and the ministers) has retained the primary power to decide whether and 
how the Bundeswehr contributes to international military missions. The Bundestag has 
“only” the option of permitting or preventing its deployment.219 Furthermore, although 
having the right to withdraw German Armed Forces from any mission at any time, the 
Bundestag has no opportunity to bind the government for participation of its own accord. 
Second, the German parliament is politically and personally closely interlocked 
with the cabinet and government, intensifying the strong executive power within foreign 
and security policy. Since the coalition government rests on the simple majority within 
the Bundestag, party and coalition politics, which are dominated by the party leaders in 
the executive, make it unlikely that the Bundestag would deny the deployment of German 
soldiers after the decision has already been made by the cabinet within the systems of 
collective security.  
Moreover, third, there is an unwritten consensus among German politicians that 
once a decision on multilateral level has been made for Germany’s participation in an 
international military intervention, the German Bundestag cannot really reject it any 
longer,220 unless parliament is willing to question Germany’s obligations in a general 
sense of statecraft. In the event, no governmental request for a German participation has 
been denied to date, a fact that deserves its own prominence in a study of this kind. 
Fourth, German politics, including foreign and security policy, have become more 
volatile through the dynamics of party and coalition politics as the political landscape of 
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Europe in the twenty-first century is, itself, more contentious.221 Since unification, the 
composition of the Bundestag has changed from a three-party lineup to first five and now 
currently four more or less enduring parliamentary groups, representing a more 
heterogeneous spectrum of foreign policy orientations with diverging attitudes toward the 
role of military intervention and increasing the contestation between government and 
opposition parties. The newer “regulars” in parliament include the Green Party (with its 
own place in the German political spectrum), and the LINKE as the hard-left successor to 
the East German communist party; the latter regularly opposes out-of-area missions of 
the Bundeswehr as kind of political reflex. The trend of the last decade has been of 
Socialist-Christian Democratic coalitions, with the gradual disappearance of the old 
kingmaker, the German liberal party (FDP) whose role in foreign and security policy in 
the Cold War was pivotal. On the other hand, coalition politics in Germany urge 
governmental parties to engage in constant consensus building on major foreign policy 
issues, which imposes pressure on key actors within the decision-making process and 
does restrain Germany’s international affairs, much to the suffering of Germany’s critics 
but likely to the well-being of its citizens.222  
Fifth, shifting governmental responsibilities also resulted in the pursuance of 
varying and even inconsistent foreign and security policy preferences toward military 
interventions. The two red-green coalitions between 1998 and 2005 both freed the 
military from the old taboos of no to out of area as well as no to actual combat223 and 
accentuated a more self-determined international approach for Germany, resulting in 
Germany’s participation in the NATO air campaign in the former Yugoslavia in 1999—
                                                 
221 Rinke, “Die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr im Parteienstreit [Missions abroad of the 
Bundeswehr in party controversy],” 165–75; Rinke, “Parteien [Parties],” 269–70; Crossley-Frolick, 
“Domestic Constraints, German Foreign Policy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” 58–61; Oppermann, 
“National Role Conceptions,” 508; Oppermann and Höse, “Die innenpolitischen Restriktionen deutscher 
Außenpolitik [Domestic political constraints of German foreign policy],” 67–68. 
222 Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion,” 488. 
223 Constanze Stelzenmüller, “Mit Gewehr, aber ohne Kompass: Eine Bilanz von vier Jahren rot-
grüner Außenpolitik [With rifle, but without compass: A record of four years red-green foreign policy],” 
Die Zeit, September 12, 2002, http://pdf.zeit.de/2002/38/Mit_Gewehr_aber_ ohne_Kompass.pdf; Anna 
Geis,“Die Zivilmacht Deutschland und die Enttabuisierung des Militärischen [The Civil Power Germany 
and the removal of taboos on the military],” HSFK Standpunkte 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung 
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2005), http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/Standpunkte-2-
2005(druckfrei).pdf.    
 72 
and its nonparticipation in Iraq in 2003. Conversely, under the conservative-socialist and 
conservative-liberal coalitions between 2005 and 2013, the “culture of reticence” was 
again stronger, allegedly contributing to Berlin’s abstention from three EU/NATO 
operations, all of them in Africa where one can say that the old “out of area” taboo 
reasserted itself in new circumstances.224 On the other hand, although throughout all 
German parties a general pacifistic attitude toward military interventions remained, the 
relatively increased participation of Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions has allegedly led 
to a familiarization of a more robust German foreign and security policy.225      
3. Public Opinion 
Within the context of the increasing “domestication” of German foreign and 
security policy and the complex interplay between external and internal factors for 
German decision making on participation in military missions, public opinion has an 
ambivalent but dominant role. In particular, the interaction between public opinion or an 
attentive public and political elites in the foreign policy-making process is a subject of 
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vital debate among scholars.226 Basically, the degree to which public opinion can be a 
“resource or a restriction”227 of policy-making, and hence, can promote, contest, and 
constrain foreign and security policy decisions, depends on four criteria.228 First, 
according to Davis, it relates to policy-makers themselves and their perception of an 
international event as being an external threat (as a strategic dilemma) for German 
security. The more such an external threat is significant, the more likely policy-makers 
tend to ignore (pacifistic) public opinion. This conditional phenomenon was particularly 
salient until 1989. Since the end of the Cold War, however, German state actors 
decreasingly attributed such events like the Iraq crisis in 2003 as a threat for German 
security. As a result, within policy calculations, policy-makers gave public opinion much 
more attention in their own deliberations.229  
Second, the salience of foreign and security policy issues or of a certain 
international event within the public opinion, determines the effect to which the electoral 
power of the general public can impose incentives on political decision-making. This fact 
means, the higher the significance, importance, and urgency that the general public 
ascribes to an issue area, the higher the pressure for politicians, and particularly the 
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government, to align their policies in accordance with the popular moods and preferences 
to avoid any harmful repercussions to their electoral prospects.230 Foreign and security 
policy issues, however, continually rank low as priorities in the German public opinion 
and have done so since unification, if not earlier. Consequently, the economic and 
internal focus of the German public often draws political attention away from 
international affairs toward domestic affairs, intensifying the tensions between external 
expectations and internal constraints.  
Conversely, international crises and conflicts that receive extensive media 
coverage can suddenly attract the public attention and can sensitize public opinion on 
political decisions as strategic dilemmas. The onset of the war in the former Yugoslavia 
in 1991; the genocide in Rwanda 1994, the Kosovo War in 1999, and the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001, not only received above-average attention from the German 
public, but also sparked fierce public debates about adequate foreign and security policy 
reactions, including the participation of the Bundeswehr, putting additional pressure on 
politicians as external and internal factors clashed.231  
Institutional opportunities within the political decision-making process constitute 
the second criterion. Public opinion may “indirectly affect policies by influencing the 
coalition-building processes among the elites”232 or even directly with options for a 
referendum as in, say, Switzerland, where defense policy is a subject of constant public 
votes. In contrast to other European states, however, the German public only has indirect 
influence on foreign and security policy behavior through parliamentary elections. This 
truth means that the greater the relevance of foreign and security policy issues, and hence, 
the greater the pressure on key stakeholders and other politicians, the closer a decision 
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relates to the next election of the Bundestag and the wider the dissent is between the 
government and opposition or even among the governmental parties.233 
Third, and potentially most important—for those who embrace Clausewitz as 
concerns the political nature of war and the role of politics and group psychology in 
conflict—public opinion can “matter for state strategy”;234 hence, it can directly 
influence the making of and decisions within foreign and security policy related to the 
use of military force. Public opinion and societal groups can affect choices of key 
decision-makers “by changing policy goals or how goals are prioritized, by narrowing the 
range of options and/or means to implement, or by winning symbolic concessions.”235 
This fact is particularly relevant for decisions on the deployment of German soldiers in 
missions abroad—especially outside of Europe.  
Given Germany’s strategic culture, such decisions have a high political 
sensitivity. As a consequence, political actors have generally endeavored to seek a broad 
societal acceptance for security policy decisions and to exclude security policy outside 
party-political calculations and tactics.236 Thus, the broader the popular consensus for or 
against general foreign and security policy behavior and particular measures in relation to 
certain issue areas, the more it may incentivize or constrain the federal government and 
the Bundestag because it increases the burden both to decide against it and to mitigate 
external expectations. Such challenging situations facilitate ambiguity in the face of 
critical decisions for military interventions. The influence of public opinion on policy 
decisions, implicated through the awareness of Germany’s political elite toward it, is 
expected to be magnified the closer elections are scheduled and/or the electoral outcome 
is contested. 
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Since reunification and the gradual evolution of international missions with 
Bundeswehr soldiers, the opinion of Germany’s citizens toward the Bundeswehr and its 
diverse tasks has become increasingly ambivalent and divided, with shifting support for 
certain types of missions. While retaining its general preference of using political rather 
than military means in international affairs, the German public unquestionably supported 
the task of national defense. At the same time, the defense within the NATO alliance and 
peacekeeping missions within the framework of the UN were widely accepted among the 
German public. Peace-enforcing missions or combat operations, however, remain 
societally disputed. On the other hand, the evolution of the public opinion toward these 
types of missions demonstrates that the public’s attitude follows and reflects international 
events. Accordingly, the acceptance of combat operations gradually rose from lower than 
50 percent until 1994 to more than 70 percent in 2000, a consequence of the Kosovo war 
in 1999. Since then, however, the acceptance gradually dropped again, despite or even 
more because of the Bundeswehr engagement in Afghanistan. In 2010, the German 
public was, again, equally divided about the matter.237 
The evolution of military engagement has affected public opinion—demonstrating 
another example of the interlinkage between factors on the external and internal level. 
The long-lasting, cost- and casualty intensive combat missions in Iraq or Afghanistan 
have hardened a public that considerably doubts the offensive or preventive use of 
military. The military means-averse attitude intensified as some missions did not progress 
as planned, like in Afghanistan, or even had counterproductive effects, like in Iraq. This 
development may be one additional reason for German citizens to favor military missions 
that have a supportive character and are embedded in a comprehensive approach that 
focuses on civil means, to and expect a peaceful evolution.238 
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The general preference of the German public seems to appeal to decision-makers 
and parliamentarians alike.239 Federal Chancellor Schröder’s refusal to deploy German 
troops in support of the Iraq operation in 2003 had more to do with his concerns about the 
prospect of success in the upcoming parliamentary elections.240 Given that almost 80 
percent of Germans at that time rejected a war in Iraq, and especially Germany’s 
participation in it, Schröder raised this domestic political critique purposefully to set 
Germany back onto a Sonderweg (“special path”) for the sake of his own reelection.241  
The yearlong refusal of key German policy-makers to use officially the term 
“war” in relation to the operational conditions in Afghanistan, can be partly traced back 
to the political concerns about the potential lack of a broad public acceptance as well as 
the to the strategic muddle with which the Afghan operation began and the eventual 
impact of this fact on the conditions in the years 2009 and 2010.242 In this context, given 
that a majority of the population openly supports a more self-confident approach of 
Germany in international affairs (that is, a German national interest) but simultaneously 
                                                 
239 Kaim, Deutschlands Einsatz in Afghanistan [Germany’s mission in Afghanistan], 9–11; Körber-
Stiftung, Einmischen oder zurückhalten? [Intervene or retain?], 3–4; Jörn Thießen and Ulrich Plate, 
“Bundeswehr und Parlament [Bundeswehr and the parliament],” in Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, 
Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr [Armed forces on a mission: Principles, 
strategies, and results of Bundeswehr participation], ed. Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner (Baden-
Baden: Nomos: 2009), 155–56. 
240 Katsioulis, “Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik im Parteiendiskurs [German security policy in party 
debate],” 227–52; Wilfried von Bredow, “Mühevolle Weltpolitik: Deutschland im System internationaler 
Beziehungen [Troublesome global politics: Germany in the system of international relations],” in Deutsche 
Außenpolitik: Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen [German foreign policy: Security, welfare, 
institutions, and norms], 2nd ed., ed. Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (Wiesbaden: 
Springer Fachmedien, 2011), 724. 
241 Johannes Varwick, “Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigunspolitik in der Nordatlantischen 
Allianz: Die Politik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung, 1998–2003 [German security and defense policy in 
NATO: The politics of the Social Democrat-Green federal government, 1998–2003],” in Deutsche 
Sicherheitspolitik: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder [German security policy: A record of the Schröder 
government], ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Christos Katsioulis, and Marco Overhaus (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2004), 24–25. 
242 Brehm et al., Armee im Einsatz [Armed forces on a mission], 164. 
 78 
opposes more international engagement,243 public opinion may work as a “domestic 
catalyst” for an emerging German self-image as a “normal ally,” further facilitating 
ambiguity in the face of critical decisions for military interventions.244  
D. DETERMINANTS ON THE ACTOR LEVEL 
Domestic political state actors are central in the making of foreign and security 
policy decisions. Since external and domestic determinants justly gain influence on 
foreign (and security) policy if they are “grasped and processed by human actors,”245 
individual (and/or collective) policy-makers—those who obtain the authority to decide—
act as the binding and mitigating246 elements between the poles of the external and 
domestic levels of policy. As these factors influence state actors in their decisions, the 
major players’ personalities, attitudes, perceptions, and preferences also play a decisive 
role in this process. Thus, apart from their functions in the system, state actors have a 
“certain leeway”247 on the policy outcome.248 Given different attitudes and changing 
(personal and power) relationships between the individual actors, policy decisions are 
expected to vary. 
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In Germany, the formulation and implementation of foreign and security policy is 
in primary responsibility of the federal cabinet government as executive branch.249 It 
maintains diplomatic relations with other states and such international organizations as 
the UN, NATO, and the EU, and shapes the policies Germany pursues in those 
organizations. Despite constitutional changes in the praxis for decisions on military 
engagements, the power to decide whether and how Germany “will participate in 
collective action[s] … including [international] military operations,” rests with the 
federal government.250 
Within the federal government, three actors, and their respective working 
ministries and subordinate echelons, predominantly design, influence, and implement 
German foreign and security policy in relation to decisions on missions abroad of the 
Bundeswehr: the federal chancellor, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of 
defense.251  
Between those three, and with the disposal of the federal chancellery, the federal 
chancellor holds the dominant position. This fact is a legacy of the Adenauer cabinet in 
the first years of the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1955. Article 65 of the Basic Law 
assigns the federal chancellor, as the highest member of the federal government, the 
power to determine the general guidelines of (foreign) policy (the so called chancellor 
principle) and thereby the responsibility for its implementation.252 The overruling 
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authority of the federal chancellor is constrained through ministerial autonomy, that is, 
the so called cabinet, and coalition principle, with its own checks and balances.253 Each 
federal ministry conducts its affairs independently and under its own responsibility. The 
cabinet principle demands that the federal government settles interministerial differences 
within the collective discussion and decision-making process. In case of an equality of 
votes, however, the vote of the federal chancellor as chairman decides. As governments 
in Germany are generally formed between two parties,254 party-political differences and 
the distribution of public offices between the coalition-partners may restrain foreign 
policy as well. 
With the Federal Foreign Office, embassies in other countries and its missions in 
international organizations, and the ministerial autonomy principle, the minister of 
foreign affairs has a broad competency for directing and coordinating foreign and 
security policy. Despite maintaining responsibilities in several key domains of foreign 
and security policy, the foreign minister’s power has been slightly decreased over the last 
decade, as responsibilities for certain policy subjects have shifted to other parts of the 
executive as well as the number of personnel dealing with international affairs in other 
executive bodies have exceeded those in the Federal Foreign Office.255 The foreign 
minister, however, remains an important actor because the position is traditionally 
manned by the coalition partner and combined with the role as vice-chancellor, which 
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allows the foreign minister to act as a political counterweight to and contester of the 
federal chancellor in the decision-making process.256 
The minister of defense complements the triad of important key stakeholders in 
relation to foreign and security policy decisions. This role has grown in the last decades 
since 1990. As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the defense minister is 
responsible for the German defense and military policy, including mission, size, and 
structure of the Bundeswehr, but also the deployment of the Bundeswehr within the 
framework of international military missions.257 
Representing Germany in international organizations during specific summits and 
dealing with general policy guidelines or decisions on particular military operations, all 
three actors strongly influence German foreign and security policy decisions. Like other 
decision-makers, they aim to reconcile and balance the two systems so that policies “do 
not openly contradict either of them.”258 Detailed studies on Germany’s participation or 
nonparticipation in multilateral military operations until 2011—from the Gulf War in 
1991, over Yugoslavia in 1999, through Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, to DRC in 
2005 and the Gulf of Aden in 2008—reveals that in each case the then minister of 
defense significantly influenced the formation and direction of public opinion, the 
political debate, and ultimately the decision making itself in a manner that broke with the 
record of the past from 1955 until 1990.259 Shifting governmental coalitions brought to 
these offices personalities with divergent personal beliefs about appropriate German 
behavior in international affairs and the role of military interventions as political means. 
Likewise, all of them showed variations in the degree to which their actions were affected 
either by external or domestic demands and constraints.  
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Beginning with the federal chancellor and the minister of foreign affairs of the 
reunification, Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), who both claimed 
a bigger international responsibility for their country, Germany slowly became involved 
in its first limited military out-of-area mission in Iraq, Cambodia, and Somalia while the 
conservative interpretation of Article 87a held sway until 1994.260 Simultaneously, 
however, Kohl, with reference to historical restrictions of his country, insistently refused 
a German military engagement in Yugoslavia, a position that became widely known as 
“Kohl doctrine,” but later changed in the wake of dramatic deterioration of the crisis into 
near genocide in the middle and end of the 1990s.261 Under the willingly more self-
confident leadership of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), rejecting Germany’s long-
lasting accused “checkbook diplomacy” (as in the Kuwait war of 1990 to 1991), German 
soldiers deployed in their first combat operation since the end of World War II, as the 
German government—with support of the majority of the Bundestag—decided to 
participate within the NATO operation Allied Forces against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, even without a UNSC mandate.262 Although continuing the Bundeswehr 
support to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan after 2002, Federal Chancellor Angela 
Merkel (CDU), the Ministers of Defense Franz-Josef Jung (CDU) and Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg (CSU), and particularly Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle 
(FDP), showed more reservations concerning the need and relevance of military forces as 
political means,263 which affected the decision-making processes, such as in the case for 
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the nonparticipation in the EU operation in Chad/CAR in 2007/2008 and the NATO 
Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden in 2008.  
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III. LIBYA—A “NORMAL” SPECIAL CASE: AMBIVALENT 
PREMISES OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY  
The Arab Spring of 2011 unleashed a new wave of turmoil in the Middle East that 
followed the eruption of the U.S. led Iraq war in 2003. The Götterdämmerung (Twilight 
of the Gods) of the Gaddafi regime posed a significant test for the principles of German 
foreign and defense policy enumerated above. This chapter frames the context and 
subsequently traces the sequence of events that contributed to the unexpected abstention 
from the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973 and the nonparticipation in the NATO mission 
to enforce it. Second, the analysis demonstrates that a complex interplay between 
elements on all three domains explains the alleged departure from premises of German 
foreign and security policy. On the macro level this chapter additionally shows, however, 
that the early German decision for a nonparticipation in an international military 
intervention also resonated with several continuing tenets of German foreign and security 
policy—underlying its “normalizing” ambivalent nature, revealed a more direct influence 
of domestic factors on foreign affairs, 
In mid-February 2011, the wave of public resentment that had roiled Tunisia and 
Egypt only weeks before, spilled over to Libya. As protests against the Gaddafi regime 
spread around the country, so did violence. Within the first five days of the unrest, an 
estimated 233 protesters had been killed, rapidly turning the nature of the Libyan revolt 
from a peaceful uprising to an armed civil conflict.264 Facing growing protest, the 
Gaddafi regime confirmed its willingness to suppress the uprising at all costs, echoed by 
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air-strikes against the rebels. On February 22, Gaddafi publicly announced that he would 
cleanse Libya house by house, killing protesters like rats.265 
The international community responded comparatively quickly to the crisis. On 
the same day of Gaddafi’s speech, the Arab League and the UNSC denounced the 
violence employed by the Libyan government.266 On February 26, the UNSC, including 
Germany as nonpermanent member, passed unanimously Resolution 1970, condemning 
the “use of force against civilians,” demanding Libyan authorities’ “responsibility to 
protect” its population, and imposing sanctions on Libya.267 Later that day, Operation 
Pegasus started, a quickly decided and secretly executed German-British joint military 
evacuation operation, in which Bundeswehr soldiers from all services directly conducted 
or contributed to a successful extraction of some 200 German and other European 
citizens from southeast Libya.268 As the violence continuously worsened and the tide 
turned against the rebels, some European states actively pushed for stronger actions 
against the Libyan government. Within only a couple of days, the initially reluctant 
attitude of the international community toward an active role in ending the violence 
against civilians in Libya reversed, culminating in the UNSC Resolution 1973 on March 
17, 2011, which sought to establish a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace.269  
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Germany, unexpectedly, however, abstained from the vote, siding with China, 
Russia, India, and Brazil. Although not voting against the resolution, Germany’s 
abstention marked a vote against such other NATO and EU allies and partners as France 
and the UK within the UNSC for the first time. The German government argued later it 
did so on the assumption that voting in favor of the no-fly zone almost certainly would 
obligate Germany to join the operation because it was too big to refuse a participation.270 
Indeed, Germany’s decision had already been preceded by a withdrawal of German naval 
assets and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) personnel deployed in the 
region.271  
Under U.S. coordination, between March 19 and March 20, French, British and 
U.S. air- and sea-based military operations started, aiming at preventing further attacks 
on Libyan citizens and opposition groups, as well as to “degrade the regime’s capability 
to resist the no-fly zone.”272 On March 24, after a weeklong struggle between NATO 
states about whether and how NATO should play a role in solving the crisis, all 
members—including Germany—agreed, based on the consensus principle within the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), that NATO would gradually take over command of the 
international military intervention. NATO formally assumed its command within 
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Operation Unified Protector on March 31.273 Germany’s official position to not provide 
military assets to the military intervention remained, even if, however, the Bundeswehr 
participated “indirectly”—without the approval of the Bundestag—within the mission 
through its multilateral integration, such as in the commanding Allied Joint Force 
Command in Naples.274 
Despite the operational praxis, however, Germany’s abstention from the vote and 
official nonparticipation in the international military mission in Libya “caused 
considerable surprise and irritation” among allies and sparked fierce domestic criticism 
among those repulsed by a coalition of the willing with the Russians and Chinese against 
the EU and NATO.275 Internationally, speculations about a potential shift from 
traditional German foreign and security policy toward a “more independent, non-aligned, 
and mercantilist-driven position” arose, worried about a new German “special path” 
(Sonderweg).276 Among those who joined the criticism in Germany was former foreign 
minister Joschka Fischer who after leaving office embraced an Atlanticism of honorable 
heritage of the Bonn Republic, calling German foreign policy a “farce” and the abstention 
a “scandalous mistake,” through which Germany had demonstrated a “losing touch with 
reality,” and hereby, ultimately had lost its “credibility within the UN and the Middle 
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East.”277 These harsh words were echoed by former federal chancellor Helmut Kohl who 
argued that Germany had lost not only its “compass,” but also its reliability in foreign and 
security affairs.278  
A. CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK OF THE DECISION-MAKING-
PROCESS 
The knotted developments of security and economy of 2011 within the domestic, 
European, and international environment framed Berlin’s decision-making process. Since 
2008, Europe had experienced a multiple crisis of national debts, banks, and economies, 
which threatened the common currency and the stability of the EU itself. What began as a 
crisis of the currency became a political crisis and impinged on the security crises after 
September 11 and also led to a transformed role for Germany in the international system. 
After several countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and particularly Greece, faced 
serious challenges to manage their national budgets due to macroeconomic performance 
imbalances, the European Union implemented a variety of financial instruments, such as 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM), aimed at preserving financial stability in Europe by providing 
financial assistance to Eurozone states in difficulty. Germany’s economic power and 
resilience gave it the power to lead the process of dealing with the crisis and to contribute 
financially on conditions of the members’ compliance with austerity measures. Promoted 
by a particularly Greece-critical media coverage, the German public stood predominantly 
opposed to any measures that required larger financial burdens from, or risks for, 
Germany.279 
As 2010 turned into 2011, politico-societal eruptions occurred in close vicinity to 
Europe’s security environment. Initiated by the “Jasmin”-revolution in Tunisia at the end 
of 2010, a wave of demonstrations and popular uprisings against long-standing 
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authoritarian regimes hit the Arab world in Northern Africa and the Middle East in early 
2011, which would become known as the “Arab Spring.” Although different in their 
underlying economic grievances and social dynamics, all revolts shared the common call 
for personal dignity, freedom and social justice, and responsive government.280 In 
Tunisia and Egypt, these revolts led to a quick overthrow of the respective regimes of 
Ben Ali and Mubarak, as particularly the army abandoned the former presidents. In 
Yemen, Libya, and Syria, however, lacking institutional contestation shifted the 
trajectory of the uprisings toward violence and civil wars of power and resources between 
governments and rebels.281  
The views of the European states toward the crises differed considerably. 
Germany actively supported the transformation processes in the Arab world with 
diplomatic and financial support along its “policy of alignment with the democratic 
awakening,” arguing that this support would correspond with “German values and 
German interests alike.”282 This was a position that raised a cheer within the 
transforming countries, visible during Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s visit to the 
Egyptian capital at the end of February, where he was greeted with chants of “Long live 
Egypt! Long live Germany!”283 France and Italy, historically and politically much more 
strongly tied to the Mediterranean region, however, remained reluctant toward an active 
engagement into the transformation process. Even more, they initially demanded a 
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stabilizing role of the EU in favor of the ruling regimes, such as Muammar al-Gaddafi’s 
in Libya.284  
On March 11, 2011, the most serious earthquake of Japan’s history and the 
resulting tsunami caused a nuclear accident at the power plant in Fukushima—a disaster 
that had been anticipated by antinuclear politics in the Germany since the origin of the 
Greens in the late 1970s. This tragic event sparked a vigorous debate among parties and 
within the German general public concerning the security of German nuclear power 
plants and the future of Germany’s energy security, dominating the media coverage. The 
high level of domestic attention prompted Federal Chancellor Merkel in mid-March 2011 
to put the oldest German nuclear power plants temporarily out of operation and to revise 
a recently developed plan that intended to extend Germany’s power plant phaseout until 
2036.285 
As the power-political and security environment before the decision on 
participation in a military intervention in Libya had changed, so did the international 
engagement of the Bundeswehr. From Merkel’s government takeover in 2005 up to 
March 2011, the Bundeswehr had either started or had finished several new missions, 
showing a clear increase of engagement in and around Africa: EUFOR RD Congo 
(2006), UNIFIL II (Lebanon, since 2006), UMIS (Sudan, 2005–2011), UNAMID 
(Darfur, since 2008), EU NAVFOR Somalia—Operation Atalanta (since 2008), and 
EUTM Somalia (since 2010).286 Most decisively, however, the nature of the Bundeswehr 
mission in Afghanistan had changed from security building to counterinsurgency. 
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Throughout the years 2007 and 2008, the rising wave of insurgent activities, which had 
already grasped the rest of Afghanistan, swept into the hitherto comparably calm German 
area of responsibility in the north of the country—urging political leaders to gradually 
release their formerly strict defensively oriented operational caveats and risk minimizing 
approaches for the Bundeswehr soldiers—the latter contrasted to lax rules of engagement 
for other ISAF contingents involved in frequent combat.287  
Consequently, German soldiers were increasingly confronted with combat 
situations of guerilla war as well as IED attacks that increased in number and 
sophistication—with deadly consequences.288 Whereas in the first six years of the ISAF 
mission 15 German soldiers died, the number nearly doubled to 23 between 2007 and 
2011.289 Magnified by the incident of a disputed German ordered airstrike in the vicinity 
of Kunduz in September 2009, which killed more than one hundred Afghan people, the 
undeniably hostile and lethal reality of the Afghan mission shifted the “German public 
and political perception of a peacekeeping mission to one of war,” changing the entire 
nature of the German ISAF involvement.290 Both then-Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg, whose new vigor and forthrightness brought him fame, and Federal 
Chancellor Merkel proclaimed that the conflict in Afghanistan and the German fighting 
within it occur in a “war,” breaking long-lasting social and foreign policy taboos.291 
Finally, domestic events connected to the advent of chaos further framed the 
German decision-making process. Due to an accusation of plagiarism concerning his 
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dissertation, the formerly glamorous Defense Minister Guttenberg resigned on March 1 in 
disgrace, just two weeks before the UNSC vote on Libya. His successor, Thomas de 
Maizière, was appointed on March 3, with little time to catch up on the speed of change 
for the deliberations on Libya. In addition, the German political parties faced three 
important regional elections end of March, including those contested between the 
conservatives and social-democrats in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia and 
the conservative stronghold of Baden-Wuertemberg. The elections were considered as a 
crucial test of the governmental coalition between CDU/CSU and the FDP, as the politics 
of the liberal junior partner had been nationally contested. Consequently, several 
members of the government, including the federal chancellor and foreign minister, were 
campaigning throughout the Libyan crisis and the evolving international response to it. 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
GERMANY’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS  
In face of a worsening situation on the ground, the multilateral environment 
before the UNSC Resolution 1973 and the decision for an international military 
intervention in Libya was characterized by critical changes in international settings, rapid 
shifts in national positions, and discordance between members of all important security 
systems. Simultaneously, Germany’s role within and attitude toward the potential 
solution of the crisis shifted, culminating in an early commitment not to participate in a 
military intervention and its abstention from the vote for the UNSC Resolution 1973.  
1. Acceleration, Germany’s Skepticism, and France’s Turnaround  
Throughout the initial international reaction toward the Libyan crisis, Germany 
played a considerable role. It strongly supported the efforts to condemn the violence by 
the Gaddafi regime and even criticized other European states for not joining the common 
course.292 UNSC Resolution 1970, which initiated sanctions on the Libyan government 
                                                 
292 Christian Walz, “Merkel verurteilt Gaddafis 'Kriegserklärung,’ [Merkel condemns Gaddafi’s 
‘declaration of war’],” Deutsche Welle, February 23, 2011, http://www.dw.de/merkel-verurteilt-gaddafis-
kriegserkl%C3%A4rung/a-14861369. 
 94 
and referred the crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC), resulted in large parts 
from German diplomatic attempts.293  
After Resolution 1970 had been passed, however, discussions on further actions 
started almost immediately. The United Kingdom’s Prime Minister David Cameron 
publicly discussed the “use of military assets” against the violent Libyan regime and 
announced preparations for a “military no-fly zone.”294 Although emphasizing the 
requirement of an international mandate as well as a multilateral approach for the 
implementation of such a decision, London stressed the argument that the international 
community could not accept the use of military force by Gaddafi against its own 
population and therefore has the responsibility to protect civilians from the attacks.295 On 
the other hand, the federal government was initially willing to explore the changes for a 
no-fly zone with its partners, but became quickly skeptical toward the idea, which for 
Germany constituted a military intervention, backed by the equally skeptical position of 
the United States.296 In a speech on March 7, Westerwelle underlined Berlin’s changed 
attitude toward a potential solution of the crisis, arguing that any further actions beyond 
sanctions “must be authorized by the UNSC and can only proceed with the approval of 
partners in the region.”297  
On March 10, a change of course in the French position became evident. Already 
having had initiated a national military planning process, France’s President Nicolas 
Sarkozy commented for the first time officially in favor of a military intervention, calling 
for the establishment of a no-fly zone in a joint letter with Prime Minister Cameron. The 
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speed and vehemence of Paris’s diplomatic rushing-ahead hit Berlin by surprise. 
Sarkozy’s solo effort one day earlier to recognize the “National Transitional Council” as 
legitimate representation of the Libyan state, which had neither been coordinated with 
nor communicated to the German government as well as contradicted standard European 
policies, notably annoyed Federal Chancellor Merkel. In addition, Berlin questioned the 
actual motives for the British and French rush for a military intervention, suspecting that 
the upcoming presidential elections and a desire to score domestically with an active 
approach in international affairs, was the primary reason for President Sarkozy to end his 
formerly close relationships with Arab dictators.298  
2. European Division and Germany’s Growing Military Reluctance  
At the Euro summit of the heads of state in Brussels and the meeting of the 
European foreign ministers in Hungary on March 11, it was clear that the European states 
(and the EU) were unable to define a common position concerning their behavior toward 
the Libyan crisis.299 Astounded by the French and British compulsion to implement their 
politics, several East and South-East European countries alongside Germany prevented 
the incorporation of the notion of a no-fly zone in the official summit declaration.300 
Westerwelle’s reaction to the official call for an establishment of a no-fly zone by the 
Arab League at the UNSC on March 12 revealed for the first time both Germany’s 
growing reluctance toward participation in a military intervention and its efforts to 
increase the diplomatic burdens to international actions above the level of sanctions. 
Claiming that “every international military action needs to be authorized by the UN 
Security Council” and that “a no-fly zone can only be implemented with the active 
participation of the states of the region,” he emphasized simultaneously that “the 
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implementation of a no-fly zone is a military action” and that Germany did not “want to 
get involved in a civil war in North Africa.”301  
Meanwhile, the situation for the rebels in Libya, however, was deteriorating 
rapidly during the second week of March. Whereas many external observers had 
expected a quick fall of the Libyan government based on the initial advances of the 
rebels, Gaddafi’s troops regained the momentum of the offensive and recaptured several 
cities until March 13, threatening the rebel stronghold of Benghazi.302 
Encouraged by the worsening conditions on ground, and regardless of Germany’s 
attitude and diplomatic efforts regarding a military intervention, immediately after the 
call from the Arab League on March 12, French, British, and Lebanese officials in New 
York had started to draft a UN resolution for a no-fly zone. Following the initial 
discussions in the UNSC on March 14, the Lebanon delegation distributed a draft version 
to council members, including Germany, the following day.303 This document reached 
Berlin, however, just at the second day of the G8 summit meeting in Paris on March 14 
and 15, where the dispute between France as new driving power for a military 
intervention and Germany as “brakeman” escalated. While France’s new Foreign 
Minister Juppé openly sought support for a no-fly zone, which he got from the United 
Kingdom and Canada, Westerwelle openly defended Germany’s manifest skepticism 
regarding the success and implications as well as the potential risks and costs of a 
military interference in Libya. Berlin, crucially, felt vindicated in its position, as U.S. 
President Barack Obama had shown a cautious approach toward the Libyan crisis and 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed considerable concerns about the 
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implementation and consequences of a no-fly zone, including the potential need for 
ground troops.304 
3. U.S. Switch and the Shift toward “All Necessary Means” 
Despite the apparent alignment between the German and U.S. position, they 
differed already substantially by the end of the G8 summit meeting.305 The skeptical 
attitude of defense secretary Gates toward a no-fly zone in Libya did not reflect a 
coherent opinion of the Obama administration. Instead, senior U.S. officials were divided 
into two camps. Whereas Vice President Joe Biden and top-level Pentagon advisors 
shared Gates’s concerns about the risks and implications of a military intervention for 
Libya and the region but also for the credibility of the United States, National Security 
Council (NSC) Senior Director Samantha Power and U.S. ambassador to the UN, Susan 
Rice, pushed for military actions from the onset of the crisis. Influenced by experiences 
of failed international responses to the ethnic cleansings in Rwanda and the Balkans 
during the 1990s, both highlighted the responsibility of the “international community to 
protect civilian populations from violations of international humanitarian law when states 
are unwilling or unable to do so.”306  
Most importantly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had reversed her initially 
opposing opinion toward a military intervention, making an unusual break with Defense 
Minister Robert Gates. In addition, her meetings with Arab leaders in Paris and Cairo on 
March 14 and 15 revealed that the Arab countries not only supported a no-fly zone but 
even made serious commitments to actively participate in “military operations against 
                                                 
304 Lena Greiner, “Auf Libyen folgt Syrien? [Does Syria follow Libya?],” Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik [Pages for German and international politics], no. 7 (2012): 74; David E. Sanger and 
Thom Shanker, “Gates Warns of Risks of a No-Flight Zone,” New York Times, March 2, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/africa/03military.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Nicholas Watt, 
“U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates Slams ‘Loose Talk’ About No-Fly Zones,” Guardian, March 3, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/mar/03/robert-gates-dismisses-no-fly-zone; John Barry, 
“Robert Gates’ Fears about Libya,” Daily Beast, March 8, 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2011/03/09/defense-secretary-robert-gates-fears-about-us-military-action-in-libya.html; Lindström and 
Zetterlund, Setting the Stage, 42. 
305 Brockmeier, “Germany and the Intervention in Libya,” 69–70. 
306 Michael Hastings, “Inside Obama’s War Room,” Rolling Stone, October 13, 2011, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-obamas-war-room-20111013.  
 98 
one of their own.”307 Facing the potential threat of “mass atrocity” to civilians in 
Benghazi but a solution for the credibility problem of a U.S. military intervention in the 
region, Washington made a crucial change in its stance on the evening of March 15.308  
Reassured by UN ambassador Susan Rice that the UN would support a broader 
intervention and with plans for targeted airstrike on the table, President Obama instructed 
Rice to negotiate a resolution that would authorize not only a no-fly zone, but the use of 
“all necessary means”309 to protect civilians in Libya, including NATO strikes against 
targets on the ground, which he thought to be the only thing “that’s going to make a 
difference.”310 On the same evening, as instructed, the U.S. delegation in New York 
revised the Lebanese-French-British draft resolution, introduced significant amendments, 
and coordinated it with their French and British colleagues. Simultaneously, President 
Obama called French President Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister Cameron to inform them 
about the shift in the U.S. position.311 
4. Germany’s Misinformed Political Debate and Public Refusal 
The German government, however, initially remained uninformed. Only as UN 
Ambassador Rice called her German colleague Peter Wittig in the late morning on March 
16, Berlin learned of Washington’s crucial change of mind and the new draft resolution 
in the later afternoon, local time, on March 16—after Libya-related political meetings in 
Germany had already been concluded.312 At first in the morning, the German 
parliamentary committee for foreign affairs, the most important constitutional instrument 
to prepare the parliamentarian vote for the approval of the deployment of German forces, 
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met to discuss the situation in Libya. Immediately afterwards, a debate of the German 
Bundestag took place, in which Foreign Minister Westerwelle gave a governmental 
declaration concerning the turmoil in the Arab world. Already reflecting the constituting 
governmental position against a German participation in a military intervention in Libya, 
this speech “made it almost impossible for Westerwelle to turn around and support 
military measures in Libya the next day, despite the change of circumstances.”313  
Westerwelle raised particular concerns about the potential risks, negative 
repercussions, and questionable efficiency of a no-fly zone—which equaled for him a 
military intervention—in Libya. While asking “what happens, if [after having established 
a no-fly zone] the attacks on the ground continue? Do we then have to fight Gaddafi’s 
tanks from the air? And if this is not enough, do we then have to send ground troops?” he 
raised questions that the U.S. administration had already answered with its amendments 
to the draft resolution.314 Consequently, he stated that “the federal government is highly 
skeptical in regard to a military intervention in the form of a no-fly zone.”315 
Westerwelle continued to argue that Germany did not want to and must not become a 
“war party in a civil war in North Africa,” to prevent Germany from a “slippery slope, 
where on its end then German soldiers are part of a war in Libya.”316 Instead of being 
inactive, the internationally community should rather use “targeted sanctions, which 
[would] increase the pressure on Gaddafi.”317  
A poll published by the popular news magazine Stern (known for its skeptical 
editorial stand on defense policy and of U.S. policy, as well) on the same day, supported 
the manifesting nonparticipatory position of the federal government. Whereas 56 percent 
of those polled agreed with the establishment of a no-fly zone, in comparison to 70 
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percent in favor of a trade embargo, 88 percent opposed a direct military engagement of 
German soldiers in Libya.318 
The debate following Westerwelle’s speech was framed by the common belief 
that the United States still opposed a military intervention, a respective proposal would be 
limited to a no-fly zone, a commitment for active engagement by the Arab states did not 
exist, and a UN resolution was not likely.319 Whereas Social-Democrat and Green 
foreign policy experts criticized the governmental policy of having quickly refused 
instruments of the UN Charter, such as a no-fly zone, as legitimate means to solve the 
crisis,320 Westerwelle’s cautious position received broad support by parliamentarians of 
the governmental coalition as well as from the left-wing party.321 Foreign policy experts 
of the governmental coalition, however, contended that in case of an active Arab 
participation in an intervention, “Germany cannot and will not abdicate its responsibility” 
and in case of an UNSC Resolution for the establishment of a no-fly zone, “Germany 
would then have to think again, who could possibly intervene there.”322  
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5. UN Negotiations and Merkel’s Determination against German 
Participation 
Such a resolution already existed as a draft in New York and was brought into 
official consultation on March 16, at around noon, local time, under pressure of France 
and the United Kingdom.323 Washington had introduced a language that explicitly 
demanded the “legal authority from the UN to use force against Gaddafi’s troops and key 
national security installations”324 as well as the active participation of the Arab states in a 
NATO-led air coalition. Both developments caused fierce debates between the members 
of the council. As the German Ambassador Wittig informed Westerwelle after the end of 
the consultation in New York at 7 p.m., it was clear, however, that neither Russia nor 
China would use its veto to a block a UNSC resolution, which vote was expected to take 
place the following day.325 
While after the first information from New York officials in the Foreign Office 
were still debating how Germany should vote as a nonpermanent member in the 
upcoming resolution, allegedly excluding a “no”-option from the onset as unrealistic,326 
the federal chancellor had already made up her mind regarding the German stance toward 
the Libyan case—against German participation in a potential international military 
intervention in Libya. In an interview on March 16, which was published the following 
day, she expressed her skepticism toward a military interventions and argued that “as 
Federal Chancellor, she could not lead [Germany] in a mission with an extremely 
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uncertain end.”327 In case the minimal preconditions for such an intervention would have 
existed, namely a UNSC resolution and an active engagement of the Arab League, two 
aspects from which Federal Chancellor Merkel believed that they were still undecided, 
she made clear that even then “this still does not mean, that Germany will … 
participate.”328   
6. From Nonparticipation to Abstention 
On the morning of March 17, German and Libyan time, Gaddafi publicly 
threatened the rebels, announcing that “his armed forces were coming to their capital 
Benghazi tonight and would not show any mercy.”329 Members of the international 
community in favor of an intervention understood the urgency to act swiftly before 
Benghazi would be lost. In the meantime in Germany, Foreign Minister Westerwelle 
reaffirmed in a radio interview his strong position against the notion that Germany would 
become part of a “permanent civil war” in Libya and that “German soldiers will be 
involved” in such a prolonged war. He explicitly excluded the opportunity that the 
“German Air Force bombs Libyan anti-aircraft positions.”330 The entire morning, 
however, was dominated by the governmental declaration of Federal Chancellor Merkel 
and the parliamentarian debate regarding the energy turnaround in Germany after the 
nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima.331  
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On the sidelines of the debate, Westerwelle spoke frequently with the faction 
leaders in the Bundestag, getting the impression that all of them shared the governmental 
skepticism regarding a military intervention.332 Not earlier than 2 p.m., German time—as 
negotiations at working level had already resumed in New York—diplomats and advisors 
of the Foreign Office got the opportunity to discuss Germany’s further course of action 
with Foreign Minister Westerwelle.333 The focus of the short meeting was on a politically 
acceptable justification for the definite nonparticipation of the Bundeswehr in a military 
intervention in Libya.334 Central issues and questions concerning Germany’s alliance 
solidarity, the price to pay for a German nonparticipation, and the protection of civilians 
were addressed. Proponents of an abstention argued that a “yes” vote without 
participating would be politically unsustainable and could be even more damaging for 
Germany’s reputation in the alliance, if Germany did not provide its available military 
capacities as required for the enforcement of the no-fly zone. Only a few diplomats, 
including Wittig, advocated a conditioned “yes” vote—a common German political 
praxis within the UN—as they feared the consequences of a potential German isolation 
from its Western allies.335  
The formal decision to abstain from the vote was finalized not later than the 
second meeting of the group in the evening on March 17. Until then, three important 
evolutions occurred. First, during the day it became clear that, even if still not fully 
certain, there was a sufficient majority within the UNSC to pass the vote without 
Germany’s approval. Portugal, also initially skeptical toward the proposal of a no-fly 
zone, had decided to vote “yes,” even if it intended not to participate in the military 
intervention. At the same time, under pressure from U.S. Ambassador Rice, the African 
states showed the willingness to vote for the resolution. Second, Federal Chancellor 
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Merkel, Foreign Minister Westerwelle, and Defense Minister de Maizière had already 
internally agreed to endorse an abstention from the vote, based on their common decision 
that Germany would not participate with soldiers or with equipment in a military 
intervention in Libya. Yet in a call with Prime Minister Cameron, Federal Chancellor 
Merkel reassured her counterpart flexibility for the unlikely case that the passing of the 
resolution would ultimately depend on German support. Third, to mitigate potential 
concerns about Germany’s alliance solidarity, Defense Minister de Maizière offered in a 
call with NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen German military air crews 
for the AWACS-mission in Afghanistan, which offer he accepted.336 
Late attempts by British and U.S. officials to shift the German government’s 
opinion proved unsuccessful. Federal Chancellor Merkel did not take a call from U.S. 
President Obama, trying to explain to her the change of the American position. An offer 
by the British Foreign Minister Hague shortly before the vote to exclude the notions of 
ground troops and occupation force in the resolution, was refused by Westerwelle with a 
reference to an already existing unbearable threat throughout the enforcement of a no-fly 
zone.337 
Eventually, as the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973 took place around midnight 
German time, UN Ambassador Wittig raised his hand for abstention. In a statement 
immediately after the passage of the resolution, Westerwelle justified Germany’s course: 
When the resolution was put to vote, Germany abstained. The resolution 
contains significantly tougher international sanctions against the Gaddafi 
regime. We welcome and support this, as we ourselves had pushed in this 
direction. We are still very skeptical, however, about the option of a 
military intervention in Libya, also contained in the resolution. We see 
considerable risks in this. Therefore, we cannot subscribe to this part of 
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the resolution. German soldiers will not participate in a military action in 
Libya.338 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANCE AND INTERPLAY OF 
DETERMINANTS FOR THE GERMAN DECISION FOR 
NONPARTICIPATION 
As the sequence of events demonstrates, days before the final decision to abstain 
from the vote, the German government was trapped in an apparently unsolvable 
dilemma.339 On one hand, it could act according to the expectations of its allies and 
partners and participate in the military intervention, but face enormous domestic pressure 
and potential political backfire from an opposing German public in the upcoming 
elections. This problem was hardly unique to 2011, and has existed in other forms as far 
back as the foundation of the FRG in 1949. On the other hand, Merkel, Westerwelle, and 
de Maizière could act accordingly to their substantial doubts about the viability of a 
military operation in Libya and eschew a German contribution to it, but risk a break with 
premises of own foreign and security policy. The early predetermination of the German 
government against a military participation, which ultimately shaped the logical 
foundation for an abstention from the vote against UNSC Resolution 1973, rested on a 
complex interplay between overlapping, contradicting, and mutually reinforcing impulses 
and constraints on all three levels, exemplarily revealing the mutually dependent and 
interpenetrated linkage between the domains in the formation of policy for military 
intervention not only on the continent of Africa, but elsewhere. 
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1. Determinants on the External Level 
In contrast to some studies,340 this thesis posits that the external system cannot be 
neglected in explaining Germany’s decision for a nonparticipation in the military 
intervention in Libya. Instead, as demonstrated in the following, external factors either 
did not create the “normal” level of impulse for, or disincentivized the German 
government from a German military contribution in Operation Unified Protector. 
Consequently, the specific qualities of the external system redirected the attention to, 
magnified, and fueled domestic concerns as well as actor-related traits that favored a 
nonparticipation. 
a. Power and Security Environment 
The conditions and evolutions of the power and security environment in Europe 
and Africa in 2011 affected Germany’s decision for a nonparticipation in the military 
intervention considerably, as many of the discrete elements reduced the salience of 
Libyan crisis as a “strategic dilemma,” and hence, disincentivized or distracted the 
general public and the politicians from taking a more positive stance toward a German 
military contribution.341 The Eurozone and financial crisis dominated the headlines and 
mass attention in Germany in 2010 and 2011, overshadowing the public and political 
discourse and keeping the federal government preoccupied with the “interests of German 
taxpayers” as well as highly occupied with the mitigation of the crisis’ potential strategic 
ramifications for Germany’s role in Europe.342 The emphasis on the primacy of the 
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German taxpayer has been a legacy of the past 20 and more years of national 
reconstruction in unification, and more recently, in the imperative to preserve European 
unity as the basis of German national interests of prosperity and security. 
The federal government’s primary focus on strengthening Germany’s economic 
power base in face of a challenging environment limited the appeal of the Libyan crisis as 
a direct threat to Germany’s security. As a result, it gradually reinforced a geo-
economically dominated attitude, reluctant to actively shape the international response to 
the crisis and to become involved in another costly and risky international military 
commitment as it had been going in the wrong direction in Afghanistan during the past 
year.343 Framed and increasingly internationally criticized by this declining disposition 
for (military) engagement, Germany, as a nonpermanent member in the UNSC, lacked 
the opportunity and willingness to use its political leverage to influence the design of 
UNSC Resolution 1973.344 Instead, as part of the triad of western European powers, 
Germany’s international restraint and lack of alternatives indirectly affirmed France’s and 
Britain’s active and forceful course (where few or no inhibitions operate about the 
African continent and the need to use military force, following the model of Suez or 
Algeria in the 1950s), which in turn reinforced the federal government’s sentiments 
toward the potential implications of a military intervention. 
The military engagement–averse conditions intensified throughout the crucial 
phase of a shifting international perception for a more active role in Libya, as German 
politicians, including the federal government, were completely focused on discussions 
about Germany’s energy security policy, resulting from the nuclear accident in 
Fukushima on March 11—a primacy of domestic politics of a particular kind. Since 
Merkel’s coalition had just prolonged the operational lives of the country’s nuclear power 
plants, many of them in Baden-Wuerttemberg, against the opposition of the Social 
Democrats and Green parties in the autumn of 2010, the federal government feared an 
“anti-nuclear backlash” in the upcoming regional elections where the CDU was on the 
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losing side in what had traditionally been an old bastion of West German Christian 
Democracy. While having lost one of its key projects and facing broad criticism after 
reversing its stance on nuclear energy, the federal government therefore was under 
enormous pressure to “get Libya right” in terms of electoral politics, sensitizing Merkel 
and Westerwelle for public concerns and disincentivizing both from becoming involved 
in a mounting unpopular crisis management commitment.345  
b. National Interests and Strategies 
National interests that related to the region itself, the protection of human rights, 
and the security dimension of Germany’s foreign and security policy, were mainly 
disregarded in the decision about Germany’s involvement in the international military 
intervention in Libya. Instead, “interests” related to economic concerns, domestic short-
term calculations,346 and considerations regarding the potential impacts of a military 
intervention framed and dominated the decision-making process, promoting 
nonparticipation. Germany’s White Paper 2006 identified unresolved regional conflicts in 
the European periphery and resulting uncontrolled migration as two of the key challenges 
and risks, as they have the potential to result in civil wars, destabilize entire regions, 
affect the security of the international community, and particularly threaten the 
“European area of stability”—Germany’s overriding security concern.347 The evolution 
of the armed civil conflict in Libya thus had all qualities to negatively affect this 
stability—directly and indirectly. Furthermore, Gaddafi’s declaration of war against his 
own people clearly constituted a serious violation of human rights.  
Throughout the political debates and in public announcements until the decision 
for nonparticipation and abstention from the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973, however, 
the federal government failed to highlight the steadily worsening humanitarian crisis in 
Libya and its potential to strike at European, and respectively, German security 
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interests.348 Instead, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel argued in her interview on March 
16 that, in contrast to the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan, Germany’s 
security was not threatened in Libya, and thus a (military) intervention would not be 
justified.349 Moreover, Westerwelle repeatedly attempted to raise the threshold for an 
international involvement and publicly affirmed that Germany is “incapable to eradicate 
injustice all over the world,”350 a statement that was echoed by Defense Minister Thomas 
de Maizière one day after the abstention.351 This position suggests that key German 
stakeholders even willingly refused to pursue clearly affected national interests in 
accordance with the UN Charter, as they stood in contrast to other policy considerations.  
In contrast, with the initial enthusiasm about the Arab Spring that operated at this 
moment in 2011, Westerwelle frequently emphasized that the public upheavals and 
democratic movements, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, corresponded to Germany’s 
“values and interests alike,” which needed to be diplomatically and financially supported 
and even “protected” against the potentially negative spillover effects of an external 
intervention in Libya.352 This overall ambivalent position remained, although the 
Maghreb region had successively gained relevance for German foreign and security 
policy in relation to three aspects: 1) the increased significance of energy security, as 
Libya and Algeria ranked at the beginning of 2011 as Germany’s fourth and eighth 
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biggest oil suppliers respectively; 2) the containment of migration, as the region had 
become an important transit hub of migrant movements to Europe; and 3) the fight 
against terrorism and organized crime, with the rise and spread of al Qaida in the 
Maghreb.353  
Despite the increased significance of the entire North African region for German 
foreign and security policy, in early 2011, Germany still lacked an overall strategic 
concept that determined and coordinated policies for that particular area, demonstrating 
Germany’s continuing problems to define and understand its relations with, and particular 
its interests in, the African continent.354 On the other side, Westerwelle’s permanent 
reference to the responsibility of the Arab world to be part of the solution for the crisis, 
could also be understood as Germany’s approach to promote Africa’s political “self-
reliance,” formulated early in 2000.355 While uncertain about the implications of a strong 
Western influence in Africa and of the potential repercussions of a military engagement, 
the motto “African solutions for African problems” could additionally justify Germany’s 
overall reticent stance. 
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Lacking or disregarding clearly articulated German national and European 
security interests in Libya, but being mainly concerned with economic and domestic 
challenges, the German government, however, was both hampered and reluctant to follow 
the shifting international attitude for a forceful international engagement—an old, 
familiar problem. Consequently, while indirectly criticizing France and Italy for “having 
paid court to Gaddafi in the past,” Defense Minister de Maizière posited that the federal 
government “would not see any duty for Germany” to remove the Libyan ruler. Even if 
supporting the efforts of the international community, the federal government would 
“reserve the right in the German interest, to say [Germany] will be not involved this 
time.”356 He failed to explain further where Germany’s interests for a nonparticipation 
rested—contributing to the notion that only decision-makers decide what national 
interests are.357 
c. Multilateral Integration 
Germany’s external expectations finally proved insufficiently powerful to 
overrule domestic and operational concerns in favor of a military participation.358 The 
push of events overwhelmed an initially reluctant cabinet. This fact led to rapidly 
changing but continuously discordant positions in the multilateral environment, which 
exceeded the capabilities of the German decision-making process.359 Thus, arose crucial 
German misinterpretations,360 misassumptions, and miscalculations in the case of Libya 
and the intervention. All of these factors facilitated an early predisposition of the German 
government to eschew participation, letting the federal government falsely assume to act, 
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at least, partly according to its premises of Westorientierung (orientation to the West) and 
“alliance solidarity.” Such policy considerably hampered, however, also a redirection of 
the German position in support of a (Western-heavy) multilateral engagement as the 
conditions rapidly changed—resulting in harsh criticism from within and without as 
concerns Germany’s reputation as a credible and reliable multilateral partner.  
Relativizing the initially harsh domestic criticism aimed at the federal government 
due to Germany’s isolation amid its most important Western allies, Germany did not 
stand alone within NATO and the EU with its skeptical position regarding a military 
intervention, which in turn had increased the incentives for a decision against a national 
military contribution. Instead, deeper and rather unusual dissents among the members 
characterized the internal conditions of both institutions, weakening their adhesive and 
centripetal effects on a Germany participation.361  
Whereas past security disputes in Brussels, especially Iraq in 2002 and 2003 had 
often been fought between Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European states and parts of 
Western Europe under the common German-French lead, the case of Libya split both 
institutions between the old Western core of NATO with France and East European states 
with Germany. In particular, the gradual “disillusionment” of Eastern European states, 
such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czech Republic, concerning the implications of 
their contributions to Western interventions and France’s unilateral actions deprived the 
EU of a common, more active, and more robust response to the Libyan crisis. Likewise in 
NATO, Turkey’s reticence to a possible Western intervention in a Muslim country and 
opposition to a potential French leadership of a coalition of the willing, France’s 
reluctance to involve the alliance, and the United States’ long-lasting skeptical position 
raised considerable political tensions among its members and hampered coherent actions, 
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even if the alliance internally prepared operational plans for Libya.362 Thus, the EU and 
NATO’s internal incoherence strengthened Germany’s risk- and intervention-averse 
stance, disincentivizing German participation.  
Magnified by sincere suspicions about the real motives of France and the United 
Kingdom and by the lack of up to date information, all these factors led the federal 
government and the majority of the Bundestag falsely to believe, first, that an UNSC 
resolution on a military intervention in Libya was unlikely to be initiated, and second, 
that even if achievable, the French-British-Lebanese proposal for a no-fly zone would fail 
against the opposition of the United States as well as the potential veto of Russia and 
China.363 Within the context of questions regarding Germany’s alliance solidarity, such 
evidence as Westerwelle’s governmental declaration and Merkel’s interview on March 
16, suggests that it is precisely the misassumption about the enduring agreement of the 
U.S. side with Germany’s general skepticism about intervention, which facilitated and 
promoted an early predisposition of the federal government against a German military 
involvement in Libya—believing it would still act in concert with its most important 
transatlantic ally. 
This misinformation-based misperception of the international constellation also 
supports the notion that the federal government miscalculated the consequences of an 
abstention from the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973, resulting in an underestimation of 
the resulting damage to Germany’s reputation as a reliable multilateral partner. While 
weighing between potential foreign and domestic policy costs and benefits, the 
government in Berlin believed it could politically afford its military intervention–
skeptical attitude against the positions of other allies with the support of a U.S. stance of 
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reticence in this case, as well as domestically score in advance of two important regional 
elections.364  
Despite protests to the contrary that the German abstention “should not be 
confused with neutrality” and that Germany “share[s] the goals of the resolution 
unreservedly,” once determined, the federal government felt unable to reverse its overall 
reticent position in face of rapidly changed circumstances—even if such a stance would 
violate its solidarity with its biggest allies and partners.365 It believed and argued that a 
vote for the resolution “without subsequent military contributions would not [only] have 
been inconsistent,” but also impossible to sustain. As “the largest European member of 
NATO” and with its available military capabilities precisely to enforce the no-fly zone, 
Germany would be deprived of the opportunity to decide whether it wanted to send 
troops. Rather, Berlin could deal only with the question of how many soldiers to send.366 
The conviction prevailed that such a position would have a higher potential to damage 
Germany’s multilateral reputation.367 Consequently, the federal government adhered to 
its attitude that “[it] cannot send German soldiers to Libya, because the others do it.”368 
d. Evolution of Military Engagement 
German public outcry about the casualties of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan 
both nourished a public opinion that stood increasingly opposed to any further foreign 
engagements of the Bundeswehr, particularly in combat operations, and strongly 
magnified governmental concerns about potential backlash toward a military intervention 
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in Libya—all of them facilitating a refusal to deploy forces.369 All new missions of the 
Bundeswehr starting from Merkel’s government takeover in 2005 up to Libya had a clear 
humanitarian or peace-supporting mandate, with a partial exception of combatting piracy 
within the EU NAVFOR Somalia—Operation Atalanta, and thus, broadly corresponded 
with the general risk aversion and military restraint that dominates domestic politics and 
the thinking of political elites. 
The ongoing mission in Afghanistan with its escalation after 2008, however, had 
an unprecedented negative influence on the perception of the government, the 
parliamentarians, and the public regarding the role and relevance of military forces as an 
instrument of foreign policy. The limited NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 had created 
the impression that an “intervention could be efficient and successful, with low risks and 
costs.”370 The international engagement in Afghanistan, conversely, had proven the 
opposite because of the strategic problems of the U.S.-led global war on terror and the 
security realities of Southwestern Asia as they have stood for two centuries. Despite 
enormous personal, material, and financial efforts amid and in parallel to NATO ISAF 
and U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, such as political reforms and development 
assistance, the security situation in Afghanistan had worsened since 2008 into an 
insurgency on a broad scale and more or less on the pattern of the resistance to the British 
and the Soviets in earlier times.  
As the publicly and politically perceived nature of the Bundeswehr engagement 
shifted from a “peacekeeping mission to one of war,”371 so did the political and public 
assessment of the mission. This development, in and of itself, represented the climax of 
the evolution of German security and military policy as it had progressed from 1990 to 
2011. Even if Federal Chancellor Merkel and Defense Minister de Maizière argued later 
in 2011 that “military means cannot and must be excluded as ultimo ratio”372 as well as 
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that “the use of military force can be a political means to prevent or to contain worse 
violence,”373 the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan became broadly seen by its critics 
and its supporters, too, as a “risky, long, and costly enterprise with [questionable] 
benefits.”374 A study conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in 
mid-2011 revealed the intensifying public opposition to the mission, as 51 percent of the 
respondents demanded that Germany should withdraw all troops from Afghanistan and 
19 percent wanted that Germany should at least reduce its troops there.375  
Most importantly, the unexpected evolutions and implications of the Bundeswehr 
engagement in Afghanistan considerably influenced political thinking in Berlin regarding 
the calculus and implicit criteria for using military force as foreign policy tool—
strengthening a risk-averse position toward a German participation in the military 
intervention in Libya. Accordingly, Westerwelle publicly stated on March 10, 2011, that 
it is imperative for him to ensure that “we as Germans will not be drawn carelessly in 
war, from which we then cannot escape for many years.”376 His reticent attitude was 
echoed one day later by Defense Minister de Maizière arguing that avoiding unpersuasive 
and unenforceable tasks requires that “military actions have to be thought through to the 
end.”377     
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e. Mission Framework 
Framed and magnified by the “Afghanistan experience,” mission-related concerns 
about the lack of an overall strategic concept, shortfalls in the planning, potential costs of 
an intervention, and risks for German soldiers, significantly influenced German key 
stakeholders to opt for Germany’s nonparticipation in 2011 as they trumped 
considerations of a legitimate cause for a military invention in North Africa. While 
arguing along its general preference of political solutions over military means, the federal 
government assumed a deeply skeptical and critical position toward a no-fly zone over 
Libya early in the decision-making process. Worried about the French and British 
motives for the initiative and with a sense of having been excluded from Franco-British 
diplomacy, Merkel, Westerwelle, and de Maizière sincerely questioned whether such an 
intervention had been “one hundred percent thought through” regarding the goals, 
appropriate means, potential consequences, and conditions for ending the mission—all 
vital criteria for German decisions on participation in military interventions.378  
With the accusation that the French-British plan lacked a coherent strategy, the 
federal government doubted that “a no-fly zone or similar military engagement from the 
air could be successful [and effective] in protecting civilians.”379 Instead, the German 
side feared that such an inadequate military intervention could even worsen the situation, 
lead to more violence and civilian casualties, and finally “weaken the entire democratic 
movement in Northern Africa.”380 Even more problematic for the federal government, a 
military intervention from the air, once proven unsuccessful, could potentially cause a 
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“slippery slope,” of mission creep, dragging Western states into a prolonged Libyan civil 
war, which would require an intervention with ground troops.381 With Federal Chancellor 
Merkel being “unable to lead [Germany] into a mission with uncertain end,”382 and 
Foreign Minister Westerwelle being unwilling for German soldiers to become “part of a 
war in Libya, a permanent civil war in Libya,”383 the federal government internally 
decided not later than March 16, 2011, after having weighed “both considerable foreign 
policy and military threats and risks”384 against potential benefits, that Germany would 
not take part with the Bundeswehr in a military intervention in Libya. All public 
statements made clear that the federal government’s sensitivity toward the risks and 
consequences of an engagement, rather than about the risks and consequences of a 
nonengagement loomed as more crucial for the decision against a participation of 
German soldiers in the mission. 
This fact would also explain why the German government disregarded legitimate 
and value-based causes that have justified—and even required—participation in a more 
robust answer to the Libyan crisis. As recently as the end of 2010, Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle publicly had stated that the “protection of human rights is a cornerstone of 
German foreign policy” and only with “the respect of human rights, permanent peace and 
economic development can flourish.”385 Gaddafi’s open declaration of war against his 
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own people clearly violated these ideals and thus formed a reasonable and justifiable 
basis to intervene in the humanitarian framework of a “responsibility to protect” the 
Libyan civilian population against the arbitrariness of its own government. With the 
mandate of the UNSC and the support of the Arab League, the political, legal, and moral 
preconditions for a German military engagement in Libya were even more pressing than 
in the case of the Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.386 Yet, whereas some scholars doubt 
whether the German government clearly understood the humanitarian and peace 
enforcement concept of a “responsibility to protect” and its significance to the situation in 
Libya,387 the weight of the mission framework–related concerns, domestic politics 
calculations, and cultural facets decisively reduced their importance during the decision-
making process. 
2. Determinants on the Internal Level 
Factors in the internal system significantly influenced the national and collective 
security decision to refuse to participate with German soldiers in the international 
military operation in Libya. Within the extended, interpenetrated three-level logic of 
(German) foreign and security policy, the insufficient and even disincentivizing nature of 
external factors magnified the impact of domestically-motivated actor-related short-term 
calculations, considerations to domestic acceptance,388 and certain elements of 
Germany’s strategic cultural as well as role conception on the decision-making process. 
The Libyan case not only supports the notion of an increased “domestic politicization”389 
of German foreign policy, but also illustrates to what extent the salience of other aspects, 
including foreign policy aims and principles, allow internal factors to unfold their 
influence on the decision.  
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a. Strategic Culture and Conception of National Role 
Germany’s foreign policy strategic culture and its conception of its national role 
significantly influenced the decision for nonparticipation; however, beside the impact of a 
more self-confident attitude of members of the federal government in 2011, the effect 
overwhelmingly relates to the over-emphasis on the nonviolent and civil premise 
“politics before force” and the related “culture of (military) restraint,”390 as both 
superposed all other cultural and role conceptual subcomponents of a “civil power” and 
deprived them of their salience. As elucidated in the last section, the nature of the Libyan 
crisis in 2011 and the conditions of the international response completely corresponded 
with to these two conceptual tenets of German foreign and security policy. 
First, “never again,” as the protection of the Libyan population within the 
framework of a “responsibility to protect” would have been consistent with Germany’s 
national interests, value-based approach, and normative self-image. Second, “never 
alone,” as the unanimous vote of its Western allies for UNSC Resolution 1973 and its 
implementation through a NATO operation would have been consistent with the 
multilateral premise of German foreign and security policy.391 Yet, fueled by the Afghan 
experience in 2008 to 2010 and a particular domestic political constellation of contested 
coalitions, Berlin was sincerely concerned about the risks and implications of an 
international military intervention, through which Germany could have become a “war 
party” in potentially long-lasting violent conflict in Libya. This fear magnified the 
inherent risk-averse stance in international affairs in the body politic and elites as well as 
the reticent attitude toward the use of military force in general as the overwhelming 
“lesson of history,” even when certain facts of the moment suggested that no such lesson 
really existed at all. Both elements of political culture, role concept, and diplomatic 
practice won primacy over all other subcomponents within the governmental decision-
making process—including alliance solidarity, which has played a lesser role in the 
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recent past than in the worst days of the Cold War at which time such solidarity was more 
essential. Germany’s favor of “political (and economic) before military means,” resulting 
in the abstention from the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973 and nonparticipation in the 
multilateral military intervention, therefore, simultaneously corresponded with, and 
contradicted, core tenets of German foreign and security policy—demonstrating its 
continuing ambivalent nature. 
The publicly displayed determination of the federal government to defend 
Germany’s national stance against international positions,392 hereby arguing and acting 
against such key allies as France and the United Kingdom, further supports to the notion 
that Merkel, Westerwelle, and de Maizière had developed, during the years of their 
common government, of a self-confident attitude toward and a nuanced image of 
Germany’s role in international affairs in the midst of a tumultuous international system 
that has grown multipolar and been beset with overlaying crises. In particular, Germany’s 
economic-based strengthened power position amid the financial and economic crisis after 
2008 backed this more self-assured appearance and partly “solipsistic mindset.”393 This 
environment facilitated an inward-looking early predisposition to refuse the use of 
military force as a solution for the crisis in Libya—even against potential external 
resistance, which, in the event, was greater than the stakeholders of such German policy 
initially conceived in the heat of crisis. Although limited through the misassumptions 
about the conditions in the international environment and the miscalculations about the 
implications of Germany’s foreign policy decisions, a matured national role conception, 
with less emphasis on the premises of a “civilian power,” may additionally explain why 
the federal government could partly subordinate long-term foreign policy interests and 
goals under short-term domestic political considerations.394  
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b. Parliament and Political Contestation 
Domestic political motives and considerations, such as the party politics of the 
FDP in crisis, upcoming regional elections in which the health of the coalition was at 
risk, strained cohesion of the coalition in the face of a deteriorating party landscape, and 
uncertain parliamentary support also played a significant role for the decision for 
nonparticipation395—supporting the notion that “[German] politics is local.”396 This 
generalization also applies to defense policy since 2001, if not since 1949 and 1950. In 
the wake of the Libyan crisis, the federal government stood under enormous domestic 
pressure. Intensified by a strong opposition within the Bundestag toward the 
government’s handling of the Eurozone crisis with the rise of populism on the right and a 
revival of extreme left agitation, the conservative-liberal coalition’s fragile status mainly 
reverted to the weakness of the Liberal junior partner. 
The FDP’s intraparty division and tough stance toward solutions of the European 
financial crisis had backfired after 2008 in the face of a rising anticapitalist tide in politics 
generally. Consequently, it experienced a dramatic collapse of its poll ratings, down to 3 
percent in voter’s rate in December 2010, and a stunning loss of 80 percent of its 
supporters in less than one year.397 Party leader, vice-chancellor, and Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle was threatened with losing both his party leadership and his cabinet position 
depending on the outcomes of the upcoming regional elections particularly in Baden-
Wuertemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia where the politics of nonestablishment parties 
became strongly felt in turn.398 Facing a skeptical German general public, the prospect of 
taking advantage of the crisis in Libya to “reverse the party’s political fortunes”399 by 
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promoting a stance of refusal toward the military intervention in general, and toward an 
involvement of the Bundeswehr in particular, was reasonably high. Even if the decision 
for abstaining from the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973 remains disputed whether or not 
it was a result of an “intra-coalition compromise,” to the extent that Federal Chancellor 
Merkel may have convinced Foreign Minister Westerwelle to refrain from his intention to 
vote even for “no” in the UNSC,400 the decision to not participate was unanimously made 
between the members of the federal government.  
Two additional aspects regarding the Bundestag facilitated and contributed to the 
decision. First, between the eruption of the crisis in mid-February and the UNSC 
Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, only two parliamentary debates over the topic Libya 
took place in the Bundestag. In a aktuelle Stunde (“current hour”—debate on matters of 
topical interests) on February 24, all parties condemned the violence of the Gaddafi 
regime and encouraged the government to continue both its support for the democratic 
movements in the Arab world and its approach to answer the crisis with a determined 
position as well as with political pressure and economic sanctions.401 Despite critical 
developments in Libya and in the multilateral environment, it lasted until the morning on 
March 17, 2011, that a second parliamentary discussion of the topic took place—thus 
constraining the influence of the Bundestag on the decision making of the federal 
government. Instead, on the sidelines of a debate about no longer germane events, 
Westerwelle became convinced that the government’s skeptical position about military 
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involvement in Libya was shared by the opposition parties.402 Yet, not only during this 
last debate, but also in the first debate on March 18, 2011, one day after Germany’s 
abstention from the vote in New York, facts on the ground revealed that the federal 
government faced bipartisan resistance—even from within the coalition—to its refusal to 
participate militarily in North Africa.403 Politicians from all parties, except from DIE 
LINKE, continued to criticize the federal government’s approach of having connected the 
behavior in the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973 with the question of a participation of the 
Bundeswehr—hereby violating Germany’s reputation as reliable and trustworthy ally and 
partner. Instead, many argued that Germany should have voted “yes” and opted for a 
limited military footprint within the NATO mission.404 
Second, although it is not clear whether Merkel, Westerwelle, and de Maizière 
had sensed this broader bipartisan resistance to an abstention and complete 
nonparticipation, a contributing factor for the decision of the federal government may 
have been its reluctance to request a mandate for German participation in a military 
intervention from the Bundestag. Given the serious concerns in Berlin regarding the risks 
and implications of a military operation in Libya, and in the face of a deeply averse 
German public, the federal government could have simply avoided asking the Bundestag 
for a mandate of an intervention which it did not believe in.405 A contested result or an 
outright failure not only could have negatively affected the outcome of the upcoming 
regional elections, but also have further weakened the vulnerable governing coalition. 
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c. Public Opinion 
Between the poles of foreign policy expectations and domestic constraints, 
German public opinion had a significant influence on the governmental decision for 
nonparticipation, suggesting that “more than ever, voter’s sentiment dictated policy,”406 
however, seemingly not for the abstention from the vote in the UNSC. Accordingly, 
opinion polls and the news media coverage revealed a rather ambivalent domestic 
attitude, distinguishing between the international response to the crisis in Libya itself and 
Germany’s role within it. Whereas the dispersion of pro- and contra-arguments 
concerning an international military intervention was relatively equally represented in 
German articles in the weeks before the resolution in New York,407 the poll of the 
magazine Stern, conducted between March 10 and 11 and published on March 16, clearly 
demonstrated a broad public resentment against any German military participation in 
Libya.408  
While the focus of the public and media attention shifted in the week before the 
resolution toward the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, the worsening conditions for 
the Libyan population turned the public opinion in favor of an international engagement; 
however, the deep skepticism among the news media and within the German public 
toward a German military engagement in Libya remained in place. This attitude 
expressed deep concerns about becoming involved as a warring party. This fact reflects 
the specific nature of Germany’s dominant culture of reticence, which generally opposes 
military force as an appropriate means in international affairs, but particularly refuses the 
involvement of German soldiers especially in what has long been an area taboo from 
anything other than adventure tourism. In such a constellation, and having German 
national concerns about the success of a military engagement in Libya as well as facing 
two important regional elections, the federal government acted in what it believed to be 
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with its electorate when deciding against a German contribution, aiming at limiting 
potential electoral repercussions. Although supported by polls after the abstention from 
the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973, showing that two-thirds of the German public were 
in favor of Germany’s nonparticipation while 60 percent supported the NATO 
mission,409 the short-term domestic calculus to take advantage from a restrained position 
did not pay off for the governing coalition. Westerwelle’s FDP lost control over Baden-
Wuertemberg to the first Green party–led regional government in Germany.  
3. Determinants on the Actor Level 
Whereas all three important key actors in the federal government unanimously 
advocated Germany’s refusal for a military intervention in Libya,410 it was Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle who predominantly framed and influenced the governmental 
decision-making process, giving short-term domestic political considerations and 
personal preferences primacy over long-term policy goals and external expectations. 
Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel assumed a rather cautious stance to the Libyan crisis, 
widely leaving the design and the communication of Germany’s foreign policy 
orientation to Foreign Minister Westerwelle as part of the customs of cabinet practice as 
well as the dynamics of coalition government in the FRG.  
Despite her power to determine the general guidelines of foreign policy 
(chancellor principle), two reasons may explain her approach. First, as head of 
government, Merkel was heavily involved in dealing with the consequences of the 
Eurozone crisis, the implications of the nuclear accident in Japan—all of which loomed 
large in domestic politics—and the preparation for the upcoming regional elections, 
simply limiting her ability to focus on other foreign policy issues. Second, given the 
FDP’s growing weakness in the wake of the Euro crisis and the backlash, a lead of a 
publicly accepted German foreign policy toward Libya by Westerwelle could strengthen 
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both the Foreign Minister and his party, helping to improve the electoral outcome in the 
regional elections and consolidating the fragile coalition.411  
Regardless of whether Merkel really urged Westerwelle to disregard a potential 
“no” vote, she was getting publicly more involved the more it became clear that 
Westerwelle’s exaggerated approached could threaten Germany’s alliance policy. While 
defending—because unable (or unwilling) to reverse—Germany’s decision to not take 
part in military measures as reasons for the abstention in the vote, it was Merkel who 
firstly publicly attempted to calm the waves and opt for foreign policy “damage control.” 
She stated that Germany would nevertheless “share the goals of the resolution 
unreservedly,” arguing that Germany’s “abstention should not be confused with 
neutrality.”412 This position may also reflect Federal Chancellor Merkel’s deeply rooted 
pragmatic approach—her very own version of Realpolitik in the Berlin Republic—always 
aiming for the achievable rather than the desirable.413  
Her resilience to criticism about a violation of Germany’s Western orientation and 
alliance solidarity may also have its roots in the rationally nuanced adjustments of her 
basic positions. Although emphasizing the traditional concept of multilateralism, 
Westorientierung, transatlantic partnership, and value-orientation as core tenets of 
German foreign and security policy, Merkel underlined in her speech at the 47th security 
conference in Munich in February 2011 as well “that NATO alone, the transatlantic 
partnership alone,” are insufficient to solve the major conflicts. Instead, “the [Western 
states] need partners worldwide … because this [is] a multipolar world.”414 Looking 
hereby as a geo-economic oriented state at emerging countries and important trading 
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partners, such as Russia and China, Merkel did not change her decision as it became clear 
that Germany would side along these states in the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973—
against all its Western NATO allies. 
Foreign Minister Westerwelle dominantly influenced Germany’s decision against 
a participation of the Bundeswehr in the military intervention in Libya and to abstain 
from the vote. He had already publicly interrelated a no-fly zone with a potentially 
broader military intervention early in the management of the international crisis, arguing 
that “nobody should cherish the illusion that [a no-fly zone] is just putting up a traffic 
sign. To enforce a flying ban, the Libyan air defense has to be military neutralized 
first.”415 Hence, it was Westerwelle’s framing of the risky and unforeseeable 
implications of a military intervention in Libya as well as categorical refusal of any 
German military contribution to it that narrowed Germany’s opportunity to act and finally 
maneuvered it in a foreign policy dead end, impossible to reverse direction as the 
conditions had changed. Simultaneously, his risk-averse and German nonparticipation 
stance dominated the political and public discourse, intensifying the skeptical attitude of 
the German public to arms and policy. 
Four factors chiefly explain his stance. First, Westerwelle saw himself 
normatively anchored in a “tradition of restraint, what concerns military missions.”416 
Consequently, military force always constituted for him an ultima ratio that should be 
used only after having exploited all other political means. Westerwelle’s repeated claims 
that he personally, and not the German Bundestag, would do everything to keep Germany 
from becoming a warring party in a civil war in Libya, and German soldiers involved in 
it, reflected his deeply internalized attitude that the “culture of military restraint [is] a 
constant of German foreign policy.”417 Even as Gaddafi publicly threatened ultimate 
violence against his people, Westerwelle, therefore, still believed that the sanction policy 
                                                 
415 Westerwelle, “Regierungserklärung durch Bundesaußenminister Westerwelle [Governmental 
declaration of Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Westerwelle].” 
416 Guido Westerwelle, “Gaddafi muss weg-ohne Frage [Gaddafi has to go away—Without a 
question],” interview by Ralf Neukirch, Erich Follath, and Georg Mascolo, Spiegel Online, March 21, 
2011, http://magazin.spiegel.de/EpubDelivery/spiegel/pdf/77531597.  
417 Hans Monath, “Westerwelle und de Maizière: Zwei für Krieg und Frieden [Westerwelle and de 
Maizière: Two for war and peace],” Der Tagesspiegel, May 21, 2011. 
 129 
of the international community “was not exhausted” and should be continued.418 Second, 
facing upcoming regional elections and simultaneously pressure through declining 
popular ratings for the FDP, Westerwelle had considerable domestic incentives to take 
advantage of the intervention-weary mood of the German public by demonstrating a 
determined, antimilitary stance. Third, Westerwelle’s loosened normative and 
institutional ties to the transatlantic alliance explain why he adhered to a completely 
participation-averse attitude, even as the circumstances changed, willingly taking chances 
on a weakened German reputation within NATO and the EU in favor of domestic 
considerations and violating his own high expectations to the protection of human 
rights.419 Finally, being relatively inexperienced in the foreign policy field, Westerwelle 
might not have fully comprehended the potential implications of voting against 
Germany’s Western allies. Linking abstention as a logical consequence of 
nonparticipation narrowed his view for political alternatives.420  
As former head of the Office of the Federal Chancellor and Minister for Interior, 
Defense Minister de Maizière was considered as a close confidante of Federal Chancellor 
Merkel. Although his appointment to the post limited his role among the federal 
government in the decision-making process for nonparticipation, he clearly supported 
Merkel’s and Westerwelle’s restraint. It was he who warned on March 10, 2011—before 
any public statement from Merkel—that all military actions “must be thought through to 
the end” and that the international community should take care not to get involved in 
something, “from what one is not convinced afterwards, and what one is unable to 
enforce.”421 
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D. CONCLUSION—LIBYA: THE AMBIVALENCE IN A GERMAN 
SONDERFALL  
The analysis of the decision-making process for the nonparticipation of the 
Bundeswehr in the international military intervention in Libya as well as the abstention 
vote may well demonstrate how the mutual interplay and inherent tensions between 
imperatives of the two systems and the impact of state actors while mediating between 
them affected a rather unexpected outcome. To understand the astonishment of 
Germany’s allies and subsequent domestic and international criticism concerning the 
federal government’s decisions compels one to consider the broader external setting in 
which the decision took place as well as what it finally related to. First, the crisis in Libya 
related to German security interests as it gradually gained the potential to destabilize an 
entire region close to the European sphere of security. Likewise, from a legal and 
normative perspective, it constituted a clear case of state failure to fulfil its responsibility 
to protect its own people. 
Consequently, an international engagement according to the principle of a 
“responsibility to protect (R2P)” would have had at least the same level of legitimation 
than the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Second, in contrast to the Kosovo case, 
however, Germany could have justified its military engagement based on the UN Charter 
with a resolution of the UNSC. Finally, Germany’s most important Western allies not 
only unanimously voted for UNSC Resolution 1973, but also participated in its 
enforcement. Consequently, shaping the overall nature of the external pole in the two-
level system, these factors created sufficient incentives and reasons to drive the federal 
government to a decision in favor of a participation of the Bundeswehr in the military 
intervention. Such as decision would have been in accordance with the German key 
foreign and security policy principles of “never again” and “never alone.”  
The opposite decision was a consequence both of a complex confluence between 
several, mutually related factors on all three dimensions and the particular circumstances 
of the Libyan crisis as well as the international response. Other dominant events in the 
external environment, doubts about French and British motives, the late and surprising 
shift by the United States, the negative Afghan war experiences of the Bundeswehr, and 
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deep concerns about the risks and consequences of a military involvement in Libya all 
reduced the salience of the abovementioned imperatives in favor of German military 
participation, and instead redirected the attention to and magnified domestic politics 
considerations as well as basic positions that favored nonparticipation—facilitated by 
critical misinterpretations and misassumptions about the consequences. In particular, 
Germany’s inherent risk-averse stance in international affairs and its “culture of military 
reticence” regarding the international involvement of the Bundeswehr (“politics before 
force”) became the predominant normative background in which the federal 
government’s decision took place. The upcoming elections, the weakness of the FDP, and 
a German military participation–averse public, reinforced the federal government, and at 
its forefront Foreign Minister Westerwelle, to firmly pursue its intervention-skeptical 
course.  
The particular circumstances of the Libyan case and the unfolding of events and 
factors in relation to the decision-making process, therefore, lead to three major 
conclusions. First, both aspects relativize the generalized argument made by some 
analysts that “international expectations of alliance solidarity no longer rank as the 
predominant driving force in German foreign policy”422 and as a crucial factor “within 
the calculation of national interests.”423 Even if impossible to prove the counterfactual, 
but a more transparent communication by France and the United Kingdom regarding the 
goals and scope of their plans for establishing a no-fly zone, a better inclusion of 
Germany within the diplomatic preparation for UNSC Resolution 1973, and an early 
information by U.S. senior officials regarding a shift in their attitude toward a military 
intervention in Libya, could have decisively put more weight to the multilateral impulses, 
hence, incentivized the federal government to side with its allies and opt for a (limited) 
participation. This assumption is supported by the fact that, although Berlin defended its 
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decision for nonparticipation, the federal government was immediately endeavored to 
relativize its resolution-averse stance and most importantly, to underline its unaltered 
multilateral commitment by indirectly supporting the NATO mission in Libya. While 
increasing its involvement in surveillance flights over Afghanistan, Germany helped to 
free up NATO AWACS capacities for enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya, and hereby, 
as Defense Minister de Maizière claimed, send a “political sign of our solidarity with the 
alliance.”424  
Second, the case demonstrates that, at this particular stage, German foreign and 
security policy continued “to be driven by inherent contradictions”425 between its 
traditional core principles and between external and internal imperatives, causing 
ambiguous and ambivalent policy-decision outcomes depending on the salience of either 
side. On one hand, Germany still adhered to the tenets of Westorientierung, 
multilateralism, and value orientation as backbones of its foreign and security policy. On 
the other, simultaneously, Germany remained deeply bound to a general risk-averse 
position in international affairs, a culture of military restraint, and domestic politics 
considerations.  
This attitude has repeatedly led to criticism of “responsibility gap(s)” where 
Germany missed opportunities to “support its declared policy objectives and its allies … 
by taking concrete actions.”426 Accordingly, the Libyan decisions would add another 
example after Chad in 2008 and Ivory Coast in 2010 and 2011, notably all of them on the 
African continent. Moreover, Germany’s reticence resulted in a dominant tendency to 
self-restrict its policy toolbox, excluding the use of force (for combat-like tasks) almost 
categorically, and in a specific sensitivity toward domestic demands. The more 
Germany’s multilateral institutions became involved in international military 
interventions, however, the imperatives of multilateral commitments and military 
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restraint conflicted as they provided diametric impulses. Supported by personal 
preferences and attitudes (including role concepts) of governmental key actors—who 
were compelled to mediate between the different impulses—domestic policy 
considerations, risk aversion, and military reticence were given primacy over multilateral 
imperatives (both external expectations and internal commitments), facilitating the 
decision for nonparticipation in the military intervention in Libya.  
Finally, the characteristics of all influences on the decision-making process 
suggests that the decision for nonparticipation in the NATO operation in Libya, despite 
the existence of justifiable reasons, a UNSC resolution, and an international mission to 
implement it, constituted a “normal” special case (Sonderfall) rather than a first step on a 
German special path (Sonderweg) by considerably departing from premises of German 
foreign and security policy. Instead, it is more a proof of Germany’s normalizing 
ambivalence in decisions for a participation of the Bundeswehr in military interventions. 
Pending on the specific context and the salience of certain factors and premises, the 
policy outcomes are expected to vary. 
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IV. MALI—A STANDARD CASE: GERMANY’S RETURN TO 
CONSISTENT PATTERNS OF DECISIONS FOR MILITARY 
ENGAGEMENT 
This chapter frames the context and subsequently traces the sequence of events 
that contributed to the decisions of whether and how German forces should participate in 
EUTM Mali, contribute to AFISMA, and support to France in 2013, that is, two years 
after the Libyan debacle. Second, the analysis suggests that a complex interplay between 
factors on all three domains, and particularly tensions between the external and internal 
domains, explain not only Germany’s decisions in favor of the Bundeswehr engagements 
in Mali, but also its reluctance to get involved more actively and with “robust” capacities, 
that is, military force. Finally, this chapter shows that the Mali case marked a return to 
consistent patterns of German foreign and security policy decisions for international 
military engagements as interpreted above. While increasingly willing to assume more 
responsibility and to fulfill its multilateral commitments, Germany remained bound to its 
risk-averse position in international affairs, a hesitancy within the decision-making 
process, a position of military restraint, and the leading role of domestic politics 
considerations. 
Both the crisis and the international reaction in Mali 2012 and 2013 are in many 
ways directly connected to the crisis and international reaction in Libya in 2011. The 
support of the NATO air campaign paved the way for the Libyan opposition to overthrow 
the Gaddafi regime in October 2011, hence, for further disorder that spread southward.  
By then, ethnic Tuaregs from the Sahel region, whom the Libyan dictator had 
long used as mercenaries, had already deserted. They fled into neighboring countries as 
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they feared reprisals from the new authorities.427 Embedded in the long-lasting struggle 
of the disenfranchised Tuareg ethnicity to achieve the territorial and cultural autonomy of 
the Azawad,428 this influx of manpower, arms, and equipment into Mali fueled the 
separatist ambitions of the Tuareg population, leading to the creation of the National 
Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)429 in October 2011. It also 
worsened the intensifying power-struggle in the northern parts of the country and 
facilitated the emergence and spread of Islamist groups throughout the poorly governed 
region.430  
By the end of 2011, not only had al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
extended its presence in northern Mali, but also Ansar al-Dine, a militant Islamist group 
seeking to impose Sharia law across Mali, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West 
Africa (MUJWA),431 a black African–led radical Islamist splinter-group from AQIM 
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seeking to establish a caliphate in West Africa were gaining influence in the region.432 
Aligning itself with those groups, on January 17, 2012, the MNLA made its first attack 
on Malian Armed Forces near Menaka, marking the outbreak of the violent crisis in 
northern Mali.433 Within only a few weeks, the already weak governmental control of the 
Malian North collapsed, as Malian armed units, trained and equipped by the United 
States, “either fled or Tuareg soldiers and commanders defected to the insurgents.”434 
Reports about massacres of some 85 unarmed soldiers and civilians on January 18, 2012, 
near Aguelhok435 and accusations about an insufficient approach against the rebellion 
caused public uproar in the capital Bamako, culminating in a military coup d’état on 
March 22, 2012, under the lead of U.S.-trained Captain Amadou Sanogo.  
The political chaos in the capital of the “poster child of democracy”436 in Africa 
fueled the offensive of the armed groups. After having seized control over vast areas in 
northern Mali until early April 2012, the alliance between the MNLA and the Islamist 
groups, however, gradually disintegrated, finally resulting in the expulsion of secular-
nationalist Tuareg forces from all major northern cities by mid-2012 and the 
establishment of a Sharia-based state.437 By the late summer of 2012, Mali was de facto 
divided, with the Islamists and the Malian military settling into a phony war.438 
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Recognizing a demarcation line between northern and southern Mali for almost half a 
year, with more than 1,000 troops and 200 vehicles on January 10, 2013, the Islamist 
groups occupied the small town of Konna, south of this line—but only 500 kilometers 
northeast of Bamako.439 
Fearing a further advance toward the capital, the Malian interim government 
appealed to France, the long-term dominant power in the region with its own imperial 
tradition and finally, a strategic culture and civil-military relations that brooked little or 
no hesitancy to use force with troops stationed nearby for immediate help; Paris 
responded on January 11, 2013, by launching Operation Serval. After the initial 
engagement of Special Forces Aviation Units, France quickly deployed some 4,000 
troops to Mali, successful blocking a potential advance of the Islamist groups to the south 
and expelling them from all major cities in the North until February 2013.440 Hereby, 
African troops from a growing African-led International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA), authorized by the UNSC Resolution 2085 on December 20, 2012, and 
reaching some 6,000 troops by March 2013, supported France’s combat efforts and 
gradually took over the responsibility for helping Mali to “restore the authority of the 
State of Mali over its entire national territory, to uphold the unity and territorial integrity 
of Mali, and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated 
groups.”441  
In parallel, based on UNSC resolutions and a direct appeal from Malian 
authorities, the EU decided to launch its Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali).442 
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Initially planned for a 15-month period, the mission started with approximately 500 
European personnel from 23 nations in April 2013. Located with its headquarters and an 
advisory task force in Bamako as well as with some 250 military instructors in 
Koulikoro, 60 kilometers northeast of the Malian capital, EUTM Mali continues to help 
restore the capacities of the Malian Defense and Security Forces and to help Mali to 
regain and maintain its territorial integrity and internal stability.443  
Throughout the evolution of the crisis and despite the backing of France’s 
intervention in Mali, the German government constantly refused to get directly involved 
into any form of a combat operation with its troops in Mali. Instead, the federal 
government stressed the need for a political solution to the crisis and offered logistic, 
medical, and humanitarian support.444 Consequently, in mid-January 2013, the federal 
government decided, more or less in a familiar pattern of the nonlinear approach, to 
indirectly support France’s engagement in Mali, by deploying up to three transport 
aircraft of the vastly overcommitted German air force to Dakar, Senegal, helping to 
transport troops and materiel from AFISMA forces. The engagement, however, ruled out 
actively supporting French forces and air operations in the northern battle zone.445 On 
February 28, 2012, framed by further decisions within EU, another French appeal, and 
the federal government’s requests, the German Bundestag gave finally its approval that 
Germany would contribute to both EUTM Mali and AFISMA with up to 330 soldiers, 
including 40 engineer trainers, 40 medical personnel, and air-transport and air-refueling 
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capacities—the latter were allowed to operate throughout all of Mali to directly support 
French forces.446 
A. CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK OF THE DECISION-MAKING-
PROCESS 
Various developments within the international, European, and domestic, 
environment framed Berlin’s decision-making process on a military engagement in Mali. 
Internationally, three major dominant factors of policy were determining. First, the 
internationally community became increasingly concerned about and focused on Syria, as 
the public uprising against the Assad regime, which had started in March 2011, turned 
into a bloody and brutally fought civil war with nearly 15,000 casualties after 12 months 
of fighting, resulting from a state declaration of war against the rebellion in June 2011. In 
2012, the conflict became protracted, as both sides proved unable to achieve a decisive 
momentum, the opposition splintered, the country experienced an enormous influx of 
foreign fighters, and extremist groups entered or emerged throughout the fight.447 The 
views, on how to react to the crisis differed considerably. While France’s newly 
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inaugurated President Francois Hollande argued in May 2012 that a military intervention 
could not be excluded, the German federal government, endeavored to close ranks with 
its Western allies after the abstention from the Libyan vote—especially with the United 
States—stood skeptical toward such an approach, intending to “prevent a military 
wildfire spreading across the entire region.”448  
These concerns about a “highly dangerous situation” in the Middle East became 
magnified, second, with an escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October and 
November 2012.449 As a result of an increase in rockets attacks by the Hamas throughout 
the second half of 2012, Israel responded with air strikes against targets in Gaza, causing 
civilian casualties and evoking the threat of a potential ground offensive.450 Third, the 
most decisive influence on the international power and security framework, however, had 
the announcement of the United States in January 2012 to “necessarily rebalance” the 
geographic priorities of its security and defense policy from the Transatlantic “toward the 
Asia-Pacific region.”451 Notwithstanding an “enduring strategic relevance of the 
transatlantic partnership,” Europe and Germany would have to accept the reality that their 
“security concerns (may) no longer remain the top U.S. priority,” requiring them to better 
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coordinate their policies and boost their capacities required to achieve own security 
interests.452 
In the European theater, the Eurozone crisis continued to dominate the political 
domain with ever more destructive effects that gradually went beyond the familiar 
confines of the stock markets and central banks to the hearts and minds of the citizens of 
the EU. After being initially reluctant, Germany stepped into leadership at the end of 
2011 and assumed responsibility for the European crisis management to protect the 
union’s politico-economic stability. The Euro crisis brought about the consolidation of 
German power in Europe, as the global order of states further adjusted in the twenty-first 
century. In this process, no one was more surprised than the Germans themselves.  
Against the resistance of, and partly at the price of Southern Europe, Germany 
enforced a comprehensive strategy, combining an austerity policy through fiscal 
consolidation of the Eurozone (fiscal compact in January 2012) and budgetary ceilings in 
all Euro member states with a permanent fiscal rescue mechanism (European Financial 
Stability Facility) and banking regulations. Such policy, itself, arose from strictures of 
domestic politics as well as political culture, but was fated also to have a variety of 
unintended results in the realm of power. As a result, although widely criticized for its 
rigorous stance—culminating in South European media attempts to match Merkel’s 
Germany with the Huns of yore or even with the Nazis453—until end of 2012, Germany 
came out of the crisis as the uncontested European leader, strong economically and 
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dominating the narrative for a crisis resolution.454 Such power, however, for the reasons 
examined in this thesis was not without its contradictions, which were again to be put to 
the test in Africa.  
The international engagement of the Bundeswehr and its context also had changed 
in the past two years from Libya. Established at the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 
December 2011, and formally decided on the NATO Summit in Chicago, May 2012, the 
international community agreed upon the full transition of the security responsibility 
toward Afghan authorities by the end of 2014, hereby, terminating the Afghan ISAF 
mission.455 Alongside other partners, Germany, after ending its largest, most contested, 
and costly international military engagement in the history of the FRG, pledged that 
Afghanistan would not be abandoned and promised a “clear and reliable commitment to a 
long-term engagement for the next decade beyond 2014.”456  
Since its fiercely debated nonparticipation in the NATO operation in Libya, 
Germany also had become engaged in new international military missions. Beside 
contributions to an UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, since July 
2011), required through the founding of an independent South Sudan state, and an EU-
capacity building mission to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia (EUCAP Nestor, since 
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August 2012),457 Germany deployed, based on Turkey’s request and a NAC decision, 
several Patriot antiair systems and some 300 Bundeswehr soldiers to the country, helping 
to strengthen NATO air defense against potential attacks from Syrian soil (Operation 
Active Fence, since December 2012).458  
Finally, domestic evolutions informed Germany’s decision-making process. 
Between 2011 and 2012, Germany issued four new strategic documents that underlined 
Germany’s unchanged foreign and security policy principles, such as its commitment to 
multilateralism and its concept of comprehensive approach, its evolving conception of its 
international role in the world of power, and its stance toward the African continent. 
These documents included the new Defense Policy Guidelines (May 2011); the “Concept 
of the Federal Government for Africa”459 (June 2011)—the first integrated Africa policy 
document of the Federal Republic;460 the governmental concept “Shaping 
Globalization—Extending Partnerships—Sharing Responsibility”461 (February 2012) 
that primarily defined Germany’s new global order policy and relation to emerging 
“shaping powers;” and the “Interagency Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal 
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Government toward Fragile States”462 (September 2012). Moreover, already having 
suspended conscription after 45 years as of July 2011, Germany continues to significantly 
reform the Bundeswehr.  
As direct consequences of discrepancies between Germany’s level of ambition 
and actual available forces for international missions as well as the Eurozone crisis–
related reductions of the defense budget, the federal government decided to reduce the 
size of the Bundeswehr down to 185,000 soldiers and restructure the entire 
organization.463 Finally, German political parties faced parliamentary elections in 
September 2013, an event that particularly gained external attention, speculating about 
continuity or shifts in Germany’s future stance toward the Eurozone crisis.464 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
GERMANY’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS  
In the face of a continuously deteriorating situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
international community indeed recognized the potential threat emanating from a loss of 
state control over vast areas in Northern Mali. The leaders of the powers, however, only 
slowly developed a position that considered an active external interference into the crisis, 
supporting the Malian state in reestablishing constitutional order, regaining territorial 
control, and building capacities. This particularly restrained the Western stance and set 
the context for Germany’s decision-making process. Consequently, while willing to 
assume Germany’s international responsibility and acknowledging the potential impacts 
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of the Malian crisis on European, and hence, German security, the federal government 
exercised restraint and caution in deciding whether and how German troops would 
operate in Mali. Early on, the Berlin government refused any participation of German 
soldiers in combat operations in the West African country; emphasized the primary 
responsibility of regional organizations to respond to the crisis; and exclusively 
considered noncombat alternatives, such as training, medical help, and logistic support, 
as suitable policy options.  
At the same time, Germany’s political elite continued to focus on a necessary 
political process to both address the underlying root causes of the conflict and help Mali 
to reestablish its constitutional order.465 In contrast to its apparently well defined 
(restrained) stance, the federal government did not encourage a political debate about 
Germany’s strategic approach to the crisis, which would incorporate and coordinate a 
broader set of policy tools according to Germany’s “networked security” philosophy. 
Likewise, the actual German contributions to EUTM Mali and AFISMA also remained 
vague for a long time. Germany’s challenges concerning the decisions for participation in 
international military engagements in Mali eventually culminated with the onset of 
Operation Serval at the beginning of 2013. France’s actions magnified the permanent 
tensions within Germany’s foreign and security policy, dragging the federal government 
between external expectations, its own aspirations, and internal constraints.  
1. Coup d’état, Deteriorating Security Situation, and Slowly Evolving 
International Response 
Although the violent crisis in Northern Mali had broken out already at the 
beginning of 2012, the country gained considerable international, and Germany’s, 
attention just with the military coup d’état in Bamako between March 21 and 22, forcing 
then-President Touré out of office. In concert with the international community, Germany 
condemned the “illegitimate to take-over of power,” claiming that the “constitutional rule 
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and order must be re-installed immediately,” and suspended its bilateral aid and 
support.466 The unstable political situation in Mali’s capital accelerated the offensive of 
the rebel and jihadist groups, allowing them to take over large swathes of Mali’s north 
within two weeks after the coup, culminating in the MNLA’s declaration of an 
independent Azawad on April 6, 2012.467 Despite serious concerns about the “rapidly 
deteriorating humanitarian situation”468 as well as the implications of the tense security 
and political situation in Mali, the international community left the initial response to 
crisis to the African states and organizations.  
Consequently, it was the West African economic organization ECOWAS that, 
after an unanswered 72 hour ultimatum, imposed severe financial and economic sanctions 
against Mali at the beginning of April. Cut off from all external sources, the military 
junta around Captain Sanogo on April 6 signed a framework agreement for the 
restoration of constitutional order in Mali, stepped down, and handed over the power to a 
transitional government under the lead of interim president Traoré, the then-President of 
the Malian Parliament.469 While ECOWAS had already started with initial planning for a 
potential deployment of its troops toward Mali, Western countries, such as France and 
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Germany, refused any military engagement in the country, calling for “waiving 
violence”470 and a “political solution.”471 
The worsening situation in Mali, however, gradually changed the international 
perception. By mid-2012, Islamist groups had expelled MNLA from nearly all major 
cities in northern Mali and imposed a strict Sharia law. At the same time, the political 
situation in South Mali had deteriorated, and the humanitarian crisis across the country 
had also deepened. Hundreds of thousands of people fled from the fights and the brutality 
of the jihadist rule in the North, their sensitive situation worsened by a countrywide food 
shortage.472 As a consequence of the continuously deteriorating situation in Mali, 
ECOWAS and the AU jointly requested a mandate of the UNSC, authorizing “the 
deployment of an ECOWAS stabilization force in order to ensure the protection of 
Malian State institutions and assist in upholding the territorial integrity of Mali and in 
combating terrorism.”473  
In response, the UNSC, including Germany as nonpermanent member, issued the 
French-drafted Resolution 2056 on July 5, which officially condemned the coup d’état in 
March and endorsed the (West) African political efforts to support the restoration of state 
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authority throughout Mali, but stopped short of backing the military intervention until 
further details had been provided.474  
2. France’s Push, the International Struggle toward a Military 
Engagement, and Germany’s Quest for Participation 
Around the same time, France’s stance concerning the response toward the 
Malian crisis started to shift. In mid-July 2012, Foreign Minister Juppé argued that “at 
one moment or another there will probably be the use of force (in northern Mali),” noting 
that such an intervention “would be African-led but supported by international forces.” 
France could not lead a military intervention because “its colonial past in the country 
would complicate matters.”475 
The direct appeal of Mali’s interim president both to ECOWAS and to the UN in 
September 2012, asking for troops and for authorizing a military intervention against the 
jihadist groups, facilitated the international efforts in support of a military response to the 
destabilizing situation and the spread of terrorism in northern Mali.476 Considering the 
crisis in Mali as “a risk for the international community as a whole,” it was, however, 
France’s new president, Francois Hollande, who urged an immediate response as a 
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“dictate of the moment.”477 During a high-level UN meeting on the Sahel on September 
26, he called the UNSC to approve a resolution for an African military intervention in 
Mali “as quickly as possible.”478 Considering Mali as a “powder keg that the 
international community cannot afford to ignore,”479 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton echoed Hollande’s critical assessment of the crisis in Mali. Yet, even if “the 
chaos and violence in Mali … (did) threaten to undermine the stability of the entire 
region,” she called for a more cautious approach, favoring a political solution, the 
preparation for elections, and the training of Malian forces.480  
On October 12, the UNSC passed at France’s urging Resolution 2071, asking the 
African organizations and other interested parties within 45 days to provide detailed plans 
for an international military intervention according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.481 
The adaptation of the resolution provoked the group Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le 
Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) to threaten France with the murder of four 
hostages and attacks on her citizens in West Africa.482  
On October 15, in response to the UNSC resolution, a letter from Mali’s interim 
president, and a request by ECOWAS, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of the EU 
decided to support the international efforts by starting the “planning of a possible CSDP 
military operation,” relating to the “reorganization and training of the Malian defense 
forces.”483 Other military options, such as a direct combat support, however, were not 
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further pursued.484 While France and the United States had officially ruled out any direct 
military intervention in Mali, but offered support of an African-led operation, both states 
sought to lobby a military intervention in northern Mali, as questions about ECOWAS-
capabilities to ensure sufficient forces for a military intervention arose.485 
Germany, on the other hand, needed until the end of October to announce a 
tentative position concerning its engagement in an international response to the crisis in 
Mali. In a speech at a convention of civilian and military top staff personnel of the 
Bundeswehr near Berlin on October 22, Federal Chancellor Merkel announced 
Germany’s general willingness to participate in a “training and support mission for 
Mali,” however, only if the “preconditions are clarified and in place.”486 Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle immediately refused the deployment of German combat troops and 
arms deliveries to the country. Instead, Germany would see Africa’s primary 
responsibility in responding to the crisis and could offer logistic, technical, and financial 
support.487 While echoing Westerwelle’s military intervention-averse stance, Defense 
Minister de Maizière made clear that the federal government was still “evaluating 
potential task” of German soldiers in a training mission in Mali and whether such a 
contribution would need the approval of the German Bundestag.488 Notwithstanding 
Germany’s overall cautious attitude, during a visit to Mali on November 1, Foreign 
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Minister Westerwelle underlined the “significance of Mali’s stability for Europe’s 
security,” pledging “German solidarity” and to increase Germany’s humanitarian 
support.489 
Between November and December 2012, the African and European responses 
toward Mali assumed shape. On November 13, following a series of meetings between 
African, European, and UN military planners as well as in response to the tasks set by 
UNSC Resolution 2071, the AU backed an ECOWAS plan to deploy 3,300 ground forces 
to Mali. These forces should support the Malian state in expelling armed Islamist and 
terrorist groups from the North and in reestablishing territorial integrity and stability 
throughout the country.490 One week later, on November 19, the EU foreign and defense 
ministers met in Brussels to discuss EU’s High Representative (HR) Catherine Ashton’s 
draft of a crisis management concept for a possible CSDP operation for reorganizing and 
training the Malian Armed Forces.491  
Following this meeting, Defense Minister de Maizière reemphasized Germany’s 
position that the “crystal clear” distinction between the envisioned combat operation of 
the Africans and the EU training mission, constitute a “precondition for a German 
participation to such a mission.”492 With the approval of the Crisis Management Concept 
(CMC) for a CSDP military mission to provide military training and advice to the Malian 
Armed Forces through the FAC on December 10, 2012, the EU-internal preconditions for 
a European engagement in Mali were established, allowing for the start of detailed 
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planning and negotiations for the national contributions to the mission.493 The EU efforts 
got additional backing with a letter from Mali’s interim president toward the EU’s HR 
Ashton on December 24, directly asking for the help of the EUTM Mali for his 
country.494 
In parallel, France further pushed toward the international community to approve 
a quick start of a military intervention in Mali. Defense Minister Le Drian claimed that in 
Mali “our own security [would be] at stake” and if “we do not move swiftly, then there 
will gradually emerge a terrorist state.”495 Consequently, France, with support of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Togo, drafted UNSC Resolution 2085, 
which the UNSC finally passed on December 20, 2012.496 The German UN ambassador 
Wittig described the decision as an “important step” that would complement the efforts 
for a political solution of the crisis.497 The resolution authorized the African-Led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)498 for an initial period for one year to 
take “all necessary measures” to support the Malian authorities in regaining territorial 
control and in “reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations.”499  
Yet, while the resolution also urged to finalize a political roadmap and to call for 
elections before April 2013, it did not set a start of the intervention.500 The restraint 
might have resulted from the ongoing skepticism about the plans and capacities of the 
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ECOWAS to effectively implement and sustain the envisioned combat mission in 
northern Mali.501 Accordingly, military experts assumed that because of the required 
preparation time and climate conditions, the mission could not start earlier than autumn 
2013, almost nine months after the UNSC decision.502 
3. Operation Serval and Germany’s Ambivalent Position to Support 
With the beginning of 2013, the security situation in Mali changed, urging France 
to respond militarily, accelerating the start of the AFISMA operation, and leaving 
Germany struggling to find a coherent answer to the shifting dynamics. Until the end of 
2012, jihadist and terrorist groups, such as Ansar al-Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM, had 
constrained their actions on the vast northern territory of the country. After retreating 
from peace talks and revoking a truce, AQIM and MUJAO-reinforced Ansar al-Dine 
troops overstepped the fictive demarcation line and captured the small town of Konna 
from the Malian Armed Forces on January 10, 2013.503 In a response to an urgent call by 
Mali’s interim president directly to Paris on the same day, France’s President Hollande 
launched Operation Serval on January 11, arguing that “the very existence of the Malian 
state” is at stake.504 The lacking readiness of the ECOWAS-forces to immediately 
answer to the crisis, the potential threat for thousands of French citizens in South Mali, 
and the threat that a later intervention could be decisively hampered through the seizure 
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of the Sévaré airport near Konna by the jihadists, might have triggered the shift in 
France’s stance to avoid a direct, unilateral engagement in its former colony.505 
While the EU pledged to accelerate its planning and preparation process for the 
deployment of the EUTM to Mali506 as well as the announcement from the United States 
and the United Kingdom of “unspecific support” for the French intervention apart from 
“boots on the ground,”507 Germany remained cautious and restrained toward its potential 
engagement in Mali within the first days after France’s intervention. On one hand, 
Defense Minister de Maizière publicly stated that the immediate action of France “was 
decisive, correct and deserves … (Germany’s) support.”508 At the same time, however, 
he and Foreign Minister Westerwelle made clear that “the deployment of German combat 
troops is not up for debate.”509 Instead, without a specified French request, the German 
cabinet had decided to start talks with France to clarify opportunities to support France’s 
military engagement “short of sending combat troops, for example in the political, 
logistics, humanitarian, and medical fields.”510  
Yet Defense Minister de Maizière immediately lowered the expectations, 
emphasizing that such support would raise “complex political, legal, and technical 
questions.”511 On the other hand, the federal government stressed that the decision for a 
German contribution to EUTM Mali had not been made. Given the ongoing planning 
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process in Brussels, the decision “whether and how Germany will participate, will be … 
(made) when the plans are complete” and “when a political consensus about the 
engagement of the international community in Mali” had been found.512 
While intensifying its troop deployment to Mali, France sent a direct request for 
help to Germany on January 15, causing a political debate about the appropriateness of 
Germany’s response and raising questions in Paris about Berlin’s solidarity. In a joint 
statement after the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty between 
Germany and France on January 16, Defense Minister de Maizière and Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle announced that their country would provide two airplanes to transport the 
3,300 activated ECOWAS troops to Bamako. Germany, hence, would not directly 
support the French intervention in Mali. It could, however, immediately respond because 
the logistical support would not require the approval of the Bundestag.513 While Federal 
Chancellor Merkel defended the decision with reference to Germany’s other international 
military commitments,514 the restrained and conditioned help sparked a bipartisan debate, 
reflecting Germany’s politically instable stance toward a military engagement in Mali. 
Between mid- and end-January 2013, the international efforts concerning Mali 
intensified, paralleled by the deployment of German soldiers and equipment in support of 
AFISMA and ongoing discussion about additional German contributions. After the 
launch of AFISMA on January 19 and the gradual buildup of its forces in Mali, Nigerian 
and Chadian troops in particular supported France’s efforts in fighting jihadist and 
terrorist groups, allowing them to expel the groups from Timbuktu and Gao until the end 
of the month.515 In an emergency meeting of the EU FAC on January 17—as frequently 
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German participation in Mali mission],” Die Welt, January 14, 2013, http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/
article112743916/SPD-fordert-deutsche-Beteiligung-an-Mali-Einsatz.html.  
513 Jungholt, “Paris ruft [Paris calls].”  
514 Ibid. 
515 Tramond and Seigneu, “Operation Serval,” 80–82; Shurkin, France’s War in Mali, 13–21. 
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requested by German Foreign Minister Westerwelle516—the EU established the CSDP 
mission EUTM Mali, creating the legal basis for the mission. The decision by the Council 
of the European Union not only named the French general François Lecointre as mission 
commander, but also requested him to accelerate the preparations already in place since 
December 2012 to ensure the launch of the envisioned 15-month mission in Mali not later 
than mid-February.517 As a consequence of the EU decision, Defense Minister de 
Maizière announced that federal government would soon submit a request to the 
Bundestag, asking for approval to contribute to the missions with nearly 30 soldiers to the 
expected pool of 250 European trainers.518 In parallel, Germany deployed up to three 
Transall airplanes and some 75 personnel to Dakar, Senegal, supporting the deployment 
of AFISMA-forces.519  
4. From Indirect Support to Decisions on Contribution to EUTM Mali 
and AFISMA  
Framed by developments in the European environment, Germany settled to 
formal decisions on, and parliamentary approvals for, the participation of armed German 
soldiers to EUTM Mali and AFISMA until end of February 2013. Following an 
additional French request at the end of January 2013, the federal government had already 
announced a potential extension of its Mali-related engagement toward AFISMA, 
offering the provision of air-refueling capacities for French warplanes. Since such a task 
would come close the “mission-threshold” as determined by the Federal Court, Defense 
Minister de Maizière declared to ask the Bundestag for approval, combining the request 
                                                 
516 See Thorsten Jungholt and Karsten Kammholz, “Bundesregierung sucht noch eine Strategie für 
Mali [Federal government still seeks for a strategy on Mali],” Die Welt, January 15, 2013, 
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article112764631/Bundesregierung-sucht-noch-eine-Strategie-fuer-
Mali.html. 
517 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013”; Council of 
the European Union, Council Conclusions on Mali, 3217th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting; Dicke, “The 
European Union Training Mission in Mali,” 98. 
518 “De Maizière gegen Lammert: CDU zofft sich wegen deutschen Mali-Einsatzes [De Maizière 
against Lammert: CDU has a row about the German Mali mission],” Spiegel Online, January 19, 2013, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/mali-einsatz-de-maiziere-gegen-lammerts-forderung-a-878517.html.  
519 Johnson, “Bundesregierung beschließt Mali-Einsatz [Federal government decides Mali mission].” 
 158 
with those for the EUTM Mali.520 During the Munich Security Conference at the 
beginning of February, however, a politically strained climate between Paris and Berlin 
became public. French foreign policy expert François Heisbourg expressed his 
displeasure about the federal government’s continuing stance to only provide two 
transport airplanes and to refuse a direct support to France. While Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle evasively pointed to Germany’s other international military engagements, 
such as in Afghanistan, Defense Minister de Maizière tried to calm down the bilateral 
tensions. He underlined that the German cabinet would soon decide for the EUTM Mali 
and AFISMA mandates, offering to fill “more or less 40 (EUTM trainer) positions” and 
to ensure the provision of air-refueling capacities directly to France.521 
Despite the alleged bilateral tensions and Germany’s approach favoring political 
measures, the international and domestic political setting further pushed Germany to 
engage in military missions in Mali. With the approval of the mission plan and the rules 
of engagement for the mission, the EU launched EUTM Mali through a Council decision 
on February 18 with immediate effect.522 
One day later, the German cabinet finally decided to participate with up to 330 
soldiers to the international engagement in Mali, submitting two 12-month-long mandates 
                                                 
520 “Deutsche Stiefel für die Mission in Mali [German boots for the mission in Mali],” Die Welt, 
January 27, 2013, http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article113158983/Deutsche-Stiefel-fuer-die-Mission-
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wants to extend Mali mission: Mandate for air refueling wanted],” TAZ, January 31, 2013, 
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contribution to Mali causes French resentment],” Die Welt, February 3, 2013, http://www.welt.de/politik/
ausland/article113350416/Deutscher-Mali-Beitrag-sorgt-fuer-Aerger-bei-Franzosen.html.  
522 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2013/87/CFSP of 18 February 2013 on the 
Launch of a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces 
(EUTM Mali),” Official Journal of the European Union L46 (February 18, 2013): 27, 
http://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/areasTematicas/misiones/fichero/UE-2013-87-EUTM-Mali.pdf; 
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Mali, 3222nd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. 
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for approval by the Bundestag.523 The first mandate foresaw the deployment of up to 180 
German soldiers for EUTM Mali, including some 40 engineer trainers, 40 medical staff, a 
national support element, and headquarters personnel. At the same time, the mandate 
forbade German EUTM personnel to participate in training efforts to the benefit of 
AFISMA, to accompany Malian forces in combat operations (mentoring), or to directly 
support AFISMA and Malian Armed Forces operations.524  
The second mandate allowed up to 150 German soldiers to support to AFISMA 
and French operations in the entire Malian territory by providing air-transport and air-
refueling capacities.525 After a first reading in the Bundestag on February 20 had already 
showed bipartisan support for the proposed mandates, with only DIE LINKE announcing 
its refusal,526 on February 27 the Bundestag’s committee for foreign affairs also gave its 
                                                 
523 “Kabinett beschließt Mali-Einsatz der Bundeswehr [Cabinet decides Mali mission of the 
Bundeswehr],” Zeit Online, February 19, 2013, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-02/mali-einsatz-
bundeswehr-soldaten-mandat; “Regierung will 330 Soldaten nach Mali schicken [Government wants to 
send 300 troops to Mali],” Die Welt, February 18, 2013, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/
article113733174/Regierung-will-330-Soldaten-nach-Mali-schicken.html.  
524 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Entsendung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte zur Beteiligung an 
der EU-geführten militärischen Ausbildungsmission EUTM Mali [Deployment of German armed forces for 
participation in the EU-led military training mission EUTM Mali].” 
525 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Entsendung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte zur Unterstützung 
der Internationalen Unterstützungsmission in Mali unter afrikanischer Führung (AFISMA) [Deployment of 
German armed forces in support of the international support mission under African lead (AFISMA)].” 
526 “Regierung wirbt um Zustimmung für Mali-Einsatz [Government solicits for support to Mali 
mission],” Deutscher Bundestag, February 28, 2013, http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2013/
43100677_kw09_sp_mali/211048. 
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recommendation to approve the government’s requests.527 The legal national 
preconditions for the participation of German soldiers within EUTM Mali and in support 
of AFISMA were eventually set as the Bundestag simultaneously approved both 
mandates with broad majorities.528 
C. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANCE AND INTERPLAY OF DETERMINANTS 
FOR THE GERMAN DECISIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN AND 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MILITARY MISSIONS IN MALI 
Germany’s decision-making process toward the participation in, and the 
contribution to, military missions in Mali was characterized by an overall risk-
minimizing, precarious, restrained,529 and partly reactive approach concerning the use of 
the Bundeswehr. All of this resulted, as demonstrated in the following, from multiple 
impulses and constraints on the external and internal levels, complex contradictions and 
reinforcements between single factors within and across the different levels, and the 
challenges for key German stakeholders to mitigate between the ambivalent imperatives.  
                                                 
527 Deutscher Bundestag, “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Auswärtigen Ausschusses (3. 
Ausschuss) zu dem Antrag der Bundesregierung—Drucksache 17/12367—Entsendung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte zur Beteiligung an der EU-geführten militärischen Ausbildungsmission EUTM Mali 
auf Grundlage des Ersuchens der Regierung von Mali sowie der Beschlüsse 2013/34/GASP des Rates der 
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17/12367—Deployment of German armed forces for participation in the EU-led military training mission 
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basis of UNSC Resolution 2085 (2012)],” Drs. 17/12522 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 
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528 “Breite Zustimmung für Mali-Einsatz der Bundeswehr [Broad approval for Mali mission of the 
Bundeswehr]”; “Namentliche Abstimmungen: Bundeswehreinsatz in Mali [Roll-call vote: Bundeswehr 
mission in Mali],” Deutscher Bundestag, February 28, 2013, http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/plenum/
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529 Katarina Engelberg argues that Germany had proved reluctant to a new EU military involvement in 
Mali. See Katarina Engelberg, The EU and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 172. 
 161 
1. Determinants on the External Level 
The external system itself provided an ambivalent context for Germany’s 
decisions for participation in EUTM Mali and contribution to AFISMA. On one hand, 
aspirations for a power-political reintegration after the backlash from the nonparticipation 
in Libya, shifts in Germany’s global self-image, perceived implications of the Malian 
crisis on German security, multilateral consensus for a modest military engagement in 
Mali, and a mission framework that set distinct and limited objectives and tasks for the 
forces involved, pulled the federal government to decide for, and the Bundestag to 
approve, a participation of German soldiers.  
On the other, evolutions in the power and security environment, strategic 
approaches in the region, an overall hesitant international community, and existing 
international commitments, disincentivized Germany from assuming a more active role 
within the international crisis response and from contributing with “robust” capacities. 
Within the interlocked three-level framework of German foreign and security policy, the 
latter factors on the external level, therefore, mutually reinforced Germany’s overarching 
domestically motivated hesitancy and risk-averse stance—politically and publicly—
toward the use of military force.    
a. Power and Security Environment 
The power and security environment affected Germany’s decisions for the 
participation in, and contribution to, the military interventions in Mali considerably. 
Discrete conditions and evolutions, however, provided ambivalent impulses, 
simultaneously pulling Germany toward and disincentivizing it from an active (military) 
engagement within the international crisis response. Important among the pulling factors 
was Germany’s aspiration to compensate for its (power)-political isolation after the 
abstention in the UNSC vote on Libya as well as its categorical refusal to participate in 
the subsequent military intervention in the country in 2011. Both the vote and the 
nonparticipation had not only undermined Germany’s credibility as reliable partner, but 
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also had “revealed immediate and long-term political costs” for Germany’s status in 
international affairs and within multilateral institutions.530  
In the aftermath of the disputed Libyan decisions, key German stakeholders 
sought to strengthen Germany’s political position. Federal Chancellor Merkel posited in 
September 2011 that Germany would “know its responsibility in the world” and that its 
interests and values would even “oblige … (Germany) to assume responsibility.”531 A 
stance that she and Defense Minister de Maizière publicly reaffirmed and reemphasized 
amid the worsening security situation in Mali in the autumn of 2012, presenting the 
prospect of Germany’s support for the weakened country.532 
Berlin’s attempts of (power)-political recovery coincided with Germany’s new 
“global governance”-approach, adopted with the governmental “New Players Concept” in 
February 2012,533 suggesting the interpenetration and interrelation between the factors of 
power consideration, national strategies, and conceptions of national role. With this 
concept, Germany acknowledged the massive power shifts in international politics over 
the recent decades toward the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (BRICS). Within an increasingly globalized, interdependent, and multipolar 
world, Germany sought to define its policy and interaction premises in relation to the new 
global actors.534 Hereby, Germany aimed to pursue politics actively, coherently, and 
                                                 
530 Major and Mölling, German Defense Policy in 2014, 7; “Reformulation of Germany’s foreign 
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534 See Jörg Binding and Lukas Kudlimay, “Deutschland: Neue Wege in der Internationalen 
Zusammenarbeit [Germany: New ways in international cooperation],” GIGA Focus, no. 7 (Hamburg: 
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within multilateral institutions.535 Although the document avoided direct association of 
the idea of a “shaping power” with Germany, the conceptual criteria, such as economic 
strength and an importance in designing regional approaches, suggest an evolving 
understanding of Germany’s (power)-political status in international affairs.536  
Two aspects might have further facilitated the resocialization and reorientation of 
Germany’s global power politics. First, Germany’s opening to new actors followed 
directly after the U.S. announcement in early 2012 to “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific 
region. It had forced European states to expand their global networks and to improve 
their capacities in pursuing their (common) interests more efficiently. Second, Germany 
became even embroiled in a more active exercise of its power. In an internationally 
recognized speech in Berlin at the end of November 2011, Poland’s Foreign Minister 
Radek Sikorski made an urgent call to Germany as “Europe’s indispensable nation” that 
it “may not fail to lead.” Instead of fearing German power, he claimed that he began “to 
fear German inactivity.” This was a historically unprecedented appeal that was backed 
during the Munich Security Conference in 2012 by even Israel’s deputy foreign 
minister.537 
In contrast to these pulling conditions, the deteriorating Syrian civil war and the 
sparking Gaza conflict repeatedly reduced the salience of the Malian crisis as an 
immanent security threat for Europe and Germany, despite opposing claims. The fact that 
the Malian crisis was only of secondary importance during the 49th security conference 
in Munich at the beginning of February, just two weeks after the launch of the French 
                                                 
535 Bundesregierung, Globalisierung gestalten [Shape globalization], 6–11. 
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Gestaltungsmacht in der Kontinuitätsfalle [German foreign policy: A shaping power in a continuity trap],” 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte [From politics and contemporary history] 62, no. 10 (März 2012): 6–7.  
537 Radek Sikorski, Poland and the Future of the European Union: Speech by the Foreign Minister of 
Poland Radek Sikorski at a Debate at the German Association for Foreign Policy (Berlin: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., November, 28 2011), https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/
event_downloads/radoslaw_sikorski_poland_and_the_future_of_the_eu_0.pdf; Sandschneider, “Deutsche 
Außenpolitik [German foreign policy],” 6. 
 164 
intervention, supports that assumption.538 Above all, it was Germany’s continuing focus 
on strengthening its economic power base by solving the Eurozone crisis that distracted 
key German stakeholders from pursuing a more active policy toward Mali within 
international institutions. Interlinked with other external and internal factors, as 
demonstrated below, it disincentivized state actors from considering a robust, costly, and 
risky German military contribution. 
b. National Interests and Strategies 
Closely interlocked with the security environment, national interests and 
strategies often had contrasting influence on the decision-making process toward German 
military engagement in Mali. On one hand, European and German security interests drew 
the political and public attention toward the Malian crisis and gave reason for a 
participation of the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, strategic guidelines related to the 
region, however, disincentivized Germany from assuming a more active role in the crisis 
management and from contributing more “robustly.” 
Throughout the public statements and political debates until the decisions for 
participation in EUTM Mali and contribution to AFISMA, the federal government and 
German parliamentarians repeatedly stressed the significance of the steadily worsening 
security, humanitarian, and human rights situation in Northern Mali and its potential to 
both indirectly and directly implicate commonly shared European, and thus, German 
security interests. As early as October 2012, Foreign Minister Westerwelle echoed a 
common conclusion of the EU FAC, arguing that a collapse of North Mali and the 
emergence of terrorist schools would not only “threaten Mali, the region, the North 
African states, but also threaten … (the people) in Europe.”539 The danger for Europe’s 
security posed by state collapse, safe havens for terrorists, and strongholds for organized 
                                                 
538 An important aspect was that the French Foreign Minister and Defense Minister had canceled their 
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crime “on Europe’s doorstep”540 thus became the main theme in the line of argument of 
European and German politicians to justify an external engagement in the West African 
country.541  
Germany’s decisions to help to mitigate commonly shared security concerns 
through the participation in EUTM Mali and contribution to AFISMA militarily, 
therefore laid, as Defense Minister de Maizière pinpointed in March 2013, “in African 
interest, in European interest, and therefore also in German interest.”542 While asking for 
the Bundestag’s approval for the two Bundeswehr mandates, Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle even indirectly resorted in his speech on February 20, 2013, to the famous 
statement of former Defense Minister Peter Struck that “the security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany is defended even at the Hindu Kush.”543 Referring to threats posed 
by the spread of terrorism in Mali, he claimed that Germany’s engagement is required to 
defend “our freedom, our open society, and the way of life in Europe.”544 
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544 Federal Foreign Office, “Rede von Außenminister Westerwelle im Deutschen Bundestag zum 
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Despite affected national interests, however, Germany, alongside its European 
allies and partners, remained hesitant and restrained in getting too actively and too 
strongly involved in a military response to the Malian crisis. Whenever the federal 
government underlined the implications of the crisis in Mali for the region, Europe, and 
Germany’s security, it simultaneously stressed the primary responsibility of the African 
states and regional organizations to respond to it, particularly in the context of envisioned 
combat operations. Defense Minister de Maizière and Foreign Minister Westerwelle 
unison justified Germany’s step back from the first line in the international response by 
arguing that “Germany could not solve the Mali crisis alone” and that external 
(European) actors had “only a limited influence” on the long-term development in 
Mali.545 Instead, Germany and its European counterparts should better “enable the 
Africans” through training and logistic support so that they can provide “their own 
contribution to a stabilization of the Malian North.”546  
Consequently, Germany’s decisions for modest military contributions to Mali 
were not only related to factors on the internal level, such as Germany’s risk aversion, 
culture of military reticence, and sensitivity to an intervention-reluctant public, but also 
were affected by traditional foreign and security policy guidelines for the African 
continent as amplified by several newly issued strategic concepts, such as the 
“Interagency Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal Government toward Fragile 
States”547 and the “Concept of the Federal Government for Africa.”548 As first 
comprehensive governmental strategy for Africa, the 2011 concept manifested 
Germany’s historically rooted restrained approach to the neighboring continent, up front 
stating that given “a realistic assessment of the continent,” Germany’s Africa Policy 
bears in mind that “the people in Africa are primarily responsible for their 
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continent”549—with a particular focus on security affairs.550 The national mandates for 
EUTM Mali and AFISMA directly reflect the federal government’s strategic emphasis to 
favor “African (local) solutions,” to “strengthen African self-reliance,” and to “do no 
harm” to African politics,551 justifying the responsible but limited level of Germany’s 
military engagement in Mali. 
c. Multilateral Integration 
Germany’s multilateral integration also had a significant but ambivalent influence 
on the decisions both whether and how Germany should engage militarily in Mali. Of 
particular importance for Berlin’s decision-making process throughout the evolving crisis 
management were Paris’s role and the French-German relationship. Based on its 
tradition, history, and relationships as a former colonial power in the entire Sahel region, 
France had a strategic interest in Mali.552 These interests explain Paris’s continuing 
attempts to bring the worsening security situation in North Mali into the focus of the 
international community and to push it for a more active and more immediate response. 
Simultaneously, France, however, eschewed unilateral actions, a behavior that had 
alienated many European partners, including Germany, in the Libyan case.553 Instead, 
Paris particularly endeavored to closely involve Berlin as early as possible within the 
intergovernmental consultation process.554 Long before the European Union confirmed 
its plans for a training mission in Mali, both capitals already “stood in close contact 
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regarding potential solutions for the crisis,” as the federal government officially 
confirmed in November 2012.555  
Paris’s inclusive and transparent approach facilitated Merkel’s early assured 
German disposition “to contribute to a supporting mission in Mali, as long as the 
preconditions therefore would be clarified.”556 The revitalized strong German-French 
relationship also explains why Berlin gave “its full support” to Paris’s intervention in 
Mali in January 2013 and why it immediately announced plans to investigate how to best 
assist to France’s efforts.557 Although once again ruling out the deployment of German 
combat troops, the federal government underlined its solidarity with France, publicly 
declaring that it “did not want to ‘leave France alone in this difficult hour.’”558  
Berlin’s solidarity stance toward Paris transformed to the multilateral level and 
magnified Germany’s aspiration to side with its allies and partners because the 
imperatives gradually evolved, particularly on the European level, which set the 
conditions for a modest engagement of European soldiers in Mali. The notable 
interrelation between decisions in Brussels and Berlin suggest that as soon as a consensus 
among European states was manifested in favor of a training and advisory mission in 
Mali, and the more the preconditions for such a mission were set, the more Germany’s 
hesitancy to commit itself to participate with German troops in the mission was reduced. 
In interrelation with Germany’s strategic culture and general risk aversion, 
conversely, the multilateral environment also nourished Berlin’s temporizing stance and 
promoted its predisposition to contribute exclusively with noncombat capacities. Based 
on the persistent institutional, political, and military instability in Bamako after the 
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outbreak of the Malian crisis, international actors, apart from African regional 
organizations and later France, had assumed “a wait-and-see attitude”559 for a long time.  
The reactive, cautious, and restrained approach was particularly evident within the 
EU. First, although acknowledging the implications of an instable Malian North for its 
own security, the EU attributed the primary responsibility in the crisis response to 
African hands, considering itself exclusively in a supportive role.560 Second, by mainly 
focusing on a political solution in Mali, European states persistently refused a 
deployment of their combat forces, nationally or on the EU level (Battle Groups), into the 
country.561 Even in the wake of France’s intervention in January 2013, the European 
community remained unwilling to send “boots on the ground”562 in support of one of 
their partners. Finally, the planning of the EU for a contribution to the crisis was 
considerably slow and constrained. Already having begun to “study” the opportunities of 
training the Malian Army in July 2012563 and to specifically plan for such a mission in 
October 2012,564 the EU had no preconditions set in place after six months of 
preparation, as France launched its intervention.565 At the same time, the envisioned 
mission area was constrained in the safe Malian south, deliberately reducing the threat for 
European soldiers. All aspects suggest to have been related to the EU’s persistent 
challenge in committing itself to Africa.566 
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The EU’s overall hesitancy and reticence allowed the federal government from 
the onset of the international crisis management to defer, to satisfy domestic concerns, 
and to rule out the participation of Bundeswehr soldiers in combat operations in Mali 
without fearing to violate its solidarity with or to isolate itself from its allies and partners. 
The cautious stance of the United States567 as well as the early announcement of the 
African regional organizations that they would assume some responsibility in the fight 
against the jihadist groups in northern Mali, additionally promoted Berlin’s convenient 
position. 
d. Evolution of Military Engagement 
Experiences made during the military engagement in Afghanistan and the status 
of Germany’s military commitments considerably influenced the political thinking in 
Berlin. The calculus for using military force in Mali and considerations about to what 
extent Germany should contribute adequately chiefly caused the effects. Amid the 
preparation for transferring the responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from 
international toward national forces, Berlin had identified two critical lessons568 that 
dominated its strategic narrative toward Mali. Both lessons suggest to have additionally 
nourished Germany’s cultural and strategic foreign and security policy preferences, and 
hence, incentivized Berlin to opt for a limited participation in Mali.  
First, Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s conceded at the Afghanistan Conference in 
Bonn end of 2011 that, despite the long-lasting efforts and heavy losses in Afghanistan, 
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“there is no military solution, there can be only a political solution,”569 precisely 
reflecting one pillar of Berlin’s approach toward Mali one year later. Second, 
Afghanistan also had demonstrated to Berlin’s political elite the importance of 
encouraging regional leadership, strengthening regional security architectures, and 
qualifying local security forces.570 Consequently, whenever the question for Germany’s 
contribution to Mali arose, both the federal government and German parliamentarians 
consistently justified Germany’s (and Europe’s) hesitant stance and limited engagement 
with Africa’s primary responsibility in solving the Malian crisis571—clearly reflecting 
Germany’s preferred strategic approach to the region. Moreover, the lesson should also 
have promoted Germany’s early declaration of willingness and final decision to 
participate in a training mission for the Malian Army and to logistically support 
AFISMA.  
On the other hand, Germany’s ongoing and evolving military engagements in 
international missions also served Berlin as a justification for its limited and only indirect 
support for France’s Operation Serval between January and February 2013. Interlocked 
with the factor of multilateral integration, it helped Berlin to mitigate external and 
domestic criticism, to stress shared responsibilities between allies and partners, and to 
maintain Germany’s comparably minimalistic approach. In a direct reaction to the 
domestic criticism concerning the appropriateness of Germany’s support to France’s 
intervention in Mali, Federal Chancellor Merkel posited that “each country … must 
determine its capacity to contribute without endangering the safety of its soldiers 
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involved in other missions.”572 Merkel, and a few days later also de Maizière, referred 
pointedly to Germany’s ongoing involvement in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, and to the 
recent deployment of German Patriot systems to Turkey, three missions in which France 
was any longer not active.  
At the same time, Merkel argued that the provision of two transport airplanes, 
which should support the deployment of AFISMA forces to Mali, would equal the 
contributions from other European states, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark.573 
While Berlin’s arguments were true, however, the gradual reduction of Bundeswehr 
soldiers in international military missions starting in mid-2012574 had freed capacities, 
both in the Army and the Air Force,575 which would have allowed Germany to support 
France, AFISMA, and finally EUTM Mali more substantially. 
Finally, Berlin’s decision for a participation in EUTM Mali with engineer training 
capacities also must be attributed to the fact that Germany and Mali had maintained 
military relationships for 40 years. Within the framework of an equipment support 
program for foreign forces, since 2007, Germany had even provided Mali with 
decommissioned materiel, most related to river-crossing capacities. Between 2009 and 
2012, the Bundeswehr repeatedly trained Malian forces in Bapho, 140 kilometers 
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northeast of Bamako, in river-crossing skills, the only capabilities that Mali offered as a 
contribution to ECOWAS’ readiness forces.576 
e. Mission Framework 
Magnified by strategic approaches and the Afghan lessons, Germany’s decisions 
to militarily engage in Mali significantly resorted to vital criteria of the mission 
framework in relation to the use of military force, epitomizing Germany’s foreign and 
security policy preferences. With the UNSC Resolutions 2071 and 2085, the decisions of 
the European and EU Foreign Affairs Council, and the two Bundestag mandates, 
Germany’s overarching legal and legitimate framework for the engagement of the 
Bundeswehr in international military actions in Mali was successfully set up. Critically, 
the international mandates carefully differentiated between the training and (support for) 
the combat tasks, a precondition that the federal government had persistently attached to 
the participation of German soldiers577 and actively enforced within the multilateral 
negotiations.578  
The separation of the mandates allowed federal government to “dose”579 the 
national contributions to EUTM Mali, AFISMA, and France based on calculation 
between what was externally required and what was domestically available and 
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affordable. Consequently, it enabled Berlin to condition each of its contributions 
according to vital policy preferences (risk aversion) and domestic constraints (public 
opinion), but without offending multilateral sentiments. 
Closely interlocked with legitimate, interest-related, and value-based causes, the 
simultaneously broadly incorporated and limited designed conceptual frameworks for 
EUTM Mali and AFISMA are suggested to have eased Germany’s decision to opt for a 
contribution with German soldiers. Essentially, all international military efforts were 
embedded within, and hence subordinated to, a comprehensive approach that aimed at 
reestablishing the rule of law, reconciling between the different parties, and guaranteeing 
stability in Mali.580 The priority of such an overarching master plan for peaceful conflict 
resolution, initiated with the approval of the political roadmap by the Malian parliament 
on January 30, 2013, explicitly corresponded with Berlin’s lessons learned from 
Afghanistan and the conviction that the political process, and not military means, were 
vital to sustainably solve the crisis in Mali.581 
Reflecting Germany’s persistent culture of military restraint and risk aversion, the 
limitations set by European and national plans concerning objectives, duration, required 
resources, and risks for soldiers on ground for EUTM Mali582 suggest to additionally 
have increased the likelihood to decide for, and approve, the participation of Bundeswehr 
soldiers in this mission. Despite the provision of the second or third largest contingent to 
the mission during the first mandate up to April 2014, however, it should be noted that 
Germany did not offer capacities for infantry training or force protection, both implying a 
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much more combat-related footprint. Instead, Germany provided engineer training and 
medical capacities,583 acknowledging that the latter included with the construction of a 
military hospital in Koulikoro the most cost-intensive national contribution to the 
mission. Notwithstanding these efforts, it also reflected to a certain extent Germany’s 
persistent military restraint. 
In contrast to the supportive elements of the mission frameworks for Berlin’s 
positive decision, insecurities about the implications of a military intervention in Mali 
and about the questions regarding to what extent Germany’s participation is reasonable, 
feasible, and appropriate, suggest to have influenced Berlin’s decision-making process 
repeatedly. The federal government’s long-lasting caution to commit itself to 
Bundeswehr participation in Mali and to clearly define its actual contribution most 
evidently underlined those aspects.584 Particularly Defense Minister de Maizière 
persistently emphasized the necessity to “first clarify what could be a task for us (the 
Bundeswehr) and what … (the Bundeswehr) needs to fulfill it,” before even considering 
to ask the Bundestag for approval.585  
2. Determinants on the Internal Level 
Determinants on the internal level simultaneously posed diametrical incentives for 
the decision-makers in Berlin whether and how Germany should embark on military 
engagements in Mali. On the one hand, Germany’s culturally embedded military 
restrained and risk-averse stance, electoral considerations, and public sentiments, 
influenced the federal government to rule out any German involvement in combat 
operations early on, to call for a comprehensive approach toward Mali, and to remain 
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cautious in defining Germany’s actual contribution. On the other, strongly felt 
multilateral commitments that were magnified by the power-political backlash from the 
nonparticipation in Libya, an evolving national self-image, a further “normalizing” 
understanding of the use of military force, and bipartisan parliamentary consensus, 
outweighed intervention-related resentments and pushed the federal government to 
decide for, and the Bundestag to approve, an engagement of German soldiers. The 
ambivalent domestic setting also helps to explain why Germany indeed declared its 
solidarity with France after the launch of Operation Serval, but deferred to support its 
partner directly and/or more substantially. Within the interpenetrated three-level 
framework of (German) foreign and security policy, the external level magnified the 
ambivalent conditions on the domestic level, urging key German stakeholders to balance 
between them. 
a. Strategic Culture and Conception of National Role 
Germany’s foreign policy strategic culture and role concept had significant but 
ambivalent influences on the Bundeswehr engagement in Mali. Strongly felt multilateral 
commitments (“never alone”), amplified by nuanced shifts in standards of Germany’s 
self-image and role, decisively promoted the decisions to participate in EUTM Mali, to 
contribute to AFISMA, and to (indirectly) support France. Conversely, Germany’s 
premise of reticence in using force—including a general risk aversion and the preference 
of “politics before force”—found expression in Berlin’s aversion toward combat 
operations, temporizing attitude, focus on a political process, and reasoning for its 
indirect support to France.  
Between 2011 and 2012, one could note a gradual and cautious rethinking among 
the German political elite concerning the Germany’s international role.586 Although the 
process was primarily based on a reflection of Germany’s long-lasting manifested 
economic power and permanent external demands for more German engagement in 
international affairs, Germany’s abstention from the UNSC vote on Libya, however, 
particularly promoted the evolution. Not later than two months after the heavily disputed 
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decision, Defense Minister de Maizière publicly argued that Germany “as rich country in 
the world, as potent country,” should ask itself “whether … (Germany) has to make a 
contribution, as other states too, if that corresponds with the international responsibility” 
and even if “national interests are not immediately threatened.”587 Such a nuanced 
conception of Germany role in the world, appealing for a more active and responsible 
approach while maintaining vital principles of German foreign and security policy, was 
not only echoed by Federal Chancellor Merkel,588 but also found its way in new strategic 
documents. Whereas the Defense Policy Guidelines in 2011 posited Germany as “an 
active member of the international community,”589 the “New Players Concept” 
considered Germany even as a power with aspirations to shape “global governance.”590  
Without making any bid for German leadership, Germany’s shifting self-image 
(particularly among the political elites), therefore, constituted a further step toward a still 
modest emancipation from Germany’s historically rooted self-restraint. Some of its 
supportive effect on the decision for the deployment of German troops to Mali was surely 
reinforced through a changing perception of the role and efficacy of force within 
international affairs by some key German stakeholders, such as Merkel and de 
Maizière.591 As demonstrated in actor-level section, the use of military means gradually 
became understood still as one foreign and security policy instrument among others, but 
one that is important and indispensable, and that should not be categorically ruled out any 
more.  
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Concerning the decisions on Mali, Germany’s heightened sense for responsibility 
suggest to have been manifested in a stronger awareness of its commitments within 
multilateral organizations, thus amplifying Germany’s multilateral-oriented foreign 
policy principle (“never alone”). Given a hesitant and cautious international environment, 
it was most notably Germany’s determination to act accordingly to its own obligations of 
Westorientierung (orientation to the West), alliance solidarity, and conflict resolution 
within multilateral frameworks that steered the federal government to commit itself early 
for, and to finally decide in favor of, a (modest) military participation.  
Sensitized by the harsh international criticism in 2011, Berlin deliberately strove 
to “make up for its hurried and categorical refusal to participate in the international 
operation in Libya.”592 It first became obvious with Merkel’s early (but conditioned) 
announcement end of October 2012 that Germany was willing to participate in a “support 
mission for Mali”593 although no plans for such a mission had been initiated up to this 
moment. The Federal Chancellor’s public pledge stood in stark contrast to Berlin’s 
characteristic restraint in international (and military) affairs. Later, Berlin’s immediate 
declaration of solidarity with France after the launch of Operation Serval594 and 
Westerwelle’s appeal toward the Bundestag parliamentarian at the end of February 2013, 
positing that Germany “must neither abandon the Africans nor the French,”595 clearly 
reflected the aspiration “to be seen (once again) as a reliable partner”596 and the 
willingness to avoid the appearance of choosing a “special path” (Sonderweg) as in the 
Libyan case.597 This assumption remained valid, even if Defense Minister de Maizière 
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still argued in November 2012 that soldiers never could be deployed only based on 
alliance solidarity.598 
In contrast to the elements in favor of a German engagement in Mali, several 
culturally-conceptual qualities suggest to have disincentivized Berlin from a more active 
stance and a more robust contribution. First, Germany’s foreign and security policy key 
premise of “politics before force” took a dominant role in Berlin’s narrative on Mali. 
Closely interlinked with the Afghan lessons and the criteria-related claim for an 
overarching, comprehensive master plan, Berlin persistently emphasized that the 
“political process had priority within … (Germany’s) efforts.”599 Already in a common 
public statement with the UN special envoy for the Sahel region Romano Prodi in 
October 2012, Westerwelle declared that Germany would “seek a political solution of the 
conflict, not a military intervention.”600 The condition that “it cannot give a simple 
military solution (in Mali)” but “vital for the conflict solution in Mali is the political 
process,” constituted an important cultural-normative framework for Berlin’s justification 
to opt for the deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers to EUTM Mali and in support of 
AFISMA in February 2013. Both national mandates made crystal clear that German 
military contributions would be subordinated to a broadly designed support of the 
political process.601  
It also might be the “politics dominance” in German thinking that gave Berlin 
further reason to favor an indirect support to the crisis resolution. Interlocked with the 
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conceptual basis to call for regional approaches, Berlin found satisfaction602 in the 
situation to “only” provide secondary-tier support either for the Malian state by training 
Malian forces or indirectly for France by logistically supporting the AFISMA operation. 
Second, Berlin’s cautious and hesitant attitude toward Mali also can be interpreted 
as an expression of Germany’s domestically motivated “politic of restraint.”603 Although 
early presenting the prospect of German Bundeswehr soldiers in a potential EU training 
mission in Mali, Berlin struggled to define a consistent and unified governmental vision 
about the scope and scale of the Bundeswehr contribution.604 Clearly related to a 
persistently complicated security and power situation in Northern Mali and Bamako—
dragging the federal government between the poles of immediate intervention and 
absence as Defense Minister de Maizière admitted605—Berlin took a wait-and-see-
attitude and did not develop any particular ambitions to bring the planning forward.606 
On February 13, 2013, many weeks after the EU-internal approval of a training mission 
in the country, the Bundeswehr was allowed to send a fact-finding team to Mali to 
reconnoiter and assess the conditions for Germany’s training contributions.607 
Finally, a deeply ingrained risk aversion also influenced the decision making 
toward the use of military force in Mali. Apart from the categorical refusal to become 
involved in combat operations, the attitude was most evident with Berlin’s reluctance to 
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support France’s Operation Serval more actively and more substantially. Experiences in 
Afghanistan or Iraq had shown that supposedly time and capacity limited operations can 
change their nature, enmeshing the participants in prolonged and intensive wars. Berlin, 
therefore, might have feared that “if the French meet more resistance from the Islamists 
than expected, Paris could request additional urgent military support from its 
partners.”608 Once too strongly committed and too actively engaged, the federal 
government would have faced serious challenges to balance between its categorical 
refusal to become directly involved in combat operations and its declared (unlimited) 
solidarity with France. Consequently, to solve the dilemma, Berlin quickly opted for an 
indirect support for France, allowing both to keep its face and to avoid negative 
consequences. 
b. Parliament and Political Contestation 
Even if the federal government’s decisions to categorically rule out combat 
operations in Mali and to only indirectly support France’s Operation Serval raised 
bipartisan parliamentary criticism, the sequence of events suggest that the Bundestag did 
not contest the federal government’s stance. Instead, such domestic political motives and 
considerations as the upcoming parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2013609 and a 
broad public refusal of German involvement in combat operations in Mali seem to have 
broadly streamlined Germany’s political elite—the federal government and all major 
parties in the Bundestag—in favor of a multilateral-incentivized Bundeswehr engagement 
in Mali, but under the clear conditions of a domestically justifiable limited scale. Thus, 
the decisions lend further support to the notion that German foreign and security policy 
toward Mali took place between the poles of external and internal imperatives. 
Until the start of France’s intervention, Mali and Germany’s potential engagement 
in the country did not constitute an issue of an (intensive) political or public discourse.610 
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Only the left-wing party DIE LINKE questioned the federal government in an inquiry 
(Anfrage) end of October 2012 about Germany’s assessment of the security situation in 
the country, plans for and implications of international efforts, and considerations toward 
an engagement of the Bundeswehr.611 The federal government’s repeated public 
assurance in the last quarter of 2012 that a decision for a Bundeswehr engagement had 
not been made at all because several preconditions, such as the separation of mandates, 
still had to be set up and the tasks for German soldiers to be clarified,612 may explain the 
stillness in Germany’s political landscape. By implication, the calm domestic political 
environment could have facilitated and amplified the federal government’s temporizing 
and cautious stance. 
The situation, however, changed with the federal government’s decision mid-
January 2013 to send two airplanes for the deployment of ECOWAS forces to Mali in an 
indirect support to France’s efforts—splitting the Bundestag across factions. Surprisingly, 
the harshest criticism came out of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s CDU. Bundestag 
President Norbert Lammert’s argument that the deployment of two transport airplanes is 
“surely not enough” and could only be understood as “an initial demonstrative signal that 
… Germany would not position oneself as in the case of Libya,”613 was echoed by the 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Rudolf Polenz, who claimed that even if “the 
current help of Germany for Mali is correct,” it should not be constrained by the previous 
commitments.614 Andreas Schockenhoff, deputy parliamentary floor leader of the CDU, 
intensified their criticism, saying that “Germany should not rule out any form of 
participation” in the military operation in Mali.615 Referring to Europe’s Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), SPD defense-policy spokesperson Rainer Arnold 
joined the choir of critics, arguing that a support for France should not be “reflexively 
refused.”616 In contrast, both SDP party leader Sigmar Gabriel and chancellor candidate 
Peer Steinbrück underlined their party’s unwillingness to support a more substantial 
engagement of the Bundeswehr in Mali, refusing any contribution of the Bundeswehr in 
combat operations in Mali.617  
The public, partisan criticism—particularly the claims made by Polenz and 
Schockenhoff—suggest that the federal government either insufficiently or did not at all 
coordinate its decision with the party leaders and important parliamentary institutions. 
The fact that the logistical support constituted a deployment below the “mission-
threshold,”618 could explain the federal government’s behavior. While being indecisive 
about the success of France’s intervention in Mali, the federal government, however, also 
could have decided not to support France with more or robust capacities, exactly to avoid 
asking the Bundestag for approval of a mandate which it did not believe in and which 
risky consequences it feared. A contested or even failed result could have negatively 
affected the outcomes in the upcoming parliamentary elections for the governmental 
coalition. 
In contrast to the criticism related to its support of France, the federal government 
was basically politically uncontested regarding the planned participation of Bundeswehr 
soldiers in EUTM Mali and their support to AFISMA. Consequently, after the 
parliamentary consultation process, both mandates found the Bundestag’s approval on 
February 28, 2013.619 The approval signified a broad political consensus concerning the 
national position that Germany should engage militarily in Mali, but only in a limited, 
modest, or indirect way. 
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c. Public Opinion 
Between the poles of external and internal imperatives, sentiments toward the 
public opinion are suggested to have had a considerable influence on Germany’s 
decisions for both whether and how the Bundeswehr should engage in Mali. The 
argument that German foreign and security policy toward Mali had been “increasingly 
responsive to domestic pressures—or ‘domesticated,’”620 can be made as Berlin’s 
political elite admitted the dependent relationship between German contributions to 
international military missions and public approval. In a speech at the Third Forum for 
Defense Policy in Coblenz on January 19, 2013, Defense Minister de Maizière had 
explicitly expressed that “military missions without the approval of the general public 
will not be sustainable.”621 Drawing a comparison with a rubber band, whereby nobody 
could precisely determine the point of ripping when stretched, de Maizière underlined the 
need of German politics to “create an understanding for the public concerning the 
international situation and Germany’s role” as well as to “justify missions well and 
realistic.”622 
By implication, de Maizière’s remarks implied both a strong sensitivity and 
dependency of German politics to the extent the public agrees with whether and how 
Germany should engage militarily—especially in a year with parliamentary elections. 
Several polls conducted between mid- and end-January 2013,623 asking for the public 
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opinion regarding Germany’s support to France, therefore, gave political elites in Berlin 
the opportunity to assess the general mood of German citizens concerning forms and 
scale of German military engagement in Mali just a few weeks before the vote in the 
Bundestag. Unsurprisingly, all poll results reinforced the federal government’s 
categorical refusal of a participation of Bundeswehr soldiers in combat operations in 
Mali, as only a minority of the respondents favored this option. Instead, while only some 
25 percent ruled out any engagement of the Bundeswehr in Mali, a clear majority of the 
respondents supported Germany’s logistic and medical help for French troops. Given the 
limited and modest nature of the Bundeswehr mandates for EUTM Mali and AFISMA, 
the broad parliamentary approval for both mandates clearly corresponded with the public 
opinion, suggesting to have influenced, or at least facilitated, the calculations of 
Germany’s politicians.  
3. Determinants on the Actor Level 
In the process of mediating between imperatives on the external and internal 
level, key German stakeholders and their characterizing attitudes and preferences suggest 
to have significantly influenced the policy outcomes concerning the Bundeswehr 
engagement in Mali. All three essential key actors in the federal government shared a 
restrained stance toward a deployment of German troops into combat operations in Mali, 
accentuated Germany’s interests in a safe and stable Mali, and emphasized their 
willingness to support the crisis response in the West African country with modest 
capacities as well as within a comprehensive approach under a regional lead.624 The 
federal government’s final decisions to participate in EUTM Mali, to provide indirect 
help for France, and to contribute to AFISMA, however, seemed to most notably resort to 
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Federal Chancellor Merkel and Defense Minster de Maizière’s shared attitudes and 
positions. Both underlined Germany’s aspiration to assume multilateral responsibility and 
had further “normalized” their understanding of the role of military force as a 
subordinately and cautiously used but necessary instrument of German foreign and 
security policy (in Mali). In doing so, they outranked Foreign Minister Westerwelle in his 
culturally-preferred military-averse stance. This was possible because of two major 
reasons. First, Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s authority in designing and enforcing 
German foreign policy—internationally and domestically—had been decisively 
weakened by his harshly criticized attitude amid the Libyan decision.625 Second, Merkel 
and de Maizière were closely connected for years, most recently since 2005 as Merkel 
appointed the then-head of office of the Saxon chancellery (Staatskanzlei) in Dresden as 
federal minister of the chancellery in Berlin. 
Both politicians shared general views on Germany’s role, German foreign and 
security policy, and a rational approach to politics. After Federal Chancellor Merkel’s 
general endorsement of a limited German military engagement, however, Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle and Defense Minister de Maizière most notably communicated 
Germany’s foreign and security policy orientation toward Mali and shaped the political-
public opinion.  
Although Federal Chancellor Merkel maintained a rather modest stance within the 
federal government’s reaction to the Malian crisis, it was her exceptional early (and 
conditioned) statement on October 22, 2012, declaring Germany’s willingness to 
participate in a “support mission for Mali,”626 that predisposed and framed the federal 
government’s principal attitude concerning the questions of whether and how Germany 
should militarily engage in Mali. The fact that many public statements of Westerwelle 
and de Maizière after Merkel’s announcement often focused on aspects of how or how 
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not rather than whether (or why) Germany should embark in international military 
missions in Mali suggest that the Federal Chancellor had used her influence (chancellor 
principle) in determining the general guidelines of German foreign and security policy in 
favor of such an engagement.  
Intensified by the lack of any civilian or military plans for Mali at the moment of 
her statement, Merkel’s rushing ahead, however, decisively contrasted her typical 
“cautious, step-by-step approach.”627 Given Merkel’s immediate attempts for political 
“damage control” after the highly criticized abstention from the vote on Libya,628 her 
advance is suggested to be significantly related to a sensitivity of avoiding another 
political isolation of Germany regarding the engagement of Bundeswehr soldiers in a 
foreign military mission.629 While mitigating between external and internal imperatives, 
Merkel, therefore, seemed to have given Germany’s long-term policy goals (multilateral 
integration), national interests,630 and conceptual policy standards (“never alone”) a 
(conditioned) preponderance over a domestically justifiable and culturally-ingrained 
aversion of using military means.  
In this case, a mélange of several mutually reinforcing foreign and security policy 
attitudes and preferences incentivized Federal Chancellor Merkel’s positive stance 
toward a Bundeswehr engagement in Mali. It included her deeply rooted pragmatic 
approach (Realpolitik),631 a shifting national self-image with an increased sense for 
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Germany’s international responsibility,632 and preference for multilaterally coordinated 
and implemented crisis resolution.633  
Most importantly, Merkel’s evolved personal orientation concerning the relevance 
and efficacy of the use of force in international affairs is suggested to have influenced the 
intra-governmental decision-making process. Already in 2011, the Federal Chancellor 
had publicly acknowledged that “military means cannot and must be excluded as ultima 
ratio”634 and “the use of the Bundeswehr is just an instrument, but even a very important 
and indispensable (one).”635 This attribution of a more nuanced, rational, and balanced—
a “normalizing”—role for the Bundeswehr within German foreign and security policy 
could have facilitated Merkel’s generally positive stance toward an active but limited 
engagement of German soldiers in Mali, and hence, guided the federal government’s 
decision-making process. 
While some of her other policy preferences, such as the “networked approach”636 
and the inclusion as well as the strengthening of regional actors,637 also found expression 
in the federal government’s approach toward Mali, Merkel’s relationship with France’s 
President Hollande638 is suggested to have also helped to coordinate between Paris’s 
requests and Berlin’s ability to support Operation Serval.  
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Foreign Minister Westerwelle and Defense Minister de Maizière had a complex 
and distinct influence on the federal government’s decision-making process. On one 
hand, Westerwelle’s and de Maizière’s positions toward the question how Germany 
should engage in Mali widely concurred in terms of substance.639 Both ministers opposed 
the deployment of German troops for ground combat operations, considered African 
actors as being primary responsible to act, and favored (German) modest military 
engagements that should empower local/regional actors for sustainable self-help.640 On 
the other, however, the foreign minister and the defense minister differed significantly 
regarding their attitudes toward the preconditions of Germany’s involvement, Germany’s 
multilateral responsibility, the role of military force in international affairs, and the 
respectively felt requirement of a modest Bundeswehr engagement in Mali. 
Consequently, with contrasting perspectives and tones, Westerwelle and de Maizière 
mainly determined the design and communication of Germany’s foreign and security 
policy orientation on how or how not Germany should engage militarily, but also 
influenced to a certain extent the decisions on whether Germany should be involved in 
Mali at all. 
Like the Federal Chancellor, a mélange of several mutually reinforcing policy 
orientations and personal attitudes of Defense Minister de Maizière’s indicate to have 
affected the federal government’s decision for, and the public support toward, an active 
but modest Bundeswehr engagement in Mali. First, holding the view that “Germany 
should not overestimate … but also not underestimate (itself),”641 and that “Germany 
must meet its security-policy requirements,”642 de Maizière even actively supported a 
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changing German self-conception,643 calling for a more confident assumption of 
Germany’s (shared) responsibility in international affairs with all available means.  
Second, de Maizière’s characterizing constructive approach in seeking feasible, 
affordable, and implementable solutions suggest to have eased the opportunities for 
Germany to define its military contributions to Mali in coordination with its partners. 
Without pushing ahead or committing Germany hastily, de Maizière always pointed out 
what Germany is willing and capable to do and what preconditions must be fulfilled.644 
In doing so and because of his notable media presence, the German defense minister 
might have had crucial influence on the public opinion—broadly supporting an active but 
restrained engagement of German soldiers in Mali—which facilitated, in turn, the 
approval of the German Bundestag. In addition, it is likely that de Maizière’s status 
outranked Federal Minister Westerwelle’s general risk-averse stance in providing with 
two airplanes, which was considered to be at least indirect support to France’s Operation 
Serval.645  
Most importantly, de Maizière’s matured personal orientation toward the role and 
efficacy of the use of force in international affairs likely contributed to the federal 
government’s decision in favor of a Bundeswehr engagement in Mali. In step with 
Federal Chancellor Merkel, de Maizière had acknowledged already in 2011 that “the use 
of military force can be a political mean to prevent or to contain worse violence.”646 
While sharing Germany’s policy preference to embed military means in a comprehensive 
approach, de Maizière, in contrast to Foreign Minister Westerwelle, therefore, critically 
considered to always condemn military interventions in conflicts and to only call for 
political solutions. Calling for a case-by-case assessment of whether the use of military 
force is needed, affordable, and feasible, de Maizière simultaneously highlighted that the 
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politics also incur blame if it decides against a military intervention, as happened in 
Rwanda or in the Balkans.647 Given the implications of an instable and insecure Mali for 
Europe and Germany’s security as well as the multilateral imperatives, this more rational 
and balanced understanding of the role of the Bundeswehr within German foreign and 
security policy is suggested to have led de Maizière to pursue a positive approach toward 
an active but modest deployment of German soldiers in Mali. 
Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s role in Berlin’s decision making on Mali, in 
contrast, was rather ambivalent. While the federal chancellor and the defense minister 
agreed on his persistent focus on a political solution of the crisis in Mali, as repeatedly 
highlighted in the national mandates for EUTM Mali and AFISMA, he proved to be 
ineffective in enforcing his deeply ingrained attitude “of restraint, what concerns military 
missions”648 within the Mali case.649 Even if the actual engagement of the Bundeswehr 
in Mali remained exclusively limited on training and logistical support, a crucial aspect 
that corresponded with and might even relate to Westerwelle’s preference of a “culture of 
military restraint [as] a constant of German foreign policy,”650 the engagements 
themselves suggest, however, that Westerwelle had only a minor influence on the 
decision whether German soldiers should be deployed.  
Westerwelle’s limited role among the three key stakeholders is owed chiefly to 
his weakened authority after the diplomatic debacle over Libya. Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle had decisively lost credibility651 on both the domestic and international 
stage because of his overemphasized and often unreflected reference to a guiding “culture 
of military restraint,” tending to ignore Germany’s international responsibility. Merkel 
and de Maizière distancing themselves—only slightly and modestly—from a politically 
tarnished foreign minister and his strong refusal of military force in an election year may 
                                                 
647 De Maizière, Internationale Verantwortung wahrnehmen [Exercise international responsibility]. 
648 Westerwelle, “Gaddafi muss weg [Gaddafi has to go away].” 
649 Gebauer and Wittrock, “Germany’s Mali Predicament”; “Germany Abroad”; Monath, 
“Westerwelle und de Maizière [Westerwelle and de Maizière].” 
650 Monath, “Westerwelle und de Maizière [Westerwelle and de Maizière].” 
651 Gebauer and Wittrock, “Germany’s Mali Predicament”; “Germany Abroad”; Monath, 
“Westerwelle und de Maizière [Westerwelle and de Maizière].” 
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also have contributed to Westerwelle’s reduced influence within the decision-making 
process on Mali.  
It became particularly apparent especially amid the tense situation concerning the 
question of whether and how Germany should support France’s intervention in Mali. 
Although Westerwelle kept arguing that the “deployment of German combat troops is not 
an option” and even affronted France at the same time in emphasizing that “Germans are 
highly involved in Afghanistan, where the French are hardly involved at all,”652 only a 
few days later, Germany sent two airplanes to support France’s efforts—even if 
indirectly.  
D. CONCLUSION: MALI—A GERMAN “STANDARD” CASE 
The analysis of the decision-making processes for the closely interlinked 
decisions on whether and how the Bundeswehr participates in EUTM, contributes to 
AFISMA, and supports France in Mali has demonstrated that the policy outcome rests on 
a complex interplay between determinants on the external and internal level as well as the 
role of state actors in mediating in-between them. 
The decisions for the Bundeswehr engagements in Mali are chiefly a result of 
vital, mutually reinforcing pull and push factors on all three levels that outweighed 
domestic or personal resentment concerning the use of military force. Shifting self-
perceptions of Germany’s international responsibility and broad political willingness to 
fulfil bi- and multilateral commitments, particularly after the power-political backlash 
from the nonparticipation in Libya, reinforced Germany’s cultural-conceptual principle to 
implement foreign and security politics within multilateral frameworks (“never alone”). 
Since these multilateral frameworks provided conditions that corresponded with German 
foreign and security policy preferences, such as a comprehensive legitimate foundation; 
shared interests in a more secure and stable Mali; a strong consensus to intervene 
militarily but under the primary responsibility of regional actors and embedded in an 
                                                 
652 Cited in Neukirch and Repinski, “Germany abroad.” For Westerwelle’s general refusal of German 
particiaption in combat operations in Mali, see Jungholt, “Paris ruft [Paris calls]”; Jungholt and Kammholz, 
“Bundesregierung sucht noch eine Strategie für Mali [Federal government still seeks for a strategy on 
Mali]”; “Mali-Mission [Mali mission]”; Neukirch and Repinski, “Germany abroad.” 
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approach that prioritized political means; and a mission framework that imposed limited 
risks, objectives, and capacity requirements, all of these factors incentivized the federal 
government, and at its forefront the federal chancellor and the defense minister, to finally 
decide that German soldiers should participate in EUTM Mali and contribute to 
AFISMA. Widely sharing the federal government’s view on the due necessity to 
modestly support international military efforts in Mali, German parliamentarians not only 
approved the federal government’s decisions, but also contributed to their genesis.  
Conversely, the mélange between other external and internal factors, including 
evolutions in the power and security environment, strategic approaches, an overall 
hesitant international environment, a remaining instable security situation in all of Mali, 
and domestic calculations about ongoing military commitments, elections, and public 
opinion, determined the political considerations on how or how not Germany should be 
engaged militarily in Mali. All of these factors corresponded with and mutually 
reinforced Germany’s persistently salient restraint in using military force, risk-avoiding 
stance, and considerations of domestic politics. They disincentivized Germany from 
assuming a more active role within the international crisis response and from contributing 
with “robust” military capacities. As a result, almost always alongside all other Western 
states except later France, early on Germany ruled out the deployment of combat troops 
into the West African country, used the reference to the responsibility of regional actors 
as pretext for its wait-and-see attitude as well as modest engagement, and remained 
cautious in defining its actual contributions below the level of combat forces. Between 
the poles of external expectations, emerging aspirations, internal constraints, and personal 
preferences, the salience of these factors also explains Berlin’s challenges to quickly find 
suitable and affordable policy options in response to Paris’s requests for support of 
Operation Serval. 
The unfolding of events and factors in relation to the decision-making processes 
for Germany’s military engagements in Mali lead to five major conclusions. First, the 
Malian case demonstrates that the shifts of Germany’s self-conception after the political 
debacle around Libya as well as the “normalizing” understanding of the role and 
relevance of force in international affairs did not result in significant changes in the 
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fundamental attitudes and principles of Germany’s foreign and security policy. On the 
one hand, Germany’s self-image of its statecraft as that of a “shaping power,” as 
understood among Germany’s political elites, and its increased sense of responsibility, 
therefore, were more related to the willingness to share responsibility in common efforts 
for international stability and security as well as to cooperate more closely with 
traditional and new partners. At the same time, Germany carried the burden of the 
shaping of global governance.653 Hence, both aspects strengthened Germany’s axiom of 
policy that exemplifies multilateralism.   
On the other hand, more responsibility and the normalizing understanding of the 
military force’s role were not metonymic—and should not be confused—with an 
increased willingness of German politicians simply to deploy more German troops 
abroad. Little prospect exists of a more robust German footprint in international military 
missions because of the factors analyzed in this study. Instead, such tenets as a restrained 
foreign and security policy approach, particularly when it comes to the use of military 
means, have remained valid in the case under review. 
Second, the Malian case also demonstrates that all shifts did not affect Germany’s 
long-term thinking on, and Germany’s restrained approach toward, Africa. Particularly 
when it comes to security concerns and military engagements on the African continent, 
Germany continued to point out the primary responsibility of local and regional actors in 
dealing with the crisis.654 Despite all documented interests in the region and the 
situationally pronounced security implications of the crisis in Mali, German politicians 
refused a stronger engagement in the country (including the participation in combat 
operations), and instead, called for an active role of, and robust mandate for, the AU and 
ECOWAS. With this restrained stance, German and European attitudes perfectly 
matched. Because even if Africa had been the focus of CSDP operations since 2003, the 
                                                 
653 Bundesregierung, Globalisierung gestalten [Shape globalization], 6–11. 
654 See Bundesregierung, Deutschland und Afrika [Germany and Africa], 5; Auswärtiges Amt, 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, and Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Für 
eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten [For a coherent policy of the 
federal government toward fragile states], 5. 
 195 
actual European (CSDP) engagement on the continent continued to be “under-resourced 
and under-funded, especially in the light of scope and scale of the needs.”655   
Closely interlinked with the former aspect, third, the decisions of whether and 
how Germany should engage militarily in Mali reflects Germany’s continuing paradigm 
to implement its foreign and security policy through and with multilateral institutions—
even if “national interests are not directly concerned.”656 In doing so, the Mali case does 
not provide any evidence to support the claim, as raised by some scholars in relation to 
the German abstentions in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011,657 that multilateral 
institutions have lost their significance on setting the framework for organizing and 
implementing German foreign and security policy in general, and on determining German 
decisions for the use of military force. Instead, it shows that German Africa policy is 
generally a multilaterally—predominantly on European level—embedded and effectuated 
policy.  
Fourth, most importantly, Germany’s decisions on Mali underline that the 
question of how German soldiers will be engaged in a military mission continues to 
significantly affect the political willingness to decide, and the public willingness to 
support, whether the Bundeswehr should be deployed at all. Between the poles of 
Germany’s commitment as a reliable ally and partner and the unchanging reservations 
about the efficacy, success, and costs of foreign military interventions, particularly in war 
or war-like scenarios, the very limited framework for participation in EUTM Mali and the 
contribution to AFISMA in terms of objectives, risks, troops, and resources, therefore, 
definitely eased Berlin’s decision in favor of the engagement.  
Despite Germany’s persistent premise of multilaterally implemented foreign and 
security policy, multilateral imperatives do not necessarily narrow down the federal 
government’s freedom of action while weighing and deciding whether or not Germany 
                                                 
655 Ginsberg and Penska, European Union in Global Security, 67. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Baumann, “Multilateralismus [Multilateralism],” 481–85; Milosevic, “Deutsche Kriegsbeteiligung 
und—verweigerung [German participation and nonparticipation in wars],” 143–44; Oppermann, “National 
Role Conceptions,” 513–14. 
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should be involved in international military missions, as the concept of the 
“multilateralism trap”658 posit. Instead, Berlin’s categorical ruling out of German combat 
troops and focus on a political solution in Mali suggest that in a hypothetical case of a 
“robust” European mission in the country, Germany was likely to decide not to 
participate and would rather convince its partners to contribute with noncombat military 
means.  
Finally, the nature of the decision-making process, the impacts of each single 
factor on the decision, and the interrelated effects between all determinants on the policy 
outcomes suggest that Germany’s military engagements in Mali constitute a “standard 
case,” and hence, mark a return to consistent patterns of German foreign and security 
policy on decisions for whether and how Germany should engage in international military 
missions. The “return” relates to Berlin’s reemphasis on multilaterally framed and 
implemented decisions for the use of force and to its intensified awareness of multilateral 
commitments. As such, the Mali case may be considered as a return to Germany’s 
predictability in international affairs—a departure from former Federal Chancellor 
Schröder or Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s Sonderweg (“special path”). While being 
increasingly willing to share international responsibility, Germany, however, maintained 
its historical-normative risk-averse attitude, a hesitance within the decision-making 
process, a position of military restraint, and its focus on domestic politics. Consequently, 
with reinvigorated multilateral imperatives, the characterizing “inherent 
contradictions”659 of Germany’s foreign and security policy have even increased around 
the decisions on Mali. Germany’s rather expected policy outcome, therefore, can be 
traced back, beside many other factors, to the federal government’s capacity to mitigate 
between the poles of external and internal imperatives and constraints. 
  
                                                 
658 Kaim, “Deutsches Interesse versus Bündnisverpflichtung [German interests versus alliance 
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V. GERMANY: A RESPONSIBLE AND RESTRAINED 
“SHAPING POWER”  
The policy outcomes in the two recent case studies of Libya and Mali lead to four 
important conclusions related to German foreign and security policy and the use of force. 
First, even if Germany’s multilateralism has become more contingent, pragmatic, 
instrumental, or selective over the last decade with the spread of security crises around 
Europe and on the continent of Africa,660 both cases demonstrate that an effective 
multilateralism—the paradigm of “never alone”—is not only “a must”661 for Germany’s 
foreign and security policy “because of … [Germany’s] history and geostrategic 
location,”662 but also remains a key principle in German strategic thought.663 Even the 
Libyan case supports this argument as the rash decision of the federal government in 
2011 to support indirectly the Libyan intervention, following the harsh international 
criticism of German inaction, can be understood as a clear sign of Berlin’s effort to be a 
credible multilateral partner as has been the case for decades. Specifically, Germany will 
seek the dialog and cooperation of the UN, NATO, and EU and continue to organize and 
implement foreign and security policy through and within these multilateral 
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institutions.664 In relation to Germany’s Africa policy, this fact becomes even more 
important, as the new federal government political guidelines of May 2014 regarding 
Africa explicitly stated, that German Africa policy is, and will remain, predominantly 
embedded in an EU-framework.665 The refugee crisis of the spring of 2015 can only be 
expected to add further impetus to such policy. 
Second, in contrast to the argument that the binding power of NATO (and the EU) 
on German foreign and security policy has decreased, this thesis concludes that Germany 
will even need a closer integration into, and cooperation within, multilateral collective 
security and collective defense institutions. This fact is true if Germany wants to gain 
influence among the other powers and beyond666 and to assume a more responsible and a 
more decisive approach to international affairs—particularly when the use of military 
means is concerned amid worsening crises. Given the closely intertwined institutional 
frameworks in NATO and EU and the reduction of national military capacities across 
Europe in the wake of demographic as well as economic straits, the mutual dependencies 
among European states for planning, coordinating, and conducting military operations 
have increased.667 Being evermore dependent on multilateral institutions to pursue its 
(foreign and) security policy, hence, Germany is unable to sustain a position that is blind 
to the external expectations of the European and world powers with which it must exist in 
order to maintain an effective statecraft.  
Yet, third, the “relevance of domestic priorities and societal debates on [German] 
foreign [and security] decision-making processes”668 has further increased as the 
international environment has slid into crisis and as the world economy has also 
reinforced German power amid a public mind that celebrates Swiss ideals as the leading 
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lights of statecraft. Affected by the turmoil of the digital and social media cosmos, 
German policy-makers orientate their calculations to the shifts and twists of domestic 
considerations669 and constraints—particularly public opinion670—when mitigating 
between the poles of external and internal imperatives. Thus, German politics is, as in 
many other states, first and foremost “local,”671 and “voters’ sentiments” affect 
policies.672 This feature of domestic politics of the last two decades today stands in very 
sharp contrast to a deepening security crisis in the Middle East, Africa and now in 
Eastern Europe. 
Finally, fourth, despite the shifts of emphasis between normative axioms and the 
calls for “more substantial” German contributions to international crisis resolution,673 the 
“culture of (military) restraint” remains the most influential imperative for German 
foreign and security policy with its strong grounding in domestic politics.674 Such 
restraint dominates both the public stance toward the missions abroad of the Bundeswehr 
and the strategic calculations within political decision-making. As a result, military 
contributions to such noncombat missions as humanitarian aid, training support, or peace-
keeping/enforcing operations—limited and calculable over all categories—will most 
likely constitute Germany’s foreign and security policy touchstone on the use of military 
force between what is (mainly) externally required versus politically desired and 
indispensable, militarily affordable and feasible, and domestically justifiable. These steps 
constitute the measures of judgment for the political efficacy of German military 
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involvement abroad that will find the broadest acceptance among politicians and the 
German public, as recently confirmed by several public polls.675 Consequently, despite 
the “normalizing” of the role, relevance, and efficacy of the use of military force in 
German foreign and security policy thinking,676 a German “aversion to involvement in 
war-fighting”677 remains, which raises the threshold for sending the Bundeswehr into 
combat operations in comparison with, say, the UK and France. 
Germany’s abstention from the vote on the UNSC Resolution 1973 and from the 
international military mission in Libya in 2011 marked a critical turning point in 
contemporary German foreign and security policy. Throughout the next almost three 
years, as this study shows, not only had the federal government kept emphasizing 
Germany’s commitment for an active and responsible role in international affairs, but 
also Germany’s self-image among the political (and societal) elites had gradually shifted 
as a result. This process culminated at the 50th Munich Security Conference, beginning 
in 2014 at a time of deepening international crisis.  
Such statements by high-level states official that Germany should take “more 
resolute steps to uphold and help shape the [world] order” and “must … be ready to do 
more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades”678 and that 
it should engage in foreign and security affairs “earlier, more decisively, and more 
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substantially,”679 “rattled German self-certainties”680 that have determined the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s orientation and stance in international affairs since 1949. 
A. GERMANY’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN ACTION 
Given the far-reaching experience of Germany’s internationally and domestically 
criticized abstention in Libya, the question remains: how does German military 
engagement in Africa after Libya (and particularly since the beginning of 2014), 
correspond with—and how can it be understood in relation to—Berlin’s stance for more 
responsibility in international affairs? 
A brief look at the evolution of German military presence in Africa up to 2015 
unveils an ambivalent outcome—active, but modest. Apart from the ongoing 
participation in the EU operation for protection of humanitarian aid and antipiracy 
operations at the Horn of Africa (NAVFOR ATALANTA) and in UN peace support 
missions in Sudan (UNAMID), German military personnel were engaged in up to six new 
missions on the African continent since 2011, with four of these six missions still active. 
These include: a) UN peace support mission in South Sudan (since July 2011); b) EU 
training mission (EUTM) and the UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali (since 
February 2013); c) UN Monitoring Mission in West Sahara (MINURSO, since October 
2013); and d) EU training mission in Somalia (reestablished in April 2014).  
Germany’s contribution to the EU peacekeeping mission in the Central African 
Republic (EUFOR RCA) ended in February 2015, shortly before the mission itself was 
closed after 11 months on March 23, 2015.681 In April 2015, Germany also ended its 
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three-year military contribution to the civilian-led EU maritime capacity building mission 
in Somalia (EUCAP Nestor).682 
The comparably large number of missions, however, does not correspond with 
numerous deployments of German soldiers within those missions. As of the end April 
2015, only 200 Bundeswehr soldiers took part in these newly approved missions. Even 
together with the contributions to EUFOR ATALANTA (311) and UNAMID (9), these 
numbers clearly rank below the soldiers deployed in Afghanistan (Resolute Support, 
832), Kosovo (KFOR, 676), and Turkey (Active Fence, 257).683  
Germany’s ambivalence toward crisis resolution in Africa, its willingness to 
participate more actively while simultaneously being restrained in actual contributions 
(hereby, primarily limiting risks for its own soldiers), became particularly evident in three 
instances in the first half of 2014.  
First, against the backdrop of changes in the EUTM Mali mission as well as 
increased security policy challenges on the African continent, the federal government 
sought to adapt Germany’s contributions to the mission in a “suitable” manner in 
preparation of the required new national mandate.684 As a consequence, Berlin raised the 
upper limit set by the parliamentary mandate from 180 to 250 soldiers. Even if Berlin’s 
new approach has led to qualitative improvements of German contributions to the 
mission, for example through the participation of Bundeswehr soldiers in infantry and 
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logistic training685 as well as the through the takeover of several staff-functions 
(Germany is expected to take over the lead of EUTM Mali in August 2015 for 10 
months),686 the quantitative changes came off rather short. Under the limitations set by 
the European force generation process, there are now some 50–60 more German soldiers 
deployed to the West African country than those deployed in the period between 2013 
and 2014.687 In addition to that, a direct support to the Malian Armed Forces and 
MINUSMA, which would expose German (and all other European) soldiers to the threats 
in northern part of Mali, is still excluded. 
Second, in case of Germany’s participation to MINUSMA (the UN follow-up 
operation to AFISMA), technical limitations of the German Transall airplanes but also 
German operational caveats had led the UN to refuse the resumption of Germany’s 
support in the summer of 2014. As a result, less than 10 German soldiers out of the 
previous 130 soldiers are now part of the mission.688 
Third, amid the debates about Europe’s reaction to the crisis in the Central 
African Republic, Germany (again) early and categorically ruled out the deployment of 
German combat troops.689 Instead, Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier argued that 
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Germany should instead focus on the EU training mission in Mali.690 This position 
clearly corresponds, as this study argues, with Germany’s (increasing) preference for 
noncombat operations in Africa and elsewhere. Eventually, Germany decided in April 
2014 to contribute up to 80 German soldiers to the very narrowly designed EU 
peacekeeping operation in the Central African state.691 While Germany provided civil air 
transport and in case of an emergency, air medevac capabilities, de facto, however, less 
than 10 German soldiers were engaged in staff functions in the Force Headquarters 
(FHQ) in Bangui (CAR) and in the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Larissa (Greece). 
B. RESPONSIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY 
In essence, the instances of German military engagement in Africa after Libya 
may not constitute the “substantial shift” as some observers had expected particularly 
after the statements at the Munich Security Conference at the beginning of 2014.692 Their 
ambivalent posture—active but modest—however, corresponds with Germany’s 
understanding of a (more) active and responsible approach in international affairs, 
particularly in relation to Africa and the use of military force. Such a policy plays out 
among three interrelated premises of contemporary German foreign and security policy 
(in Africa): “empower others,” “being responsible,” and “being restrained.”  
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First, in the course of the last decade, “Africa has become gradually but steadily 
part of the routine foreign and security policy business”693 of Germany. The fact that 
Berlin “takes Africa [more and more] seriously”694 relates to the increasing relevance of 
the African continent for Germany (and Europe) in terms of chances and challenges as 
strategically acknowledged with the two governmental concepts in 2011 and in 2014.695 
Under the comprehensive and networked approach of Germany’s Africa policy—
embedded in an EU framework696—the primary aim of Germany’s security policy 
engagement in Africa, however, remains to strengthen “African self-reliance through the 
empowerment of African partners for successful crisis prevention and effective crisis 
reaction.”697 In doing so, Germany’s preference of “African solutions for African 
problems” coalesces with an overarching tenet of German foreign and security policy that 
seeks to “make others fit to assume responsibility for security in their own regions.”698  
                                                 
693 Tull, Deutsche Afrikapolitik [German Africa policy], 1; Corina Schuhkraft, “Die Afrikapolitik 
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“Schlussfolgerungen,” 77.  
694 Speech by Roderich Kiesewetter in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht: 
Plenarprotokoll 18/30 [Stenographic Record: Plenary Protocol 18/30], 2532.  
695 Bundesregierung, Deutschland und Afrika [Germany and Africa], 5–16; Bundesregierung, 
Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung [Political Guidelines of the Federal Government Regarding 
Africa], 1–4. 
696 Bundesregierung, Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung [Political Guidelines of the 
Federal Government Regarding Africa], 12–13.  
697 Ibid., 14; Dagmar Dehner, Ulrike Scheffer, and Michael Schmidt, “Was mehr deutsche Soldaten in 
Afrika ausrichten können [What more German soldiers could achieve in Africa],” Der Tagesspiegel, 
January 28, 2014, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/auslandseinsaetze-der-bundeswehr-was-mehr-
deutsche-soldaten-in-afrika-ausrichten-koennten/9392336.html.  
698 Ursula von der Leyen, Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, on 




Consequently, Germany’s deployments in, and emphasized focus on, the EU 
training missions in Mali and Somalia not only clearly reflect Berlin’s security policy 
premise of “empower others,” but also constitute the level of (military) engagement that 
is considered as being responsible, and hence, as (mainly) externally required, politically 
desired and indispensable, militarily affordable and feasible, and domestically justifiable. 
Apart from not being politically intended and supported in society, therefore, a more 
substantial German military engagement in Africa, particularly if it comes to combat 
operations, cannot be reasonably expected by commentators on world affairs. With a 
clear focus on EU frameworks and a restrained stance toward the use of military means, 
Berlin’s security policy in Africa also reflects and continues Germany’s two axioms of 
foreign and security policy. Thus, Germany’s general thinking and action concerning 
security affairs in relation to the African continent will not shift considerably in the near 
future, if no significant threat emerges and if there is no change in the multilateral 
environment, particularly a strong consensus among the EU member states, that 
acknowledges the need for a more active policy and a more substantial engagement on 
the African continent. The advent of the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean will pose a 
test to this generalization, for certain, but the weight of policy analyzed in this study 
cannot be made to vanish in a day or a week. 
Second, Germany’s aspiration to “shoulder greater responsibility, to make 
contributions, [and] to take actions”699 should neither be confused with a unilateral or 
dominant stance in international affairs nor be misunderstood with an increased 
likelihood to deploy more soldiers abroad or with the greater acceptance of “tough 
military actions,” as high-level German politicians and parliamentarians have repeatedly 
emphasized.700 Instead, “being [more] responsible” implies three major considerations. It 
means, at first, to better share responsibility.701 Such a sharing of responsibility in 
                                                 
699 Von der Leyen, Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, 2–3. 
700 Gauck, Germany’s Role in the World, 6; Mützenich, “Gemeinsame Erklärungen reichen nicht aus! 
[Joint declarations are not enough!];” Von der Leyen, Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, 3.  
701 Gauck, Germany’s Role in the World, 7. See also De Maizière, Internationale Verantwortung 
wahrnehmen [Exercise international responsibility]; Von der Leyen, Speech by the Federal Minister of 
Defense, 3. 
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collective security and collective defense encompasses a means to help shape global 
governance and to influence international (security) affairs through a deepened 
cooperation with traditional and new partners and allies.702 Beyond doubts about such 
policies, such statecraft includes the principle not to “refrain from anything”703 or “to 
sight tight,”704 but to act if deemed indispensable by makers of policy, to adhere to the 
commitments made among partners, and to be aware of the consequences of inactivity on 
Germany’s standing in the international system and upon the human ideals that underlie 
German statecraft in Europe and beyond. The fact that Germany has actively contributed, 
on a larger and smaller scale, to all major EU CSDP military missions in Africa after 
Libya or to the international efforts in combating the Ebola epidemic in West Africa 
reflects this one facet of a heightened sense of responsibility that has arisen out of the 
cases examined here in this study. 
In addition, based on “more [German] power and influence,”705 “being 
responsible” also means for Germany to be ready and capable to lead, an unaccustomed 
role that is nonetheless made necessary for the changing international system and its 
crisis laden multipolarity. The type of leadership Germany is prepared to exercise, 
however, is not to storm ahead or to dictate the multilateral decision-making process as 
done by others or as done in the past by another generation of Germans. Instead, it stands 
for leading among and through the close cooperation with others, by enabling “others 
with less resources to make their vital contributions as equal partners,” and by having 
“the will and capacity to act.”706 Germany’s nuanced understanding of leadership in 
policy and security has found expression in Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen’s 
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motto of “leadership from the center,”707 raised at the 51st Munich Security conference 
in February 2015—a play on German international and domestic politics of the 
geographical center, but also an ideological center at the same time. Germany’s close 
embedment in the planning processes for the EU missions in Africa and the envisioned 
takeover of the lead of EUTM-Mali beginning in August 2015 can be taken as evidence 
for such a commitment to lead within the ranks of others and not from atop the structure. 
Clearly, Berlin’s current efforts to bring the Bundeswehr armaments and equipment into 
shape after decades of underinvestment or hard service in distant climes also underlines 
Germany’s appreciation that responsibility and leadership undoubtedly need resources of 
power to ensure that feasible deeds in support of policy can follow good intentions that 
echo well in public opinion. 
“Being responsible” also means that Germany seeks to actively prevent crises in 
Africa and elsewhere and always encounter them with all instruments of politics, instead 
focusing on a single means that is blind to actual conflict.708 In doing so, Germany 
continues to promote a comprehensive and networked approach, in which military means 
can—but not must—play a necessary role—as Berlin has emphasized for the crisis 
resolution in Mali. 
C. GERMAN RESTRAINT 
Interconnected with Germany’s strategic understanding of “being responsible” is 
the tenet of “being restrained.” While such a policy of checks and balances matters for 
Germany’s general appearance in international affairs, it mainly relates to the use of 
military force. In the face of a persistently evolving security environment over the last 
two decades, Germany’s understanding of the role, relevance, and efficacy of military 
means has “normalized.” Instead of either the categorical ruling out of any use of military 
force (not only in war or war-like scenarios) or merely regarding it exclusively as a last 
resort when all other options have failed,709 military means now possess a more rational, 
                                                 
707 Von der Leyen, Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense. 
708 Mützenich, “Gemeinsame Erklärungen reichen nicht aus! [Joint declarations are not enough!]”; 
Bell et al., “Früher, entschiedener und substanzieller? [Earlier, more decisive, and more substantial?],” 6. 
709 Federal Ministry of Defense, Bundeswehr on Operations, 48. 
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constructive, and balanced role within Germany’s foreign and security policy thought. 
Defense Minister de Maizière’s statements in February 2013 pinpointed this emerging 
realism. While acknowledging that the military is not a sole solution for new threats and 
conflicts, he argued that 
the military but can contribute to permanent stability and security, 
sometimes and in particular situations even the only one. And the politics 
sometimes can only be successful with the help of the military. We need 
sometime both: military means, to establish security, and political means, 
to maintain security and foster peace. There is no development without 
security and no security without development.710 
At the same time, the Bundeswehr has conceptually and structurally evolved over 
the last two decades as an “armed forces on operations,” which is to say, a force that can 
be deployed by its nation, like other NATO armies, engaged in operations in the field far 
from home that may or may not include combat on a limited scale. 
While all reasonable observers of policy came increasingly to acknowledge the 
potential benefits (and risks) of military means in international affairs, neither the 
aspirations for more responsibility nor a normalizing understanding of the role of military 
force imply a wholesale dissolution in Germany of boundaries and constraints in actually 
using military force. Thus, these developments did not lead—and will not lead—to a 
“militarization” of German foreign and security policy, as some German critics of the 
recent past have postulated otherwise with an exaggeration that is also typical of war and 
peace in German domestic politics.711 Such a shift would manifest itself in a stronger 
focus on military force as a favorable means in crisis resolution, an acceptance of greater 
risks and consequences of deploying German soldiers, and an increase in deployments of 
German troops abroad or in a more robust posture in international military missions. 
Nowhere in the real world of Germany in 2015 do such phenomena even remotely exist. 
Conversely, Germany’s normative imperative of “being restrained” concerning 
the use of force, grounded in the “lessons of the past,” the political desire to avoid risks, 
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the preference for comprehensive approaches to crisis resolution, and the public 
skepticism toward military means remained widely intact. Thus, Germany adheres to 
principles of employing military means on a proportional scale, for clearly defined 
purposes, and under the conditions they are “imperative and indispensable.”712 The 
premise of “being restrained” found expression in Germany’s military engagement in 
Africa since 2011 through the refusal of participations in combat operations (Libya, Mali, 
and Central African Republic), the struggle to define actual military contributions, the 
preference of civilian instruments, the focus on missions with limited employments of 
military means, and the overall modest German military presence throughout the 
missions.  
D. REFLECTIONS 
Clearly, the mixed and ambivalent outcomes of German military engagement in 
Africa since 2011 add one piece to the much larger picture of Germany’s ongoing 
struggle to “flesh out the details”713 of what taking greater responsibility as well as 
contributing to international affairs earlier, more decisively, and more substantially, 
entails for the different policy areas but particularly for the use of military force as an 
instrument of German foreign and security policy. Until then, the simultaneous salience 
of the two principles of “being responsible” and “being restrained” is expected to 
repeatedly create tensions, and hence, challenges for state actors to find a balance 
between what is externally (mainly) required versus what is politically desired and 
indispensable, militarily affordable and feasible, and domestically justifiable. 
Yet, in contemporary German strategic thinking on the use of military force, 
neither is “being restrained” metonymic with “refrain from anything,” nor is “being 
responsible” the same as “willing to do everything.” Germany can be responsible and 
restrained at the same time—without dissolving boundaries or overemphasizing 
normative constraints. Instead, both premises must be understood as two sides of the 
same coin, mutually dependent, characterizing the dual nature of contemporary German 
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foreign and security policy—particularly in relation to the use of military force—as 
Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen echoed in February 2015 a statement of then-
Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière in May 2011:714 
Germany is virtually condemned to play an increasingly important part. 
Well, this is true. With a sense of proportion. With the courage to act, but 
with humility in action. Committed to our security interests, our 
humanitarian obligation and our historic responsibility.715 
Eventually, in foreseeable future, Germany will remain a responsible and 
restrained shaping power—for the good reasons of both of these ideals of statecraft when 
measured against the dangers of neglecting such principles in the past and present.   
                                                 
714 De Maizière, “Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr entschieden [Reorientation of the Bundeswehr 
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APPENDIX 
Overview of out-of-area missions and respective contributions of the 
Bundeswehr, as of 2011.716 
 
                                                 
716 “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr 2011 [Mission Abroad of the Bundeswehr 2015],” CRP-
Infotec, updated February 23, 2015, http://www.crp-infotec.de/05sipo/bundeswehr/grafs/
mil_ausland_2011.gif.  
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Overview of out-of-area missions and respective contributions of the 
Bundeswehr, as of March 7, 2013.717 
 
  
                                                 
717 “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Stand 7. März 2013 [Mission Abroad of the Bundeswehr: As 




Overview of out-of-area missions and respective contributions of the 
Bundeswehr, as of February 1, 2015.718 
 
  
                                                 
718 “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr 2015 [Mission Abroad of the Bundeswehr 2015],” CRP-
Infotec, updated February 23, 2015, http://www.crp-infotec.de/05sipo/bundeswehr/grafs/
mil_ausland_aktuell.gif. 
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Overview of out-of-area missions and respective contributions of the 
Bundeswehr, as of May 18, 2015.719 
 
Strength of the German Mission Contingents 
   Mission Area Strength 
   Resolute Support Aghanistan, Uzbekistan 839 
KFOR Kosovo 697 
Active Fence Turkey 254 
UMISS South Sudan 16 
UNAMID Sudan 9 
Operation Active Endeavour 
(OAE) Mediterranean Sea 184 
UNFIL Libanon 144 
EUTM Mali Mali 162 
MINUSMA Senegal, Mali 8 
Atalanta Horn of Africa 305 
EUTM SOM Somalia 8 
Training Support Iraq Iraq 80 
   
Further Missions and Support  
   Mission Area Strength 
   UNAMA Afghanistan 3 
STRATAIRMEDIVAC  Germany 41 
MINURSO West Sahara 4 
  
 
Total of German soldiers engaged in missions abroad 2756 
 
                                                 
719 “Einsatzzahlen.” 
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